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large landholders of New York, aristocratic by association and temperament, he was not in sympathy with many New England ideas and ideals. Although Schuyler, probably, was a better man and a better officer than General Gates, the Vermonters frankly preferred the latter, because he listened to them with courtesy and gave them to understand that he favored them in the land controversy with New York, while Schuyler was prejudiced against the men of the New Hampshire Grants, as an examination of his correspondence will show.

Lincoln was distressed because the Massachusetts militia left Vermont almost as soon as Reidesel's troops withdrew from the vicinity of Castleton, and writing from Bennington on August 10, he said: "There never was an opportunity when we could act with so great a probability of success against them (Burgoyne's army) as the present, for they have penetrated and are penetrating far into the country, and have left a very naked and uncovered rear; therefore never a greater call for the exertions of the people."

A few days after Stark had received his orders from the New Hampshire Assembly, he proceeded to Charlestown, and as fast as men arrived, he forwarded them to Colonel Warner at Manchester. Vermont had agreed to send some person to Charlestown to advise with Stark relative to the route to be taken and the disposition of troops, and to furnish them with provisions.

General Stark, who had crossed the Green Mountains by way of Bromley (now known as Peru, where a marker has been erected on the site of his camp ground), arrived at Manchester on August 6, with about eight

hundred men, at least two hundred and fifty New Hampshire militia having preceded him. Here he met General Lincoln, who brought a message from General Schuyler, directing him to join the latter at Stillwater.

Some writers say that Schuyler repeatedly called on Stark to join him. Williams, in his "History of Vermont," written less than a score of years after this period, says that Stark, just before the approach of Baume, had decided to leave Bennington, meet General Lincoln "at an appointed place," and they were to join Schuyler. Stark evidently did not intend to let personal prejudices govern him, but was governed in the action by military reasons. A letter from Schuyler to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety, dated August 11, 1777, says that "happily I have the assurances from General Stark that he will not hesitate to do what is required." It was fortunate, indeed, that Stark did not respond to Schuyler's appeals, although apparently he was preparing to do so.

Leaving Manchester on August 8, Stark arrived at Bennington the following day, encamping about two miles west of the meeting house, near Colonel Herrick's residence, where he remained for five days, consulting with the Vermont Council of Safety, with Colonel Warner and other officers, and gaining such information as could be obtained regarding the enemy.

Vouchers among the early State papers in the Secretary of State's office show that bounties were paid Vermont soldiers at the time of the battle of Bennington; that Jonathan Fassett rode express to Boston about this time to bring arms; and that a considerable number

of guns were loaned by the Council of Safety to soldiers just before the battle of Bennington.

When Burgoyne reached Fort Edward he found that the condition of his transport service was such that it was with difficulty he could supply his army with provisions from day to day, and there was no prospect that he would be able, under existing conditions, to establish a magazine of supplies, a necessary step to take if a forward movement were to be made. This seemed an opportune time to advance. The American forces had been defeated, and to a certain extent demoralized. Lieutenant Colonel St. Leger was beseiging the American post of Fort Stanwix. All that Burgoyne needed, apparently, to continue his successful campaign was a greater supply of provisions.

When General Reidesel conducted his operations in the vicinity of Castleton during the latter part of July, he conceived the idea of an expedition to march to Manchester and thence in the direction of the Connecticut River for the purpose of securing horses with which to mount the dragoons, and one thousand three hundred additional horses to be used for the transportation of baggage.

Burgoyne decided, however, after having given approval, apparently, to the plans of the German commander, that other needs of the army were more urgent than the mounting of the dragoons. An important depot of supplies had been established at Bennington. Large numbers of cattle, much corn and flour, and a considerable number of wagons had been assembled here by the Americans for the use of the Northern army on or near the spot now marked by the Bennington monu

ment; and the information of the British commander was to the effect that these valuable stores were guarded only by militia, their numbers fluctuating from day to day. A British report stated that upwards of two thousand oxen and three hundred horses had been assembled at Bennington. Reidesel had reported that he found the people in the portion of Vermont which he had traversed frightened and submissive, some of them apparently loyal and the remainder in a state of panic, and Burgoyne reported that Reidesel had no doubt of the success of an expedition into this region. In his "Memoirs," however, Reidsel says he called attention to the dangers of the undertaking, "Bennington being at too great a distance, and the enemy too near it."

Some idea of the importance of Bennington as a depot of supplies may be gleaned from official correspondence of the period. Nathan Clark, writing to James Yancey, Deputy Commissary General, on October 24, 1776, told of the manufacture of one thousand bushels of wheat into flour, which was to be forwarded to the army at Ticonderoga. On November 5, 1776, Commissioner Yancey wrote the Bennington Committee of Safety that a certain number of men had been discharged to aid in forwarding supplies. He added: "The particular attention you pay for the welfare of your country demands its most cordial thanks for the same. General Gates directs to return you his sincere thanks for your good attention to the supplies of the army." In a letter to Lord George Germaine, Burgoyne said of the plan to surprise Bennington, that "the possession of the cattle and carriages would certainly have enabled the army to leave their distant magazines, and to have

acted with energy and dispatch; success would also have answered many secondary purposes." In a hearing before the House of Commons he said: "Had my intelligence been worse founded, I should not have hesitated to try this expedition with such troops, and under such instructions as I gave to the commanding officer, for so great a purpose as that of a supply sufficient to enable the army to follow at the heels of a broken and disconcerted enemy." Burgoyne further stated that he had been informed by those whom he supposed to be in a position to know, that in the vicinity of Bennington "the friends of the British cause were as five to one, and that they wanted only the appearance of a protecting force to show themselves."

The instructions for this expedition were prepared originally by General Reidesel, and were amended by General Burgoyne. The object as stated, was "to try the affections of the country, to disconcert the councils of the enemy, to mount Reidesel's dragoons, to complete Peters' corps (of Loyalists), and to obtain large supplies of cattle, horses and carriages." No tents were to be taken and the officers were to take only such baggage as they could carry on their own horses. As originally drawn, the instructions provided that the expedition was to proceed from Battenkill to Arlington, and wait there until joined from the southward by Captain Sherwood's detachment of Provincials. From Arlington the force was to proceed to Manchester, securing the pass over the mountains to Rockingham. At Manchester the Indians and light troops were to be sent northward, toward Otter Creek. On their return, if intelligence had been received that the Americans were not in force in the Connecticut

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