in such manner as their feelings of friendship towards these republics or as their own honor and policy may at the time dictate."

It has been contended that this action was a disavowal of the Monroe Doctrine, but it was far from it. The occasion called for a more precise statement of the course to be pursued by the United States, and this statement, as contained in the House resolution, was the logical result of the principle of self-defense which underlies the declaration in President Monroe's message. The declaration was made because of a threatened movement "dangerous to our peace and safety," -to the peace and safety of the United States, not of others. It would, therefore, be unwise for us to enter into any alliance or compact which would intrust to other powers the decision, in whole or in part, of the question what was dangerous to our peace and safety. We must reserve to ourselves exclusively the decision of that momentous question, and it would be the part of wisdom to withhold the decision of that question till the crisis should arise. Hence the House resolution of 1826, so far from being a disavowal of the doctrine, is an affirmation of its true spirit and intent. Happily the United States, since the declaration of President Monroe, has increased sevenfold in power and influence, and does not need to seek an alliance with its neighbors to enforce the doctrine of non-interference against European domination. But at the same time it encourages and welcomes the adoption of the doctrine by our sister republics.

The next occasion when the Monroe Doctrine was

sought to be applied was in 1848, when President Polk in a special message brought to the attention of Congress the fact that the white population of Yucatan (a state of Mexico) had called upon the United States for help against the Indians, who were waging against them a war of extermination; offering, if aid should be granted, to transfer the "dominion and sovereignty " to the United States, and stating that similar appeals had been made to England and Spain.1 President Polk disavowed any policy of acquisition, but stated that there was danger, unless the United States intervened, of the peninsula falling into the hands of a European power, which he regarded as dangerous to our peace and security.

Following the message a bill was introduced in the Senate authorizing the temporary military occupation of Yucatan, and this resulted in a debate, the most notable feature of which was a speech from Mr. Calhoun, who was then the only surviving member of the Cabinet of President Monroe, Mr. J. Q. Adams having died only a few months before. In this speech, Mr. Calhoun sought to weaken the force of the Monroe Doctrine, and he stated that President Monroe did not contemplate the use of force when he made his declaration. views and memory are in contradiction to those of Mr. J. Q. Adams, also a member of Monroe's Cabinet. In a conversation with Mr. Bancroft, a member of Mr. Polk's Cabinet in 1845, he supported the latter's attitude as to the Oregon boundary, and in indorsing the 1 4 Richardson's Messages, 581. 2 4 Calhoun's Works, 461.

His

Monroe Doctrine, said "he believed it indispensably necessary to make large expenditures for preparation by sea and land, to maintain it, if necessary, by force of arms. Mr. Calhoun was, however, correct in asserting that the situation in Yucatan afforded no proper occasion to invoke the doctrine. We were then just closing the war with Mexico, and the helpless condition of the white population of Yucatan mainly grew out of the disorder attending that contest. There was no indication that any European power was contemplating the occupation of the peninsula. With the peace came a restoration of order and safety, and the subject was dropped in the Senate.

Soon after came the negotiation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty of 1850. It had two objects in view: first, the promotion of the construction of an inter-oceanic canal across the isthmus of Central America; and, second, the restriction of British territorial dominion in the same quarter. With the acquisition of California, the interest of the people of the United States was greatly increased in the construction of the canal, and it was felt that the capital for its construction must come from England. On the other hand, the British influence on the isthmus was very active at that time. The Belize settlement was growing into a colony and a British protectorate was sought to be extended over the Mosquito coast, covering the eastern outlet of the Nicaragua canal route.

Mr. Clayton, then Secretary of State, entered into negotiations with the British minister, the result of 1 12 Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, 218.

which was the treaty by which the two governments stipulated for a joint guarantee of the canal to be constructed; and agreed not to occupy, fortify, colonize, or assume or exercise any dominion over any part of Central America. The treaty was ratified without much discussion, in the belief that it would insure at once the construction of the canal and would exclude British colonization and protectorates from Central America; but it was no sooner published than it began to be a source of dispute as to its scope and meaning. Secretary Blaine, in 1881, described it as "misunderstandingly entered into, imperfectly comprehended, contradictorily interpreted, and mutually vexatious." President Buchanan said in 1857, that if in the United States the treaty had been considered susceptible of the construction put upon it by Great Britain, it never would have been negotiated, nor would it have received the approbation of the Senate. Mr. Cass, who was a member of the Senate at the time it was ratified, has made a similar declaration.

The American expectation as to the early construction of the canal, with the aid of British capital, was disappointed; and for the next ten years our secretaries of state were occupied in bringing the British government to an observance of its engagements respecting the colonization and protectorates. The treaty marks the most serious mistake in our diplomatic history, and is the single instance, since its announcement in 1823, of a tacit disavowal or disregard of the Monroe Doctrine, by the admission of Great Britain to an equal participation in the protection and control of a great Ameri

can enterprise.' The wisdom of that doctrine is mos signally illustrated in the effects of this single disavowa the heated discussion engendered, and the embarras ments which the treaty has brought to this government, and from which it still suffers.2

Mention has been made of the notice which Secretary Clay caused to be given to France and Great Britain that we could not consent to the transfer of Cuba to any other European power. This position was, as we have seen, announced by President Jefferson as early as 1808, and it has been repeated by almost every administration from that day to this. The basis of this position is the Monroe Doctrine, and it has had the unanimous support of all our public men, although there have been times in our history when the attitude of our government towards Cuba has not been free from criticism. Similar declarations have been made respecting San Domingo, when apparently threatened by European aggression or transfer. President Grant, in his annual message of 1870, in discussing the Spanish misrule in Cuba, and the relation of the other American nations to the Monroe Doctrine, used this

1 "This treaty [Clayton-Bulwer] is the only instance in which the United States has consented to join with any European power in the management of political interests in the western hemisphere; and the treaty is remarkable, not only because it is a departure from the settled policy of the United States not to sanction any European interference in the affairs of America, but because, deviating in this way from our settled system, it undertakes, in concert with a foreign power, to determine a question the most important to the United States that can arise outside of our own territory." Dr. Francis Wharton, 1 Wharton's Int. Dig. 168.

2 For history of the discussion and citation of authorities, 1 Wharton's Int. Dig. sect. 150 f.