him with our wings, but finding our steady lines invulnerable, and having suffered wretchedly, he finally fell back, and by half-past eight o'clock, he was driven clear back to his own defensive line. It was a furious fight. Save Donelson and Shiloh, there has been no such battle on this continent. It begun in disgrace, with every advantage of numbers and conditions favoring the enemy. It ended that day with a severe repulse to him. But he was consoled for his disappointment and serious casualties, by the spoils of Casey's and Couch's camps. From the former he took six pieces of artillery - his ammunition, camp equipage, many standards-in fact, all his army furniture; and from Couch he took one gun and his camp equipage. On Sunday morning, the cannon and flags were triumphantly paraded through the streets of Richmond. Our loss of men was very heavy, but the casualties of the enemy were equally large. But it is impossible to ascertain the loss of either side until the official reports are made. One thousand will fully cover the loss of Sedgwick's division, of whom nine tenths were wounded. Burns's brigade, which was held as the first line of supports, lost five killed and twenty-eight wounded. Capt. Achuff, of the One Hundredth and Sixth Pennsylvania, Capt. Markoe, First California, Lieut. Camblos, and Gen. Burns, and Lieut. Donelson, of the First California, were the only officers wounded. The splendid conduct of the division elicits the plaudits of the army. General Sumner held his troops well in hand; Sedgwick exhibited perfect coolness and courage; Gorman was as enthusiastic as a boy, and firm as a rock; Burns's quick judgment and admirable conduct at the most critical moment of action, undoubtedly had an inspiring influence, and it was acknowledged with frenzied acclamations by the stout regiments wherever he exhibited himself. No more could have been asked by Dana. He proved himself a fearless soldier. Capt. Sedgwick, Assistant Adjutant-General to General Sedgwick, and Lieut. Howe, his aid-de-camp; Captain G. A. Hicks, A.A.G. to General Burns, and Lieuts. Blakeney and Camblos, and in fact, all the officers engaged, both field and staff, behaved themselves most gallantly. Lieut. Camblos, one of my messmates, received a severe scalp-wound, but will soon be able to resume duty. He said that when he was struck he thought he had run against a tree. Well he might. Col. John Cochrane, Col. Neill, Col. Sully, Col. Suiter, and indeed nearly every field-officer in all the divisions engaged, excepting Casey's, showed themselves good soldiers and brave officers. During the night all our artillery got through the swamps and was properly posted. The troops were disposed in three lines, as usual, to renew the engagement, it being morally certain the enemy would make another effort to drive us over the Chickahominy. A rebel surgeon who was captured, stated that that was surely the object of the enemy. During the night, a courier from Roger A. Pryor to Gen. Anderson, was captured by Richardson's pickets, with a note in forming Anderson that Pryor's brigade was in line of battle on his right. We looked for an attack at daybreak, but the pickets were not driven in until six o'clock. The enemy menaced Richardson's division, which was behind the railroad, to the left of Fair Oaks. They appeared in the forest directly in front, where they halted and taunted our line to advance. Gen. French, whose brigade was in front, declined the invitation, and the rebels rushed forward. A furious battle opened instantly. The enemy fought rapidly from the start, but adopted tactics which French construed into a feint to draw him on. They suspended fire at intervals, as if they were driven back, and then sent in new forces. In fact, their capacity for reënforcing, as on Saturday, seemed inexhaustible. Both sides fought with determined bravery, and both stood upon their own chosen positions. Between eight and nine o'clock, Gen. Richardson ordered Howard's brigade to the front. The volume of fire increased on both sides, the enemy having also reenforced. Our batteries, meantime, were shelling the forests vigorously, which evidently disconcerted the enemy. Howard now ordered Col. E. E. Cross, of the Fifth New-Hampshire, to charge bayonets, the enemy having appeared in a skirt of woods within one hundred yards, with evident design to charge. Cross (many of you know him) sung out: Charge them like h-1, boys; show 'em you are d-d Yankees." The gallant Fifth responded with a yell, dashed forward impetuously, and scattered the enemy like chaff. Brave Howard, who cheered his reliable fellows in the thickest of the fray, was now disabled and carried to the rear. His aid-de-camp and brother, Lieut. Howard, also fell wounded. Colonel Cross took com mand, the enemy having begun to fall back. Col. Miller of the Eighty-first Pennsylvania, and Lieut.-Col. Massett, of the Sixty-first New-York, were killed outright. Soon the enemy recovered and made another fierce dash. Cross ordered the gallant Fifth New-Hampshire to charge again, and led them in person. A fragment of a shell fractured his forehead, a glancing blow, abrading the skin and stunning him. But recovering instantly he again pushed on, when he was hamstrung by a musket-ball. Finding it impossible to rise, he shouted to the lads to go on, and was carried to the rear; but he had the satisfaction to hear the shout of triumph before he left. Major W. W. Cook, of the same regiment, was also disabled by a similar wound. Col. Parker now took command of the brigade, and fought it until the enemy were completely repulsed. The fight was ended. The enemy appeared no more that day. Their pickets did not even venture within view of our outpost line. In this battle, as on Saturday, the effort of the enemy was directed to our left. His second attempt being so handsomely foiled, he evidently gave it up disheartened and disgusted. The second fight was severe on both sides, but the enemy was most terribly cut up. But upon both fields of battle their dead was literally piled up in horrid masses, while their wounded, moaning with agony, were scattered through the forests in every direction. But our own casualty list is formidable. Our friend, Col. E. E. Cross, well known in the West a few years ago as editor, correspondent, etc., and later as an emigrant to Arizona, where he was a conspicuous citizen, raged like a lion through battle, and they say that when his long body fell he went down like a pine tree. Finding it impossible to stand, he shouted: "Charge 'em like h-1, boys; show 'em that you are Yankees; d-d sorry to say I can't go with you." Previous to the misfortune, while he was posting a company, a rebel officer rode up inquiring for Gen. Anderson. Cross reached for his collar and brought him down on the run, answering the astonished officer, that: "You're just the chap I was looking for." Those who know the Colonel best can appreciate his Yankee mannerism. But he acquitted himself gallantly in the fight. After surveying the field deliberately, I concluded that our commanders felt that the army had a narrow escape. Nothing but the splendid conduct of our disciplined troops saved us from general disaster. You must bear in mind that his whole best disciplined force, under the eye of Jeff Davis himself, and commanded by Generals Joe Johnston, Huger, Magruder, G. W. Smith, Whiting, Anderson, and other educated generals, was massed on our left, and that our right was utterly unable to render any assistance. They could not possibly cross the river and attack on the right, and it would have been folly to have left the right open. Gen. McClellan was where his duty called him. I saw him in the field during the Sunday fight, and afterward he rode along the entire battle-front. During his progress he was greeted with great enthusiasm. It was a splendid ovation. I neglected to mention that we lost no general officer, but had two wounded. But our loss in regimental, field and line officers, was very severe. Among our captives we have Gen. Pettigrew and Col. Champ Davis, of South-Carolina, Col. Long, formerly of the regular army, and several other distinguished Southerners. Sunday night our troops again slept on the battle-field, and will continue to do so until we advance into Richmond. It is a grand satisfaction, permit me to say in conclusion, that Sedgwick's splendid division fought and gloriously thrashed the famous Hampton legion. More than a hundred of them are buried on this field. But they fought long, and learned how firm the Yankees stand fire. W. D. B. CASEY'S DIVISION IN THE BATTLE. peared in the public press and been accepted 66 In First. One journal states that after the overthrow of Casey's men, "Gen. Couch, with his veterans, saved the day." Gen. Couch did nothing of the sort, and Gen. Couch has no veterans" in his command. One brigade of his division came up tardily to the support of Gen. Casey, but went back very rapidly. In the disaster of that afternoon and evening his command bore its full part. Its camp, as well as Casey's, fell into the hands of the rebels, and was occupied by them on the night after the battle. Second. It is stated (and Gen. McClellan's despatch implies it) that the fight of Saturday was a Union victory; that Sumner and Heintzelman's corps came up and drove back the enemy who had defeated Casey. They did nothing of the sort. They simply prevented his going on further and using the victory he had gained. They, with thousands of fresh men, simply came in when the fighting was nearly all over, and held in check the rebel army, which, for nearly five hours, Casey's division had resisted alone. Third. It is stated that Gen. McClellan came up on Saturday evening and took command, and To the Editor of the N. Y. Tribune: that he slept on the battle-field. If he did come SIR: Feeling assured that you will not refuse up on Saturday, it is strange that no one of those to a division of the Army of the Potomac, that who were engaged in the front saw him or his has been grossly misrepresented, an opportunity staff, or body-guard, or received any orders from of setting itself right with the public, I beg to him. That he slept on the battle-field is simply offer you the following statement of facts, and untrue, a claptrap newspaper item without foun correction of other statements which have ap-dation in fact. The rebel Generals, at least Roger A. Pryor, did sleep there, but none of ours. Fourth. It is stated that on Sunday Gen. McClellan made a speech to Casey's division, in which he stated, that if they would stand by him. and act as well as the other divisions, he would bag the whole rebel army in six hours. This is an entire and utter falsehood. It has not a shadow of foundation in fact. Gen. McClellan did not come once into the presence of that division, and would not readily venture to make any such insulting speech to them. If he had appeared before them to make an address, its burden should far more properly have been this: "Comrades, I thank you for your gallantry and firmness; you have saved the army, for if you had not for hours contended against an enemy that outnumbered you five to one, the rebel forces would now be across the Chickahominy, and my entire force most probably defeated!" Fifth. It is stated that Gen. Heintzelman, on Sunday morning, recovered the ground lost on Saturday by Gen. Casey. He did nothing of the sort. It was on Monday morning before that ground was really in our possession. vision the road to Bottom's Bridge, this deponent sayeth not. The real facts as regards Saturday's fight are these: For two weeks previously the First brigade of Casey's division, (commanded by Gen. Naglee,) was pushed in advance of the whole army, and kept at hard work in reconnoissances and advanced picket duty. That splendid brigade (than which there is no finer in McClellan's command) was like a finger thrust forward into the fire to test its power. Subjected to hardships which in this campaign have not been equalled, and open by day and night to the attack of the enemy, on Saturday morning the One Hundred and Fourth Pennsylvania volunteers, the Fifty-sixth New-York, the Eleventh Maine, and the One Hundredth New-York, were in camp, in advance of the Second and Third brigades, the entire division being in advance of Gen. Couch's division about one mile, and unsupported except by him. Out in front of all, half a mile or a mile in advance of its own brigade, the Pennsylvania volunteers were doing duty as picket reserve; two companies of it (F and H) being out on the line of pickets, and one other (C) having just returned from forty-eight hours spent on picket duty, almost without food, and totally without shelter and rest. While matters were in this position, the outlying pickets were fired upon by the advancing enemy, but not driven back, as is usual in such a case. They held their ground for a long time, and some of them, when actually surrounded, had to fight their way through to join their brigade. This picket-firing began between eleven and twelve o'clock. The Fifty-second was immediately drawn up in line of battle, but owing to the absence of the two companies above mentioned, and to its great losses from disease, it numbered only two hundred and forty-eight men! It was soon under fire, fire in front, fire from the right, and fire from the left, and yet held its ground. Isolated from its brigade, and so com Sixth. It is stated in Gen. McClellan's despatch, that on Sunday morning the rebels renewed the attack, but were repulsed at all points. They did not renew the attack, and so were not repulsed. They began an orderly retreat on Sunday morning, and Gens. Sumner and Heintzelman followed them and had some skirmishing, but nothing that deserved the name of a battle. Seventh. It has been publicly stated, as proof that we gained a decided victory on Sunday, that the enemy was driven back at the point of the bayonet some two miles, and that our advance immediately took position two or three miles in front of that held on Saturday last. This also is totally untrue. There were no bayonet-charges made in face of the enemy. Bayonets were not once crossed in the entire affair. And now, after the lapse of a week, our advance is not one quar-pletely flanked by the attacking enemy, Colonel ter of a mile (if it is even a furlong) beyond the position held by the Fifty-second Pennsylvania on the morning of the first fight. fire. Dodge had to act without orders, and do what he thought best for the common cause. He might have ordered a retreat, but did not. At last Eighth. The entire credit has been given to Capt. Johnson, aid-de-camp to General Naglee, Gens. Heintzelman, Kearney, Sumner, etc., but brought an order for him to bring his regiment the public is not aware that it was on their own and report to his headquarters. When this moverepresentations this was done. When Gen. Mc- ment was executed, he found the brigade all enClellan wrote his unjust despatch he had not re-gaged, and contending gallantly against a terrific ceived Gen. Casey's report; he had not heard from any member of Casey's division an account Having drawn the regiment up in line of battle, of the day's work. He took the statement of Colonel Dodge was waiting further orders, when men who were naturally more anxious to publish another Colonel, sent up with his regiment to their own achievements than to do justice to support Casey's, and who at the time was doing others. Of at least one of these very men so be-nothing, called out: "Why the don't you praised at the expense of others, it would hardly take your men into those woods?" The other, be in accordance with military law for your pre-paying no heed to the tone or style of this sugsent correspondent to tell the truth. There are such things as courts-martial, which regard but little the truth of a statement if it reflect upon the conduct of a superior officer, and therefore what gentlemen with stars on their shoulders were pushing their steeds toward the Chickahominy, and eagerly asked of some officers in Casey's di gestion, and preferring any work to idleness at such a time, led his regiment into the woods referred to, and had not advanced twenty paces when a murderous volley was poured into his ranks, and then another and another. Three were received before the enemy could be seen or the fire returned, but not a man faltered, not an inch was yielded. They stood up and fired, and fell, but did not retire. How long they were thus engaged with their concealed and numerous enemies I cannot say, but it was long enough to thin their ranks down to the merest handful, and to strew heaps on heaps of dead where their bullets were directed. After long contending in this manner, the order was passed along the line, "Cease firing;" and it was added in explanation: "You are shooting down your friends." The men were very unwilling to obey, but the officers, fearing some dreadful mistake, went along the line and with their swords enforced the order to cease firing, and after they had ceased the enemy poured in two more volleys. The remnant of the gallant regiment was then led out of the woods. The next order given was to occupy one or more of the rifle-pits; but, when they approached, these were all occupied but one, and that was so full of water that the men could not load their pieces in it. They were then led out into the open field, and took possession of a house and outhouses that stood in the front, and here their rifles told with fearful effect upon the foe. But, while they and their comrades of that brigade were so nobly contesting the ground, the enemy was pouring in fresh troops on every side, and the complete slaughter of the entire command would have resulted had not a retrograde movement been ordered. The Fifty-second, outflanked by the still increasing and advancing foe, was obliged to leave the position that for an hour or more it had occupied and used so well. They marched toward the rear amid a perfect hail-storm of bullets, which still further thinned their ranks, until not over seventy men of the entire regiment remained. Col. Dodge and Major Conyngham tried to form this mere squad into line of battle, and have them take ground again to oppose the advancing tide; but the effort was vain. The men would no longer stand to be shot down in so vain and unequal a strife. They did not equal one company in number, and would not undertake a regiment's work. For nearly four hours they and their comrades of Naglee's brigade had borne the brunt of the battle, and had held some forty thousand rebels in check, while they themselves did not number two thousand in all. Indeed, the entire number of Casey's division was less than six thousand effective men. It cannot be denied, and need not be concealed, that some regiments of this division acted badly. Whatever was the cause, the One Hundred and Third Pennsylvania volunteers became disorganized, and their panic affected, to some extent, those in front. But if any one supposes that the rest of the division was panic-stricken, or broke into a rout, he is greatly mistaken. Cut to pieces literally, they retreated in as good order as was practicable. A few of their guns were lost, (not twelve batteries, nor even three batteries,) but why? Every horse was shot, and were the men to carry their own arms and accoutrements and yet haul their artillery off the field? Who expects anything so unreasonable, or who among 66 those who are reported as having done so splendidly" could have saved their guns under such circumstances? Regiments from other commands came up fresh on the field to succor us, but were among the first to leave it, and have since been the loudest in their boasting and in denouncing Casey's division. Finally, about half-past four or five o'clock, some of Heintzelman's and Sumner's corps came up, and took our places. After this the enemy did not press us any further, but they were not driven back fifty yards at any point. Indeed, after five o'clock there was hardly any firing at all. They took possession of our camp and Couch's, and there passed the night. Very early in the morning they determined to retreat, and had commenced their backward march when Sumner attacked their rear-guard. The fight of Saturday was disastrous, but full of glory for those who maintained it so long and so well against such fearful odds. The fight of Sunday was little more than the pursuit of an enemy who, feeling himself foiled, had determined on retreat. It was a victory for us, but it was marked by no such heroisin and no such strife as the battle of the day before. The One Hundred and Fourth Pennsylvania volunteers went into the fight on Saturday about four hundred strong, and next morning rations were issued to one hundred and sixty-two men. Its Colonel and Major were both wounded. The Fifty-second Pennsylvania volunteers went in two hundred and forty-eight strong, and lost in killed and wounded one hundred and twenty, just one half; at present, after picket companies have rejoined, and sick returned, it numbers about two hundred men. The Fifty-sixth New-York, the Eleventh Maine, and the One Hundredth NewYork, show proportions of the same character. If, then, any man can show an engagement during this or any other war where from one third to one half of all engaged were cut down, we will confess that Casey's division, or at least Naglee's brigade, deserves no special credit; but at present we claim to have equalled in courage, in work, and in loss on the field any portion of the army that has as yet stood face to face with the rebels. We bear the reproach of cowards, (so kindly and judiciously given by our Commander-in-chief,) and Heintzelman, Couch, Kearney, and others have the credit of doing "splendidly," and retrieving what we so basely lost; but we dare them to a comparison of mortality. Let our dead and wounded speak for us. Let the length of time we checked the entire rebel force testify for us. And let the public insist that justice be done publicly and amply to a body of men who feel that where they have earned thanks and praise, they have received only harshness and calumny. The whole of Naglee's brigade is now less in size than some regiments of it were three months ago. What shall be done with it? Until justice is fully done, no officer or man in the brigade cares a straw. If their best efforts win for them only the character of cowards they will not be very anxious to make such efforts in the future. One ill-advised despatch, one piece of gross injustice, has wounded the spirit and chilled the ardor of thousands of men as brave and as jealous of their honor as any that ever fought the battles of their country. And their affection for and confidence in the man that did them this wrong are gone forever. Let justice be done to us, and then give us more men to fill up our skeleton regiments, and try us in the advance again; or else let justice be done and the whole brigade mustered out of the service, which since this disgrace, has no charm for it. I am, dear sir, very truly yours, CAMP NEAR BOTTOM'S BRIDGE, BEFORE RICHMOND, VA., June 7, 1862. MCCLELLAN AND CASEY'S DIVISION. June 5, 1862-11 P.M. D. HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, } Gen. Casey, Bottom's Bridge: The following despatch has just been transmitted: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, June 5. Hon. Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War: SIR: My despatch of the first inst., stating that Gen. Casey's division, which was in the first line, gave way unaccountably and discreditably, was based upon official statements made to me before I arrived upon the field of battle, and while I was there, by several commanders. From statements made to me subsequently by Gens. Casey and Naglee, I am induced to believe that portions of the division behaved well, and made a most gallant stand against superior numbers; but at present the accounts are too conflicting to enable me to discriminate with certainty. When the facts are clearly ascertained, the exceptional good conduct will be properly acknowledged. G. B. MCCLELLAN, Major-General Commanding. REBEL REPORTS AND NARRATIVES. GEN. JOHNSTON'S REPORT. RICHMOND, June 24, 1862. Gen. S. Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector-General: SIR: Before the thirtieth of May I had ascertained from trusty scouts that Keyes's corps was encamped on this side of the Chickahominy, near the Williamsburgh road. On that day MajorGen. D. H. Hill reported a strong body immediately in his front. On receiving this report, I determined to attack them next morning, hoping to be able to defeat Keyes's corps completely in its more advanced position before it could be reënforced. Written orders were despatched to MajorGens. Hill, Huger and G. W. Smith. Gen. Longstreet, being near my headquarters, received verbal instructions. The receipt of the orders was acknowledged. Gen. Hill, supported by the division of Gen. Longstreet, (who had the direction of operations on the right,) was to advance by the Williamsburgh road, to attack the enemy in front; Gen. Huger, with his division, was to move down the Charles City road, in order to attack in flank the troops who might be engaged with Hill and Long street, unless he found in his front force enough to occupy the division. Gen. Smith was to march to the junction of the New-Bridge road and the Nine-mile road, to be in readiness either to fall on Keyes's right flank, or to cover Longstreet's left. They were to move at daybreak. Heavy and protracted rains during the afternoon and night, by swelling the stream of the Chickahominy, increased the probability of our having to deal with no other troops than those of Keyes. The same cause prevented the prompt and punetual movement of the troops. Those of Smith, Hill and Longstreet were in position early enough, however, to commence operations by eight A.M. Major-General Longstreet, unwilling to make a partial attack, instead of the combined movement which had been planned, waited from hour to hour for Gen. Huger's division. At length, at two o'clock P.M., he determined to attack without these troops. He accordingly commenced his advance at that hour, opening the engagement with artillery and skirmishers. By three o'clock it became close and heavy. In the mean time, I had placed myself on the left of the force employed in this attack, with the division of Gen. Smith, that I might be on a part of the field where I could observe, and be ready to meet any counter movement which the enemy's General might make against our centre or left. Owing to some peculiar condition of the atmosphere, the sound of the musketry did not reach us. I consequently deferred giving the sig nal for Gen. Smith's advance till four o'clock, at which time Major Jasper Whiting, of Gen. Smith's staff, whom I had sent to learn the state of affairs with Gen. Longstreet's column, returned, reporting that it was pressing on with vigor. Smith's troops were at once moved forward. The principal attack was made by Major-Gen. Longstreet, with his own and Major-Gen. D. H. Hill's divisions-the latter mostly in advance. Hill's brave troops, admirably commanded and gallantly led, forced their way through the abattis, which formed the enemy's external defences, and stormed their intrenchments by a determined and irresistible rush. Such was the manner in which the enemy's first line was carried. The operation was repeated with the same gallantry and success as our troops pursued their victorious career through the enemy's successive camps and intrenchments. At each new position they encountered fresh troops belonging to it, and reënforcements brought on from the rear. Thus they had to repel repeated efforts to retake works which they had carried. But their advance was never successfully resisted. Their onward movement was only stayed by the coming of night. By nightfall they had forced their way to the "Seven Pines," having driven the enemy back more than two miles, through their own camps, and from a series of intrenchments, and repelled every attempt to recapture them with great slaughter. The skill, vigor, and decision, with which these operations were conducted by Gen. Longstreet, are worthy of the highest praise. He was worthily seconded by |