Guards) were sent him on Friday, the twelfth of Bolivar Heights so as to make a better defence, September, and on the morning of the thirteenth but Col. Miles adhered to his original line of dehe was further reënforced by the One Hundred fence, stating that he was determined to make and Fifteenth New-York, and a portion of a Maryland regiment under Lieut.-Col. Downey. Col. Ford made requisition for axes and spades to enable him to construct defences on the Heights, but obtained none. With ten axes belonging to some Maryland troops, hiring all that could be obtained, a slight breastwork of trees was constructed on the twelfth, near the crest of the Heights, and a slashing of timber made for a short distance in front of the breastwork. The forces under Col. Ford were stationed at various points on the Maryland Heights, the principal force being on the crest of the hill near the breastwork and look-out. Skirmishing commenced on Friday, the twelfth, on the crest of the hill. Early on the morning of the thirteenth the enemy made an attack on the crest of the hill, and after some time the troops retired in some confusion to the breastwork, where they were rallied. About nine o'clock a second attack was made, which the troops behind the breastwork resisted for a short time, and until Col. Sherrill, of the One Hundred and Twenty-sixth New-York, was wounded and carried off the field, when the entire One Hundred and Twenty-sixth regiment, as some witnesses testify, all but two companies, Major Hewitt states, broke and fled in utter confusion. Men and most of the officers all fled together, no effort being made to rally the regiment, except by Col. Ford, Lieut. Barras, Acting-Adjutant, and some officers of other regiments, directed by Col. Miles, then on the Heights. Soon after the remaining forces at the breastwork fell back, under a supposed order from Major Hewitt, who himself says that he gave no such order, merely sent instructions to the captains of his own regiment that if they were compelled to retire to do so in good order. Orders were given by Col. Ford for the troops to return to their position. They advanced some distance up the Heights, but did not regain the breastwork. That evening Colonel Miles was on Maryland Heights for some hours consulting with Colonel Ford. He left between eleven and twelve o'clock, without directly ordering Col. Ford to evacuate the Heights, but instructing him, in case he was compelled to do so, to spike the guns and throw the heavy siege-guns down the mountain. About two o'clock, perhaps a little later, by the order of Col. Ford, the Heights were abandoned, the guns being spiked according to in structions. On Sunday, Col. D'Utassy sent over to Maryland Heights four companies under Major Wood, who brought off, without opposition, four brass twelve-pounders, two of which were imperfectly spiked, and a wagon-load of ammunition. Gen. White, on his return to Harper's Ferry, on the twelfth of September, suggested to Col. Miles the propriety of contracting his lines on his stand on Bolivar Heights. General White also urged the importance of holding Maryland Heights, even should it require the taking the entire force over there from Harper's Ferry. Col. Miles, under his orders to hold Harper's Ferry to the last extremity, while admitting the importance of Maryland Heights, seemed to regard them as applying to the town of Harper's Ferry, and held that to leave Harper's Ferry, even to go on Maryland Heights, would be disobeying his instructions. Gen. McClellan established his headquarters at Frederick City on the morning of the thirteenth of September. On the night of the thirteenth, after the evacuation of Maryland Heights, Col. Miles directed Captain (now Major) Russell, of the Maryland cavalry, to take with him a few men and endeavor to get through the enemy's lines and reach some of our forces-General McClellan if possible-and to report the condition of Harper's Ferry, that it could not hold out more than forty-eight hours, unless reënforced, and to urge the sending of reenforcements. Capt. Russell reached General McClellan's headquarters at Frederick at nine A.M. on Sunday, the fourteenth of September, and reported as directed by Colonel Miles. Immediately upon his arrival Gen. MeClellan sent off a messenger, as Captain Russell understood, to General Franklin. At ten A.M. Capt. Russell left for Gen. Franklin's command, with a communication to General Franklin from Gen. McClellan. He reached Gen. Franklin about three o'clock that afternoon, and found him engaged with the enemy at Crampton's Gap. The enemy were driven from the Gap, and the next morning, the fifteenth, Gen. Franklin passed through the Gap, advancing about a mile, and finding the enemy drawn up in line of battle in his front, drew his own forces up in line of battle. While thus situated, the cannonading in the direction of Harper's Ferry, which had been heard very distinctly all the morning-Harper's Ferry being about seven miles distant-suddenly ceased, whereupon Gen. Franklin sent word to Gen. McClellan of the probable surrender of Harper's Ferry by Colonel Miles, and did not deem it necessary to proceed further in that direction. The battle of South-Mountain was fought on Sunday, the fourteenth. On the same day, Sunday, during the afternoon, the enemy at Harper's Ferry attacked the extreme left of the line on Bolivar Heights, but after some time were repulsed by the troops under command of General White. Sunday night the cavalry at Harper's Ferry made their escape, under Colonel Davis of the Twelfth Illinois cavalry, by permission of Colonel Miles, and reached Greencastle, Pa., the next morning, capturing an ammunition-train belonging to Gen. Longstreet, consisting of some fifty or sixty wagons. The Commission regard this escape of the cavalry, etc. Several of the infantry officers desired permis sion to cut their way out at the same time the cavalry made their escape, but Col. Miles refused, upon the ground that he had never been ordered to hold Harper's Ferry to the last extremity. erate prisoners be permitted to pass through our lines to rejoin the rebel army at Winchester. Other cases are testified to, but those are the most important. BRIGADIER-GENERAL JULIUS WHITE AND COLONELS D'UTASSY AND TRIMBLE. On the morning of the fifteenth the enemy opened their batteries from several points-seven to nine as estimated by different witnesses-directing their attack principally upon our batteries Of the subordinate officers referred to in this on the left of Bolivar Heights. The attack com- case, the Commission finds, with the exception menced at daybreak. About seven o'clock Col. of Col. Thomas H. Ford, nothing in their conduct Miles represented to Gen. White that it would that calls for censure. Gen. Julius White merits be necessary to surrender. Gen. White suggest-its approbation. He appears from the evidence ed that the brigade commanders be called to- to have acted with decided capability and courgether, which was done. Col. Miles stated that age. the ammunition for the batteries was exhausted, and he had about made up his mind to surrender. That was agreed to by all present, and General White was sent by Col. Miles to arrange terms. The white flag was raised by order of Colonel Miles, but the enemy did not cease fire for some half or three quarters of an hour after. Colonel Miles was mortally wounded after the white flag was raised. The surrender was agreed upon about eight A. M. on Monday, the fifteenth of September. In this connection the Commission calls attention to the disgraceful behavior of the One Hundred and Twenty-sixth New-York regiment of infantry, and recommends that Major Baird should, for his bad conduct, as shown by this evidence, be dismissed the service. Some of the officers, after the wounding of the gallant Colonel, such as Lieut. Barras, and others not known to the Commission, behaved with gallantry, and should be commended. COLONEL THOMAS FORD. The following was the testimony respectively of the officers commanding batteries: At the In the case of Col. Ford, charged with improtime of the surrender Capt. Von Schlen had some per conduct in abandoning the Maryland Heights, ammunition - could not tell what amount, but the Commission, after a careful hearing of the mostly shrapnel; had lost about one hundred evidence produced by the Government and that rounds on Saturday, the thirteenth, by the ex-relied on by the defence, and a due consideration plosion of a limber caused by one of the enemy's of the arguments offered by counsel, find: shells. Captain Rigby had expended during the siege of Harper's Ferry about six hundred rounds, with the exception of canister; had nothing but canister left. Captain Potts had expended about one thousand rounds, with the exception of canister; had only canister left. Capt. Graham had but two guns of his battery under his immediate command on the morning of the surrender; had probably one hundred rounds of all kinds, but no long-time fuses. Capt. Phillips had expended all his ammunition except some forty rounds of canister and some long-range shell too large for his guns. Capt. McGrath's battery had been spiked and left on Maryland Heights on Saturday. It appears that during the siege, and shortly previous, Col. Miles paroled several confederate prisoners, permitting them to pass through our lines. During the week previous to the evacuation of Maryland Heights, a Lieutenant Rouse, of the Twelfth Virginia cavalry, who had been engaged in a raid upon a train from Harper's Ferry to Winchester a short time before, was captured and brought into Harper's Ferry. He escaped while on the way to the hospital to have his wounds dressed, but was retaken. He was paroled, but returned in command of some rebel cavalry on the morning of the surrender. The attention of Gen. A. P. Hill was called to the fact that Lieut. Rouse was a paroled prisoner, but no attention was paid to it. Lieut. Rouse himself, on being spoken to about it, laughed at the idea of observing his parole. On Saturday, the day of the attack upon and evacuation of Maryland Heights, Col. Miles directed that sixteen confed That these de That on the fifth of September Col. Ford was placed in command of Maryland Heights by Col. Miles. That Col. Ford, finding the position unprepared by fortifications, earnestly urged Col. Miles to furnish him means by which the Heights could be made tenable for the small force under his command should a heavy one be brought against him. That these reasonable demands were, for some cause unknown to the Commission, not responded to by the officer in command of Harper's Ferry. That subsequently, when the enemy appeared in heavy force, Colonel Ford frequently and earnestly called upon Col. Miles for more troops, representing that he could not hold the Heights unless reënforced. mands were feebly or not at all complied with. That as late as the morning of the thirteenth Col. Ford sent two written demands to Col. Miles for reënforcements, and saying that with the troops then under his command he could not hold the Heights, and, unless relieved or otherwise ordered, he would have to abandon them. That as late as eleven o'clock A.M. of the thirteenth, a few hours previous to the abandonment of this position, Colonel Miles said to Col. Ford that he (Colonel Ford) could not have another man, and must do the best he could, and, if unable to defend the place, he must spike the guns, throw them down the hill, and withdraw to Harper's Ferry in good order. The Court is then satisfied that Col. Ford was given a discretionary power to abandon the Heights, as his better judgment might dictate; and it believes from the evidence, circumstantial and direct, that the result did not to any great extent surprise nor in any way displease the officer in command at Harper's Ferry. But this conclusion, so much relied upon by the defence, forces the Commission to a consideration of the fact, Did Colonel Ford, under the discretionary power thus vested in him, make a proper defence of the Heights, and hold them as he should have done, until driven off by the enemy? yet he places Col. Ford in command with a feeble force, makes no effort to strengthen them by fortifications, although between the fifth and fourteenth of September there was ample time to do so; and to Colonel Ford's repeated demands for means to intrench and additional reënforcements, he makes either an inadequate return or no response at all. He gives Col. Ford a discretionary power as to when he shall abandon the Heights, The evidence shows conclusively that the force the fact of abandonment having, it seems, been upon the Heights was not well managed; that the concluded on in his own mind. For, when this point most pressed was weakly defended as to unhappy event really occurs, his only exclamnumbers, and after the wounding of the colonel mation was to the effect that he feared Col. Ford of the One Hundred and Twenty-sixth New-York had given up too soon, although he must have infantry, it was left without a competent officer known that the abandonment of Maryland in command, Col. Ford himself not appearing nor Heights was the surrender of Harper's Ferry. designating any one who might have restored This leaving the key of the position to the keeporder and encouraged the men; that the aban-ing of Col. Ford, with discretionary power, after donment of the Heights was premature, is clearly proved. Our forces were not driven from the hill, as full time was given to spike the guns and throw the heavier ones down the cliff, and retreat in good order to Harper's Ferry. The next day a force returning to the Heights found them unoccupied, and brought away unmolested four abandoned guns and a quantity of ammunition. In so grave a case as this, with such disgraceful consequences, the court cannot permit an officer to shield himself behind the fact that he did as well as he could, if in so doing he exhibits | a lack of military capacity. It is clear to the Commission that Col. Ford should not have been placed in command on Maryland Heights; that he conducted the defence without ability, and abandoned his position without sufficient cause, and has shown throughout such a lack of military capacity as to disqualify him, in the opinion of the commission, for a command in the service. COLONEL D. S. MILES. the arrival of that capable and courageous officer who had waived his rank to serve wherever or dered, is one of the more striking facts illustrating the incapacity of Col. Miles. Immediately previous to and pending the siege of Harper's Ferry, he paroles rebel prisoners and permits, indeed sends them to the enemy's headquarters. This, too, when he should have known that the lack of ammunition, the bad conduct of some of our troops, the entire absence of for tifications, and the abandonment of Maryland Heights, were important facts they could, and undoubtedly did communicate to the enemy. Sixteen of these prisoners were paroled on the thirteenth, and a pass given them in the handwriting of Col. Miles, while a rebel officer by the name of Rouse, after an escape is retaken, and subsequently has a private interview with Col. Miles, is paroled, and after the surrender appears at the head of his men, among the first to enter Harper's Ferry. It is not necessary to accumulate evidence from The Commission has approached a considera- the mass that throughout scarcely affords one tion of this officer's conduct in connection with fact in contradiction to what each one estabthe surrender of Harper's Ferry with extreme re-lishes, that Col. Miles was incapable of conductluctance. An officer who cannot appear before ing a defence so important as was this of Harper's any earthly tribunal to answer or explain charges Ferry. gravely affecting his character, who has met his death at the hands of the enemy, even upon the spot he disgracefully surrenders, is entitled to the tenderest care and most careful investigation. This the Commission has accorded Col. Miles, and in giving a decision only repeats what runs through our nine hundred pages of testimony, strangely unanimous upon the fact that Colonel Miles's incapacity, amounting to almost imbecility, led to the shameful surrender of this important post. Early as the fifteenth of August he disobeys the orders of Major-Gen. Wool to fortify Maryland Heights. When it is surrounded and attacked by the enemy, its naturally strong positions are unimproved, and from his criminal neglect, to use the mildest term, the large force of the enemy is almost upon an equality with the small force under his command. He seems to have understood, and admitted to his officers that Maryland Heights is the key to the position, and The Commission would not have dwelt upon this painful subject were it not for the fact that the officer who placed this incapable in command should share in the responsibility, and in the opinion of the Commission Major-Gen. Wool is guilty to this extent of a grave disaster, and should be censured for his conduct. The Commission has remarked freely on Col Miles, an old officer who has been killed in the service of his country, and it cannot from any motive of delicacy, refrain from censuring those in high command, when it thinks such censure deserved. The General-in-Chief has testified that Gen. McClellan, after having received orders to repel the enemy invading the State of Maryland, marched only six miles per day, on an average, when pursuing this invading enemy. The General-in-Chief also testifies that in his opinion Gen. McClellan could and should have relieved and protected Harper's Ferry, and in this opinion the Commission fully concur. brought before the Commission, they are released E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General. GENERAL WOOL'S LETTER. HEADQUARTERS MIDDLE DEPARTMENT, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS, BALTIMORE, November 11, 1862. The evidence thus introduced confirms the Commission in the opinion that Harper's Ferry, as well as Maryland Heights, was prematurely surrendered. The garrison should have been satisfied that relief, however long delayed, would come at last, and that a thousand men killed in Harper's Ferry would have made a small loss had the post been saved, and probably saved two thousand at Antietam. How important was this defence we can now appreciate. Of the ninetyseven thousand men composing at that time the To the Editors of the Baltimore American : whole of Lee's army, more than one third were In the report, as published in the newspapers, attacking Harper's Ferry, and of this the main of the Commission, consisting of the following body was in Virginia. By reference to the evi- officers, Major-Gen. D. Hunter, United States voldence it will be seen that at the very moment unteers; Major-General G. Cadwalader, United Col. Ford abandoned Maryland Heights his little States volunteers; Brig.-General C. C. Augur, army was in reality relieved by Generals Franklin United States volunteers; Major Donn Piatt, Asand Sumner's corps at Crampton's Gap, within sistant Adjutant-Gen. United States volunteers; seven miles of his position; and that after the Capt. F. Ball, Aid-de-Camp, United States volunsurrender of Harper's Ferry no time was given to teers, and Col. J. Holt, Judge-Advocate General, parole prisoners before twenty thousand troops called by the Government to investigate the conwere hurried from Virginia, and the entire force duct of certain officers connected with, and the went off on the double-quick to relieve Lee, who circumstances attending the abandonment of Mawas being attacked at Antietam. Had the garri-ryland Heights and the surrender of Harper's son been slower to surrender, or the army of the Ferry, I find the following remarks applying to Potomac swifter to march, the enemy would have been forced to raise the siege, or would have been taken in detail, with the Potomac dividing his force. WAR DEPARTMENT ORDER. ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, Į GENERAL ORDER No. 183. 2d. The Commission having reported that the behavior of the One Hundred and Twenty-sixth New-York infantry was disgraceful, and that Major William H. Baird, for his bad conduct, ought to be dismissed, the said Major Baird, of the One Hundred and Twenty-sixth New-York volunteers, is, by direction of the President, dismissed from the service of the United States. 3d. The Commission having reported that Brig.-General Julius White, United States volunteers, acted with decided capability and courage, and merits its approbation, and having found nothing in the conduct of the subordinate officers myself: "The Commission would not have dwelt upon this painful subject were it not for the fact that the officer who placed this incapable (Col. Miles) in command, should share in the responsibility, and in the opinion of the Commission, Major-General Wool is guilty to this extent of a grave disaster, and should be censured for his conduct." the surrender of Harper's Ferry has no more If the report of the Commission in relation to truth for its foundation than is contained in the above paragraph, it can only be regarded as a fiction, without a shadow of proof for its foundation. (Col. Miles) in command of Harper's Ferry." He It is not true that I placed "this incapable was there in command at the time when I assumed to establish his headquarters there, on the twencontrol of this Department, and had been ordered ty-ninth of March, by Major-Gen. McClellan, then General-in-Chief. On the thirtieth of April, the Secretary of War sent the following order to Col. Miles, at Harper's Ferry: "You will please make daily reports of the state of your command to this Department." I have not now time to notice further the "cen sure" of the Commission; when I am at leisure, it will receive the attention which it merits. SOMERVILLE, MASS., September 27, 1862. I have noticed with much pain and sorrow the many reflections and insinuations adverse to the character of Col. Dixon S. Miles, going the rounds in the papers, as well as the many ridiculous statements in regard to the surrender of Harper's Ferry, and cannot but feel it my duty to deny the charges of disloyalty, and give the public a correct statement in regard to the above-mentioned lamented affair. take to defend it once. Col. Miles was wounded three quarters of an hour after the white handkerchief was displayed, emblematic of a cessation of hostilities, and not after the condition of surrender was settled. Our first rumors of the enemy's crossing into Maryland near Noland's Ferry, at the mouth of the Monocacy River, seventeen miles below Har- Again, I saw a statement that fifty-seven pieces per's Ferry, was received on September first, from of artillery were turned over, and three field-batour pickets at that point who were driven in to teries besides, making seventy-five pieces-a falsPoint of Rocks. Reënforcements were immedi-ity; also one hundred tons of ammunition and ately received at that point. Col. Miles sent the twenty days' rations for fifteen thousand men-a Eighty-seventh Ohio regiment, with two twelve-base lie. Our men had been living on half-rapounder howitzers. The enemy crossed in very large force, cutting the canal at Seven-Mile Level, driving back our forces to Berlin, thence to Knoxville, Weaverton, and finally to Sandy Hook. tions for three days previous to Gen. White's arrival, with three thousand five hundred men, from Martinsburgh. Col. Miles seized all the flour from the mills and stores in and around Thursday, September eleventh, the enemy were Harper's Ferry, to subsist his troops upon. The nearly fifty thousand strong in Pleasant Valley, injustice done Col. Miles has emanated principally and forced their way through Solomon's Gap, and from the infantry troops, who had nothing to do there "shelled out" our picket, who were thrown with the engagements of Sunday and Monday, it there by Col. Ford, of the Thirty-second Ohio, being an artillery duel entirely, with the infantry who commanded Maryland Heights. He then in trenches five feet deep. As for ammunition, had the Thirty-second Ohio, six hundred; Rhode the enemy got about forty thousand rounds of Island cavalry, three hundred and fifty; Mary-musket-cartridges, and not a single shell nor land cavalry, two hundred; McGrath's artillery company, one hundred; battalion First Maryland infantry, three hundred; total, one thousand five hundred and fifty. Col. Ford represented if he had another regiment, he could hold the Heights against the whole rebel army. He was reën forced by the Garibaldi Guards, and subsequently, at his desire, the One Hundred and Twentysixth New-York, the One Hundred and Fifteenth New-York, and the Third Maryland. The last order he had from Col. Miles was a peremptory one to hold those Heights; on Saturday he evacuated and crossed to Harper's Ferry, spiking the siege-guns. Colonel Ford never received orders, either verbal or written, from Col. Miles to evacuate. The enemy did not make his appearance on the Heights for over four hours afterward. Col. Ford had the following force when he left the Heights: Thirty-second Ohio, six hundred; Capt. McGrath's company, artillery, Fifth New-York, (heavy,) one hundred; battalion First Maryland infantry, three hundred; Third Maryland infantry, five hundred and fifty; One Hundred and Twenty-sixth New-York volunteers, nine hundred and fifty; One Hundred and Fifteenth New-York volunteers, nine hundred and seventy-five; Thirtyninth New-York, Garibaldi Guard, five hundred; total, three thousand nine hundred and seventyfive men. Colonel Ford's only reason for evacuating the Heights, when asked by Colonel Miles, was, "his regiments wouldn't fight". a stigma upon his own Thirty-second Ohio and the Garibaldians, who alone could have held the Heights until Monday. Again, Harper's Ferry is represented as an immense stronghold-"a Gibraltar." Harper's Ferry was a complete slaughter-pen-a small triangular position, contracted between two rivers, and surrounded on all sides by bluffs and hills. Gen. Jackson and Gen. Hill told me, personally, they had rather take it forty times than to under round shot. They got about fifty rounds of canister shot, (three hundred yards range.) Colonel Miles would not and did not raise the white flag until his artillerists had all reported themselves entirely out of ammunition. The enemy did not get fifteen thousand stand of arms, but about seven thousand five hundred, and most of them the men had rendered useless by taking out the lock-springs. They got the following guns: six twenty-four pounder howitzers; twelve sixpounder Napoleons, smooth; six three-inch James's rifled-guns; four twenty-pounder rifled Parrotts; six smooth-bores, brass. Also the following guns, which were spiked and useless, on Maryland Heights: two nine-inch Dahlgrens; one fifty-pounder rifled Parrott; six twelvepounder howitzers; four common rough; total, forty-seven. By publishing the above written items you will do justice to the public, and by stating that a more gallant and loyal officer does not exist in the States, nor does there exist a man who, under the circumstances, could have held out longer than did Colonel Miles. The Government knew his situation-knew he was pressed with one hundred thousand men who were determined to take the place-knew that the place was under a tremendous cannonade from daylight on Friday, September twelfth, till dark; again from daybreak Saturday till dark; from half-past two P.M. Sunday, the fourteenth, till dark; and at last, before daylight on Monday, September fifteenth, until the last shell and round shot was expended, at nine o'clock A.M. Col. Miles's limb was not amputated; reaction did not take place sufficient to allow of it. He lingered until half-past four P.M. on Tuesday. On Wednesday his body was taken to Frederick in a rough box by his staffofficers, and a metallic case procured, and therein conveyed to Sweet Air, Baltimore County, near Baltimore, Md. I hope justice will be done by the proper report at headquarters of the army. |