1863]

YIELDED ALONG THE WHOLE LINE.

433

the battle, but in the first operations the troops so frequently moved to the assault without the necessary cohesion in a charging line, that nearly all early assaults by our right wing were successively repulsed with loss. Though at first invariably successful, our troops were subsequently compelled to retire before the heavy reënforcements rapidly brought forward.

Wheeler with his cavalry struck boldly at the enemy's extreme right and center, and with such effect that, in the Federal battle reports, it appears the attack was mistaken for a flank movement by General Longstreet.

Rosecrans having transferred his main strength to our right, the attack of the left met with less resistance, and was successfully and vigorously followed up. About 4 P. M. a general assault was made by the right, and the attack was pressed from right to left until the enemy gave way at different points, and, finally, about dark, yielded along the whole line. Our army bivouacked on the ground it had so gallantly won. The foe, though driven from his lines, continued to confront us when the action closed. But it was found the next morning that he had availed himself of the night to withdraw from our front, and that his main body was soon in position within his lines at Chattanooga. We captured over eight thousand prisoners, fifty-one pieces of artillery, fifteen thousand stand of small arms, and quantities of ammunition, with wagons, ambulances, teams, and medicines with hospital stores in large quantities. From the appearance of the field the enemy's losses must have largely exceeded ours, and the victory was complete; but these results could not console us for the lives they cost. Pride in the gallantry of our heroes, rejoicing at the repulse of the invader, was subdued by the memory of our fallen brave.

After General Rosecrans's retreat to Chattanooga, he withdrew his forces from the passes of Lookout Mountain, which covered his line of supplies from Bridgeport. These commanding positions were immediately occupied by our troops, and a cavalry force was sent across the Tennessee, which destroyed a large wagon-train in the Sequatchie Valley, captured McMinnville and other points on the railroad, and thus temporarily cut off the source of supplies for the army at Chattanooga.

The reasons why General Bragg did not promptly pursue are stated in his report thus:

"Our supplies of all kinds were greatly reduced, the railroad having been constantly occupied in transporting troops, prisoners, and our wounded, and the bridges having been destroyed to a point two miles south of Ringgold. These supplies were ordered to be replenished, and, as soon as it was seen that we could be subsisted, the army was moved forward to seize and hold the only communication the enemy had with his supplies in the rear. His important road, and the shortest by half to his depot at Bridgeport, lay along the south bank of the Tennessee. The holding of this all-important route was confided to Lieutenant-General Longstreet's command, and its possession forced the enemy to a road double the length, over two ranges of mountains, by wagon transportation. At the same time, our cavalry, in large force, was thrown across the river to operate on this long and difficult route. These dispositions, faithfully sustained, insured the enemy's speedy evacuation of Chattanooga for want of food and forage."

These reverses caused the enemy to send forward reënforcements from the army at Vicksburg, and also to assign As early as General Grant to the command in Tennessee.

September 23d the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps of the Army of the Potomac were detached, and sent under General Hooker to Tennessee, and assigned to protect Rosecrans's line of communication from Bridgeport to Nashville. It was on October 23d that General Grant arrived at Chattanooga, and only in time to save their army from starvation or evacuation. The investment by General Bragg had been so close and their communications had been so destroyed that Bragg was on the point of realizing the evacuation of Chattanooga, which he had anticipated. The report of Grant thus describes the situation on his arrival:

"Up to this period our forces in Chattanooga were practically invested, the enemy's lines extending from the Tennessee River, above Chattanooga, to the river at and below the point of Lookout Mountain, below Chattanooga, with the south bank of the river picketed nearly to Bridgeport, his main force being fortified

18631

ALMOST CERTAIN ANNIHILATION.

435

in Chattanooga Valley, at the foot of and on Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain, and a brigade in Lookout Valley. True, we held possession of the country north of the river, but it was from sixty to seventy miles over the most impracticable roads to army supplies.

"The artillery horses and mules had become so reduced by starvation that they could not have been relied upon for moving anything. An attempt at retreat must have been with men alone, and with only such supplies as they could carry. A retreat would have been almost certain annihilation, for the enemy, occupying positions within gunshot of and overlooking our very fortifications, would unquestionably have pursued retreating forces. Already more than ten thousand animals had perished in supplying half rations to the troops by the long and tedious route from Stevenson and Bridgeport to Chattanooga over Waldron's Ridge. They could not have been supplied another week."

The first movement under Grant was, therefore, to establish a new and shorter line of supplies. For this purpose a night expedition was sent down the river from Chattanooga, which seized the range of hills at the mouth of Lookout Valley, and covered the Brown's Ferry road. By 10 A. M. a bridge was laid across the river at the ferry, which secured the end of the road nearest to our forces and the shorter line over which the enemy could move troops. General Hooker also entered Lookout Valley at Wauhatchie, and took up positions for the defense of the road from Whiteside's, over which he had marched, and also the road leading from Brown's Ferry to Kelly's Ferry. General Palmer crossed from the north side of the river opposite Whiteside's, and held the road passed over by Hooker. An unsuccessful attack was made on a portion of Hooker's troops the first night after he entered the valley. Subsequently, we lost the remaining heights held by us west of Lookout Creek.

Further operations of the enemy were delayed until the arrival of Sherman's force from Memphis. After his arrival, on November 23d, an attempt was made to feel our lines. This was done with so much force as to obtain possession of Indian Hill and the low range of hills south of it. That night

Sherman began to move to obtain a position just below the mouth of the South Chickamauga, and by daylight on the 24th he had eight thousand men on the south side of the Tennessee, and fortified in rifle-trenches. By noon pontoon-bridges were laid across the Tennessee and the Chickamauga, and the remainder of his forces crossed. During the afternoon he took possession of the whole northern extremity of Missionary Ridge nearly to the railroad-tunnel, and fortified the position equally with that held by us. A raid was also made on our line of communication, cutting the railroad at Cleveland. On the same day Hooker scaled the western slope of Lookout Mountain. On the 25th he took possession of the mountain-top with a part of his force, and with the remainder crossed Chattanooga Valley to Rossville. Our most northern point was assailed by Sherman, and the attack kept up all day. He was reënforced by a part of Howard's corps. In the afternoon the whole force of the enemy's center, consisting of four divisions, was moved to the attack. They got possession of the rifle-pits at the foot of Missionary Ridge, and commenced the ascent of the mountain from right to left, and continued it until the summit was reached, notwithstanding the volleys of grape and canister discharged at them. Our forces retreated from the ridge as the multitudinous assailants neared the thin line on the crest, and during the night General withdrew from the positions on the plain below. Grant, after advancing a short distance from Chattanooga, dispatched a portion of his forces to the relief of Burnside in East Tennessee, where he was closely besieged by General Longstreet in Knoxville. Longstreet moved east into Virginia, and ultimately joined General Lee. He had left the army of General Lee, and moved to the West with his force, on the condition that he should return when summoned. This summons had been sent to him. The loss of the enemy in the conflicts at Chattanooga was 757 killed, 4,529 wounded, and 337 missing; total, 5,616. Our loss in killed and wounded was much less than theirs.

18637

THE OBJECTIVE POINT OF THE WAR.

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CHAPTER XLI.

Movement to draw forth the Enemy.-Advance to Culpeper Court-House.-Cavalry Engagement at Beverly's and Kelly's Fords.-Movement against Winchester.-Milroy's Force captured.-Prisoners.-The Enemy retires along the Potomac.-Maryland entered.-Advance into Pennsylvania.-The Enemy driven back toward Gettysburg.-Position of the Respective Forces.-Battle at Gettysburg. -The Army retires.-Prisoners.-The Potomac swollen.-No Interruption by the Enemy. Strength of our Force.-Strength of the Enemy.-The Campaign closed.-Observations.-Kelly's Ford.-Attempt to surprise our Army.-System of Breastworks.-Prisoners.

In the spring of 1863 the enemy occupied his former position before Fredericksburg. He was in great strength, and, so far as we could learn, was preparing on the grandest scale for another advance against Richmond, which in political if not military circles was regarded as the objective point of the war. The consolidated report of the Army of the Potomac, then under the command of Major-General Hooker, states the force present on May 10, 1863, to be 136,704.

General Lee's forces had been reorganized into three army corps, designated the First, Second, and Third Corps. In the order named, they were commanded by Lieutenant-Generals Longstreet, Ewell, and A. P. Hill.

The zeal of our people in the defense of their country's cause had brought nearly all of the population fit for military service to the various armies then in the field, so that but little increase could be hoped for by the Army of Northern Virginia. Under these circumstances, to wait until the enemy should choose to advance was to take the desperate hazard of the great inequality of numbers, as well as ability to reënforce, which he possessed. In addition to the army under General Hooker, a considerable force occupied the lower part of the Valley of the Shenandoah.

It was decided by a bold movement to attempt to transfer hostilities to the north side of the Potomac, by crossing the river and marching into Maryland and Pennsylvania, simultaneously driving the foe out of the Shenandoah Valley. Thus,