1862] BETWEEN THE HOSTILE HOSTS. 367 up a few of the most available of his victorious brigades and turned upon the lesser. On May 3d Sedgwick's force was encountered near Salem Church, and its further progress checked by General McLaws, with the five brigades detached by General Lee for this service, including Wilcox's, which had been stationed at Banks's Ford. On the next day, General Anderson was sent to reënforce McLaws with three additional brigades. Meanwhile, General Early had connected with these troops, and in the afternoon, so soon as dispositions could be made for attack, Sedgwick's lines were promptly assailed and broken, the main assault being made on the enemy's left by Early's troops. The situation was now a critical one for the Federal lieutenant. Darkness came to his res cue, and on the night of the 4th he crossed to the north side of the river. "On the 5th General Lee concentrated for another assault on the new line taken up by General Hooker; but on the morning of the 6th it was ascertained that the enemy, in General Lee's language, 'had sought safety beyond the Rappahannock,' and the river flowed again between the hostile hosts." CHAPTER XXXVIII. Relations with Foreign Nations.-The Public Questions.-Ministers abroad.-Usages of Intercourse between Nations.-Our Action.-Mistake of European Nations; they follow the Example of England and France.-Different Conditions of the Belligerents.-Injury to the Confederacy by the Policy of European Powers relative to the Blockade.-Explanation.-The Paris Conference.-Principles adopted.— Acceded to by the Confederacy with a Single Exception.-These Agreements remained inoperative.-Extent of the Pretended Blockade.-Remonstrances against its Recognition.-Sinking Vessels to Block up Harbors.-Every Proscription of Maritime Law violated by the United States Government.-Protest.-Addition made to the Law by Great Britain.-Policy pursued favorable to our Enemies.—Instances.-Mediation proposed by France to Great Britain, and Russian Letter of French Minister.-Reply of Great Britain.-Reply of Russia.-Letter to French Minister at Washington.-Various Offensive Actions of the British Government.-Encouraging to the United States.—Hollow Profession of Neutrality. THE public questions arising out of our foreign relations were too important to be overlooked. At the end of the first year of the war the Confederate States had been recognized by the leading governments of Europe as a belligerent power. This continued unchanged to the close. Mr. Mason became our representative in London, Mr. Slidell in Paris, Mr. Rost in Spain, and Mr. Mann in Belgium. They performed with energy and skill the positions, but were unsuccessful in obtaining our recognition as an independent power. The usages of intercourse between nations require that offcial communication be made to friendly powers of all organic changes in the constitution of states. To those who are familiar with the principles upon which the States known as the United States were originally constituted, as well as those upon which the Union was formed, the organic changes made by the secession and confederation of the Southern States are very apparent. But to others an explanation may be necessary. Each of the States was originally declared to be sovereign and independent. In this condition, at a former period, all of those then existing were severally recognized by name by the only one of the powers which had denied their right to independence. This gave to each a recognized national sovereignty. Subsequently they formed a compact of voluntary union, whereby a new or ganization was constituted, which was made the representative of the individual States in all general intercourse with other nations. So long as the compact continued in force, this agent represented merely the sovereignty of the States. But, when a portion of the States withdrew from the compact and formed a new one under the name of the Confederate States, they had made such organic changes in their Constitution as to require official notice in compliance with the usages of nations. For this purpose the Provisional Government took early measures for sending to Europe Commissioners charged with the duty of visiting the capitals of the different powers and making arrangements for the opening of more formal diplo matic intercourse. Prior, however, to the arrival abroad of had these Commissioners, the Government of the United States addressed communications to the different Cabinets of Europe, in which it assumed the attitude of being sovereign over the Confederate States, and alleged that these independent States were in rebellion against the remaining States of the Union, and 1862] SAME COURSE OF POLICY. 369 threatened Europe with manifestations of its displeasure if it should treat the Confederate States as having an independent existence. It soon became known that these pretensions were ot considered abroad to be as absurd as they were known to be at home; nor had Europe yet learned what reliance was to be placed in the official statements of the Cabinet at Washington. The delegation of power granted by the States to the General Government to represent them in foreign intercourse had led European nations into the grave error of supposing that their eparate sovereignty and independence had been merged into one cornmon sovereignty, and had ceased to have a distinct existence. Under the influence of this error, which all appeals to reason and historical fact were vainly used to dispel, our Commissioners were met by the declaration that foreign Governments could not assume to judge between the conflicting representations of the tparties as to the true nature of their previous relations. The Governments of Great Britain and France accordingly signified eir determination to confine themselves to recognizing the sef-evident fact of the existence of a war, and to maintain a st iet neutrality during its progress. Some of the other powers Europe pursued the same course of policy, and it became ap of pa ent that by some understanding, express or tacit, Europe had deded to leave the initiative in all action touching the contest on this continent to the two powers just named, who were recognized to have the largest interests involved, both by reason of promity to and of the extent of intimacy of their commercial relations with the States engaged in war. sion sions It was manifest that the course of action adopted by Europe, while based on an apparent refusal to determine the question or to side with either party, was, in point of fact, an actual decigainst our rights and in favor of the groundless pretenof the United States. It was a refusal to treat us as an endent government. If we were independent States, the to entertain with us the same international intercourse was maintained with our enemy was unjust, and was injuin its effects, whatever might have been the motive which ted it. Neither was it in accordance with the high moral tions of that international code, whose chief sanction is inde refus whic rions prom oblig the conscience of sovereigns and the public opinion of mankind, that those eminent powers should have declined the performance of a duty peculiarly incumbent on them, from any apprehension of the consequences to themselves. One immediate and necessary result of their declining the responsibility of a decision, which must have been adverse to the extravagant pretensions of the United States, was the prolongation of hostilities to which our enemies were thereby encouraged, and which resulted in scenes of carnage and devastation on this continent and of misery and suffering on the other such as have scarcely a parallel in history. Had those powers promptly admitted our right to be treated as all other independent nations, none can doubt that the moral effect of such action would have been to dispel the pretension under which the United States persisted in their efforts to accomplish our subjugation. There were other matters in which less than justice was rendered to the Confederacy by "neutral" Europe, and undue advantage conferred on the aggressors in a wicked war. At the inception of hostilities, the inhabitants of the Confederate States were almost exclusively agriculturists; those of the United States were also to a large extent mechanics, merchants, and navigators. We had no commercial marine, while their merchant-vessels covered the ocean. We were without a navy, while they had powerful fleets built by the money we had in full share contributed. The power which they possessed for inflicting injury on our coasts and harbors was thus counterbalanced in some measure by the exposure of their commerce to attack by private armed vessels. It was known to Enrope that within a very few years past the United States had peremptorily refused to accede to proposals for the abolition of privateering, on the ground, as alleged by them, that nations owning powerful fleets would thereby obtain undue advantage over those possessing inferior naval force. Yet no sooner was war flagrant between the Confederacy and the United States than the maritime powers of Europe issued orders prohibit ing either party from bringing prizes into their ports. This prohibition, directed with apparent impartiality against both belligerents, was in reality effective against the Confederate 1856] POLICY OF EUROPEAN POWERS. 371 States only, for they alone could find a hostile commerce on the ocean. Merely nominal against the United States, the prohibition operated with intense severity on the Confederacy by depriving it of the only means of maintaining its struggle on The ocean against the crushing superiority of naval force possessed by its enemy. The value and efficiency of the weapon which was thus wrested from our grasp by the combined action of "neutral" European powers, in favor of a power which professes openly its intention of ravaging their commerce by privateers in any future war, is strikingly illustrated by the terror inspired among commercial classes of the United States by a single cruiser of the Confederacy. One small steamer, commanded by officers and manned by a crew who were debarred by the closure of neutral ports from the opportunity of causing captured vessels to be condemned in their favor as prizes, sufficed to double the rates of marine insurance in Northern pts, and consign to forced inaction numbers of Northern vesses, in addition to the direct damage inflicted by captures at sea. But it was especially in relation to the so-called blockade tthe policy of European powers was so shaped as to cause greatest injury to the Confederacy, and to confer signal adages on the United States. A few words in explanation may th be necessary. Prior to the year 1856 the principles regulating this subject were to be gathered from the writings of eminent publicists, the decisions of admiralty courts, international treaties, and the sages of nations. The uncertainty and doubt which prevailed in reference to the true rules of maritime law, in time of war, resting from the discordant and often conflicting principles announced from such varied and independent sources, had bea grievous evil to mankind. Whether a blockade was able against a port not invested by land as well as by sea, er a blockade was valid by sea if the investing fleet was y sufficient to render ingress to the blockaded port evidangerous, or whether it was further required for its ty that it should be sufficient "really to prevent access," umerous other similar questions, had remained doubtful com allow whe mere dent legal and and ndecided. |