having passed without an answer, he sent a second note, in which he intensified and exceeded his instructions; to the demand for indemnity he added the requirement that all persons concerned in the wrong should be dismissed from the service, and that these demands should be complied with in forty-eight hours. The secretary of legation, in delivering the note to the Spanish minister of state, pointed to the clock, then exactly at twelve, and indicated that in precisely two days the answer would be due. These notes reached the foreign office during holy week, when it is not usual to dispatch business, but the day after the second note was received, April 12, 1854, a reply was sent by the minister couched in the best style of the proud Castilian. Careful attention, it said, would be given to the affair when full information was received; it was unreasonable to expect that so grave a case should be determined upon the hearing of one side only; and it was added that the Spanish government was "not accustomed to the harsh and imperious manner with which this matter has been expressed; which, furthermore, is not the most adequate for attaining the amicable settlement which is wished for."2

Soulé could do nothing but forward this reply to his government, though he fully anticipated it would bring instructions to break off diplomatic relations. When this correspondence reached Washington the excitement had completely died out; the Black Warrior had been released, with great marks of consideration on the part of the Cuban authorities; and the warlike 1 H. Ex. Doc. 93, 33d Cong. 2d Sess. p. 70.

2 Ib. 73.

instructions which Soulé expected were never sent. In the heated state of the country over the slavery question in Kansas, such a case could not be exaggerated into a cause of war; and Marcy, the experienced politician and cool-headed Secretary of State, left his excitable minister to fret at Madrid over his silence.1

But another opportunity soon opened to Soulé to exploit his expansion schemes. While Marcy was not ready to plunge the country into war because of the provocation just narrated, he was quite anxious to bring about the annexation of Cuba, and he cherished the delusion that it could be accomplished by purchase. Accordingly he instructed Soulé to join Mason, our minister in Paris, and Buchanan, minister in London, in a conference with a view to concerting some plan for the acquisition of Cuba, in a way that would overcome the opposition of France and England, and would satisfy both the honor and cupidity of Spain. The three envoys met in October, first at Ostend and afterwards adjourned to Aix-la-Chapelle, and the result of their conference was the issuance of a remarkable document, mainly the work of Soulé, known as "The Ostend Manifesto. It set forth the reasons which impelled the United States to desire the acquisition of the island, why Spain should yield to this desire, and why the transfer would redound to the benefit of the European governments and commerce. The price, it stated, should not exceed a certain maximum sum, which was not inserted, but it is understood was fixed at $120,000,000; and it was intimated that if Spain

1 Ib. 105, 107.

should refuse this liberal offer, the United States would be justified "by every law, human and divine," in taking the island by force.1

Soulé was highly elated at his success in bringing his colleagues, Mason and Buchanan, to his views, but he was destined a second time to have his hopes dashed by his chief. When the "manifesto" reached Marcy's hands he at once saw the fatal error into which the envoys had fallen, and in an instruction to Soulé plainly indicated his dissent from the course indicated. He affected to believe that the envoys did not "recommend to the President to offer to Spain the alternative of cession or seizure," then proceeded to argue against such a proceeding, and notified Soulé that if the Spanish government was not willing to entertain a proposition for a peaceful purchase, the negotiations should not be further pressed. Upon receipt of this dispatch Soulé felt that he could no longer serve under a secretary of state who so constantly frustrated his plans, and he indignantly tendered his resignation.

The sentiment in the United States was generally averse to the "manifesto." Even the Southern expansionists felt that the envoys had overreached themselves. In the North the anti-slavery press was not stinted in its condemnation. It was styled "atrocious in its recommendations; " the "manifesto of the brig ands;" and that it meant: "If Spain will not sell Cuba, we must steal it." In Europe our reputation for statecraft was greatly tarnished by Soulé's conduct and this document. The London Times, in discussing the

1 H. Ex. Doc. 93, 33d Cong. 2d Sess. p. 127.

2 Ib. 134.

subject, echoed the prevailing judgment when it said: "The diplomacy of the United States is certainly a very singular profession."

1

The Crimean War brought us into diplomatic conflict with Great Britain, because of the attempt of the minister and consuls of that country to carry on enlistment for the British army at various places in the United States in disregard of the laws, and their conduct led to the dismissal of the minister and the consuls at New York, Philadelphia, and Cincinnati. Crampton, the British minister, had long resided in the United States, was popular in society, and greatly liked by members of the Cabinet. His offense was that, in conjunction with the consuls at the places named, he had conducted an extensive system of recruiting for military service, in plain violation of the neutrality laws of the United States. An opportunity was afforded the British government to transfer him to another post, but this it declined to do, and no alternative was left the Secretary of State but to send him his passport and require him to leave the country. The incident occasioned much excitement in England, and its press demanded the dismissal of the American minister at London, but the offense was too clearly established to justify retaliation.

At the conclusion of the Crimean War the conference of European powers, which joined in the peace, also united in a series of declarations at Paris in 1856,

1 2 Rhodes's U. S. 43.

21 Life of Jefferson Davis, by his wife, 569.

For official documents, H. Ex. Doc. No. 107, 34th Cong. 1st Sess.

which they designed, by the adhesion of other nations, to have incorporated into the recognized code of international law. These rules were, briefly stated, (1) the abolition of privateering; (2) the exemption from seizure of an enemy's goods under a neutral flag; (3) a like exemption of neutral goods under an enemy's flag; and (4) that a blockade, in order to be valid, must be effective.

All these but the first had been long advocated by the United States. The first was plainly in the interest of nations having a strong navy, but Mr. Marcy agreed to accept it with an amendment of the rules exempting the private property of individuals, except contraband, from seizure on the high sea by naval vessels in time of war. The amendment was not accepted by Great Britain, and our government declined to give its adhesion to the declarations.1 Subsequently when the Civil War began and our commerce was threatened by rebel cruisers, our government proposed to give its unconditional adhesion to them, but Great Britain and France declined, except on condition that the rules should not be applied during the war of the Rebellion.3 Verily in diplomacy, as in the ordinary affairs of men, "circumstances alter cases."

2

During the recent war with Spain our government made a public announcement of its intention to observe the rules of Paris in the existing war, and they

1 For official correspondence, H. Ex. Doc. No. 1, 34th Cong. 3d Sess. pp. 31-44.

2 3 Wharton's Int. Dig. 273.

• President's Proclamation, April 26, 1898.

8 Ib. 233.