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the claim of New Hampshire, Congress voted to postpone further consideration of the subject. Five days later Messrs. Allen and Bradley informed Congress that the time of their appointment had expired and that they were leaving for home. They expressed the willingness of Vermont to aid in establishing the sovereignty of America. Regarding the dispute concerning the territory of the Green Mountain State, they urged the importance of hearing all parties interested before deciding the matter, offered to furnish authentic papers showing Vermont's right to separate State government, and protested against a decision while America was engaged in

war.

While Congress was not ready to recognize Vermont as a State, it was quite willing to postpone a decision in such a troublesome controversy.

It

Gouverneur Morris of New York kept notes of one of the Congressional debates on the Vermont matter. appears that most of the New England members "for wise political reasons" favored the independence of Vermont, but did not want to make open avowal of such a position. Roger Sherman of Connecticut, "who was thought secretly to encourage the Vermont party," argued that Congress had no right to decide the controversy, and could act only as mediators, in a hearing in which Vermont should be a party. In his opinion the people of Vermont never were subject to New York by their own consent. Elbridge Gerry denied the power of Congress to interfere, regarded the inhabitants of Vermont as "extra provincial," and possessing the right to set up a government for themselves. He thought an

arbitrary decision by Congress would increase thee difficulty. Some of the Southern members agreed with New England members, and it appears, according to his biographer, Jared Sparks, that the view of Mr. Morris did not differ widely from those expressed.

John Jay, having been in a manner specially charged by the New York Legislature with the conduct of its case in Congress relative to the Vermont controversy, reported to Governor Clinton as early as September 25, 1779, that he found soon after his arrival at Philadelphia that certain objections to interfering with Vermont were generally prevalent; that Congress had no authority to deal with State quarrels; that such business should be postponed until all States had acceded to the Confederation; that the attention of Congress ought not to be diverted from war; that harsh measures might induce Vermont to join the enemy; that Vermonters "possessed a strong country, were warlike and determined, and that more force would be required to reduce them than could be spared from the general defence."

He had cause to suspect that there were other reasons-That certain persons of consequence in Congress and New England expected to advance their fortunes by securing lands in Vermont; that Vermont was growing stronger as time passed, would actually become independent, and later would be recognized as a State; that a fifth New England State would be a valuable accession to that region; that as ancient animosities between New York and New England, inclined the former to side with the Middle and Southern States, the loss of

Vermont to New York was not likely to be opposed by New England.

Mr. Jay found it impolitic to force through Congress a resolution antagonistic to Vermont, by a narrow majority of Southern members against the violent opposition of New England. It was expedient in his opinion, in a Congressional investigation, to consider the claims of Massachusetts and New Hampshire as well as those of New York, and to make Vermont a party.

Governor Chittenden having notified the General Assembly of the action by the Continental Congress relative to Vermont, a resolution was adopted authorizing the Governor and the Council to appoint proper persons to negotiate with the several States concerning “a defence of the frontiers and any other matters that shall be necessary." The broad scope of this resolution permitted negotiations with the various States in the Confederation concerning closer relations with Vermont.

Governor Chittenden, on September 22, 1780, in a letter to Governor Clinton of New York, demanded of the Legislature that it fully relinquish its claim to jurisdiction over Vermont, and proposed that the two States "join in a solid union" for mutual defence against the British forces, particularly those which threatened incursions on the frontiers from Quebec. Ira Allen was the bearer of this demand also. Governor Clinton referred this letter, which he termed "insolent in its nature and derogatory to the honor of the State," to both branches of the General Assembly.

The Senate committee to which the letter was referred, having heard Robert R. Livingston, who had

been a special delegate to Congress when that body considered matters concerning the New Hampshire Grants, reported resolutions declaring that it was inexpedient for New York to insist further on its right to jurisdiction over Vermont, and providing for commissioners to meet a similar delegation from Vermont and settle the terms under which jurisdictional claims should be abandoned. This resolution was adopted in the Senate, February 21, 1781, with only one dissenting vote. The House having voted to take up the Senate resolution, Governor Clinton's private secretary appeared with a message declaring that if that body should agree to carry into effect the Senate's action concerning the New Hampshire Grants, he would exercise the authority vested in him by the Constitution and prorogue the Assembly. This hint was sufficient and the resolution was not adopted.

Only this drastic measure of executive authority, it is believed, prevented a settlement of the Vermont controversy a decade earlier than subsequent events permitted. The time for a settlement was opportune. The New York frontier had been ravaged recently by a British invasion, and another attack was feared the coming spring. The people of New York were not encouraged to believe that Vermont ever could be regained when Congress delayed taking any definite action on the question of jurisdiction. General Schuyler also favored such a settlement, as did most of the people of Albany, Schenectady and the northern portion of the State.

In a letter written by Governor Clinton about this time, he admitted that "these turbulent people," alluding

to the Vermonters, "daily gain strength at our expense," and he expressed the fear, that the dissensions which the Vermont dispute excited among New Yorkers would have an unhappy effect upon the public councils. Moreover, this letter indicates an expectation that sooner or later Vermont would become a State.

A period of about ten years had elapsed since a little band of Vermont farmers assembled on the Breakenridge farm at Bennington, and made open resistance to the New York authority which threatened to evict them from their homes. Another decade was to intervene before Statehood could be won, but the machinery of a State government was in operation, and the new Commonwealth was gaining steadily in numbers and in influence.

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