command became known. Every delay diminished the chances of surprising the enemy, and increased the probability of his being reënforced. Had the attack been made a day sooner, not only would Buell's army have been absent, but there would have been no prospect of their timely arrival; and who can measure the moral effect this would have produced? It would be useless to review the controversies as to who was responsible for the confusion and consequent detentions on the march, the evil

1862]

WAR CALLED A FICKLE GODDESS.

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of which might have been greater if the vigilance of the enemy had been equal to his self-sufficiency.

War has been called a fickle goddess, and its results attributed to chance. The great soldier of our century said, "Fortune favors the heavy battalions"; but is it not rather exact calculation than chance which controls the events of war, and the just determination of the relation of time, space, and motion in the application of force, which decides the effective weight of battalions? Had the battle of Shiloh opened a day sooner, it would have been better; had it been postponed a day, to attack then would have been impracticable. Had the several columns moved on different roads, converging toward the field of battle, the movements of some could not have been obstructed by others, so that the troops would have been in position and the battle have been commenced on Saturday morning. The programme and purpose of General Johnston appear from his dispatch of the 3d, and from the disappointment evinced by him at the failure of a portion of the command to be present on the field on the morning of the 5th (Saturday), as he expected.

General Bragg, in a monograph on the battle of Shiloh, says:

In a discussion of the causes

"During the afternoon of the 5th, as the last of our troops were taking position, a casual and partly accidental meeting of general officers occurred just in rear of our second line, near the bivouac of General Bragg. The Commander-in-Chief, General Beauregard, General Polk, General Bragg, and General Breckinridge, are remembered as present. of the delay and its incidents, it was mentioned that some of the troops, now in their third day only, were entirely out of food, though having marched with five days' rations. General Beauregard, confident our movement had been discovered by the enemy, urged its abandonment, a return to our camps for supplies, and a general change of programme. In this opinion no other seemed fully to concur; and when it was suggested that the enemy's supplies were much nearer, and could be had for the taking, General Johnston quietly remarked, 'Gentlemen, we shall attack at daylight to-morrow." The meeting then dispersed upon an invitation of the commanding general to meet at his tent that evening. At that meeting a further discussion elicited the same

views, and the same firm, decided determination. The next morning, about dawn of day, the 6th, as the troops were being put in motion, several generals again met at the camp-fire of the generalin-chief. The discussion was renewed, General Beauregard again expressing his dissent; when, rapid firing in the front indicating that the attack had commenced, General Johnston closed the discussion by remarking: The battle has opened, gentlemen; it is too late to change our dispositions.' He prepared to move to the front, and his subordinates promptly joined their respective commands, inspired by his coolness, confidence, and determination. Few men have equaled him in the possession and display, at the proper time, of these great qualities of the soldier."

The results of the first day of the famous battle thus begun are very summarily presented in the following brief report of General Beauregard :

"At 5 A. M., on the 6th instant, a reconnoitering party of the enemy having become engaged with our advanced pickets, the commander of the forces gave orders to begin the movement and attack as determined upon, except that Trabue's brigade of Breckinridge's division was detached and advanced to support the left of Bragg's corps and line of battle then menaced by the enemy; and the other two brigades were directed to advance by the road to Hamburg to support Bragg's right; and at the same time Maney's regiment of Polk's corps was advanced by the same road to reënforce the regiment, of cavalry and battery of four pieces, already thrown forward to watch and guard Grier's, Tanner's, and Borland's Fords of Lick Creek.

"Thirty minutes after 5 A. M., our lines and columns were in motion, all animated evidently by a promising spirit. The front line was engaged at once, but advanced steadily, followed in due order, with equal resolution and steadiness, by the other lines, which were brought successively into action with rare skill, judg ment, and gallantry by the several corps commanders, as the enemy made a stand with his masses rallied for the struggle for his encampments. Like an Alpine avalanche our troops moved forward, despite the determined resistance of the enemy, until after 6 P. M., when we were in possession of all his encampments between Owl and Lick Creeks but one; nearly all of his field-artillery, about thirty flags, colors, and standards, over three thousand pris

1969]

IT WAS THAT ONE ENCAMPMENT.

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oners, including a division commander (General Prentiss), and several brigade commanders, thousands of small-arms, an immense supply of subsistence, forage, and munitions of war, and a large amount of means of transportation, all the substantial fruits of a complete victory-such, indeed, as rarely have followed the most successful battles, for never was an army so well provided as that

of our enemy.

"The remnant of his army had been driven in utter disorder to the immediate vicinity of Pittsburg, under the shelter of the heavy guns of his iron-clad gunboats, and we remained undisputed masters of his well-selected, admirably provided cantonments, after our twelve hours of obstinate conflict with his forces, who had been beaten from them and the contiguous covert, but only by the sustained onset of all the men we could bring into action."

There are two words in this report which, if they could have been truthfully omitted, it would have been worth to us the surrender of all the substantial fruits of a complete victory." It says: "Our troops moved forward, despite the determined resistance of the enemy, until after 6 P. M., when we were in possession of all his encampments between Owl and Lick Creeks but one." It was that "one" encampment that furnished a foothold for all the subsequent reënforcements sent by Buell, and gave occasion for the final withdrawal of our forces; whereas, if that had been captured, and the "waters of the Tennessee" reached, as General Johnston designed, it was not too much to expect that Grant's army would have surrendered; that Buell's forces would not have crossed the Tennessee; but with a skillful commander, like Johnston, to lead our troops, the enemy would have sought safety on the north bank of the Ohio; that Tennessee, Kentucky, and Missouri would have been recovered, the Northwest disaffected, and our armies filled with the men of the Southwest, and perhaps of the North

west also.

Let us turn to reports and authorities. The author of “The Life of Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston" says:

"Of the two armies, one was now an advancing, triumphant host, with arm uplifted to give the mortal blow; the other, a

broken, mangled, demoralized mob, paralyzed and waiting for the stroke. While the other Confederate brigades, which had shared most actively in Prentiss's capture, were sending back the prisoners and forming again for a final attack, two brigades, under Chalmers and Jackson, on the extreme right, had cleared away all in front of them, and, moving down the river-bank, now came upon the last point where even a show of resistance was made. Being two very bold and active brigadiers, they at once closed with the enemy in their front, crossing a deep ravine and difficult ground to get at him. Here Colonel Webster, of Grant's staff, had gathered all the guns he could find from batteries, whether abandoned or still coherent, and with stout-hearted men, picked up at random, had prepared a resistance. Some infantry, similarly constituted, had been got together; and Ammen's brigade, the van of Nelson's division of Buell's corps, had landed, and was pushing its way through the throng of pallid fugitives at the landing to take up the battle where it had fallen from the hands of Grant and Sherman. It got into position in time to do its part in checking the unsupported assaults of Chalmers and Jackson."

General Chalmers, describing this final attack in his report,

says:

"It was then about four o'clock in the evening, and, after distributing ammunition, we received orders from General Bragg to drive the enemy into the river. My brigade, together with that of Brigadier-General Jackson, filed to the right and formed facing the river, and endeavored to press forward to the water's edge; but in attempting to mount the last ridge we were met by a fire from a whole line of batteries, protected by infantry and assisted by shells from the gunboats."

In a subsequent memorandum General Chalmers writes:

"One more resolute movement forward would have captured Grant and his whole army, and fulfilled to the letter the battleplan of the great Confederate general, who died in the belief that victory was ours. ."-("The Life of Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston," p. 637.)

Brigadier-General Jackson, in his report, says: