he could retire from the office. He had been restive under the criticism of his party friends for continuing in the Cabinet of President Tyler after the latter had broken with those who elected him, and having adjusted the important northeastern boundary dispute, he sought an early opportunity to retire, after a service of two years. His relations with President Tyler had been pleasant, but the latter was deeply intent upon accomplishing the annexation of Texas during his term, and he felt that he could not count upon Mr. Webster's cooperation to that end. His son and biographer writes: "The time had come when it was necessary to have in the office of secretary of state one who would go the full length of the Texas question. Certainly that man was not Webster."1 The latter had manifested a willingness to accept a special mission to London, and it was arranged that application should be made to Congress for an appropriation to meet the expense. The state of negotiations seemed to call for such a mission. We were pressing upon Mexico the recognition of the independence of Texas. We were likewise seeking to persuade Mexico to sell to us the province of California. The WebsterAshburton treaty had left unsettled the Oregon question, and its settlement was becoming urgent. It was proposed that a tripartite convention be negotiated in London, whereby the independence of Texas should be recognized, the British government was to bring its influence to bear on Mexico to cede California to the United States for a handsome money compensation, 1 2 Letters and Times of the Tylers, 263. and Great Britain was to receive all that part of Oregon north of the Columbia River in consideration of contributing a part of the indemnity to be paid to Mexico on account of the cession of California. John Quincy Adams was chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House, and he was enlisted to procure the necessary appropriation for the special mission; but when he proposed it in the committee it was voted down by three ayes to six nays.1 Thus this project came to naught, but there still seemed a way open to accomplish the purpose. Congress had made an appropriation to establish diplomatic and commercial relations with China, and after the failure of the appropriation for the London special mission, the President nominated Edward Everett, our minister in London, to the Chinese mission. Adams was again pressed into service, and wrote Everett a letter urging him to accept the mission, but the latter preferred to remain in London and declined the appointment. Lord Ashburton, unconscious that Webster was coveting the London mission, wrote him: "We were in some anxiety that he [Everett] might leave us for the Celestial Empire, but I find, as I anticipated, that he will remain with the Terrestrials. He would be much too fine an instrument for such a purpose; it would be cutting blocks with a razor. 993 Being a second time disappointed in his plan for an easy retirement from his post, Mr. Webster submitted 1 11 Adams's Memoirs, 327, 347. 2 Ib. 337. 3 Webster's Pr. Cor. 192. For details as to Webster mission, 2 Tyler's Tyler, 259–263. his resignation, and after a brief interval he resumed his seat in the Senate. His biographer, Mr. Lodge, says: "No one, with the exception of John Quincy Adams, has ever shown higher qualities, or attained greater success in the administration of the State Department than Mr. Webster did while in Mr. Tyler's Cabinet." 1 The State Department was filled, during the ten months following Mr. Webster's resignation, by a series of ad interim appointments, until in March, 1844, John C. Calhoun assumed its duties. He, Clay, and Webster, compose the triumvirate of great statesmen of the second generation of our national history. His career began in the lower House of Congress as one of the war party, and, as chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, he had a leading part in bringing on the conflict with Great Britain in 1812. Like Webster he had held no diplomatic post, but as cabinet minister, vice-president, and senator he had borne a conspicuous part in public affairs. He, more than any other, sowed the seeds of disunion which brought about our Civil War, and as the champion of slavery was the most fit person to do the work upon which the President was so intent, and for which Webster could not be used. This was the annexation of Texas to the Union. It was largely a question of domestic politics, and one of the absorbing topics of the presidential campaign of 1844, but we have only to do with its diplomatic aspects. It has been seen that Mr. Adams, during the negotiations for the purchase of Florida and the fixa1 Lodge's Webster, 261. tion of the western boundary of Louisiana, contended for the inclusion of Texas; that is, making the Rio Grande the western boundary. During the latter's presidential term, Secretary Clay, in 1827, instructed our minister in Mexico to propose the purchase of Texas,' but the latter did not deem it prudent to submit the proposition. Ten years later its independence was recognized by the United States. The same year the new republic proposed a union with the United States, but the offer, as we have seen, was not favored by President Van Buren. The project was held in abeyance until Vice-President Tyler had become well seated in the place made vacant by Harrison's untimely death. After the retirement of Mr. Webster from the State Department, in 1843, active efforts to that end were begun. The Mexican government, learning of this movement, in August of that year notified the United States that annexation would be regarded as a cause of war.2 Mr. Calhoun, the Secretary of State, had, as early as 1836, declared himself in favor of annexation on the ground that the interests of slavery in the Southern States opposed the establishment of an independent state between them and Mexico, and the action of Great Britain and France subsequently taken showed that from his point of view such a policy was a wise one. Previous to Calhoun's taking charge of the State Department, the Texan minister had asked, as a condition of signing a treaty of annexation, that the United 1 H. Ex. Doc. No. 40, 25th Cong. 1st Sess. p. 9. States would, pending the ratification of the treaty, use its naval and military force to protect Texas from Mexican invasion. Nelson, Attorney-General and ad interim Secretary of State, had answered that such use would be unconstitutional, but he gave the Texan to understand that the forces could be so posted as to effect the desired end. Meantime the Texan government, playing a double game, came to an agreement with Great Britain, whereby, in return for the latter's action in securing the recog nition of its independence by Mexico, Texas pledged itself not to be annexed to any other country. This agreement had been approved by Mexico, and was awaiting the final action of Texas when Calhoun became secretary. This event hastened negotiations on his part. He entered office March 6, and on April 12 a treaty of annexation was signed.' It was preceded by a declaration from Calhoun that "during the pendency of the treaty of annexation the President would deem it his duty to use all the means placed within his power by the Constitution to protect Texas from foreign invasion." 2 This language, carefully chosen by Calhoun, was accepted by the Texans as a sufficient guarantee of protection from the Mexican government, and by the signature of the treaty they abandoned the British scheme of an independent existence. The treaty was not sent to the Senate till Calhoun could answer a note of the British minister, which had 1 For copy of President's Message and treaty, S. Doc. 341, 28th Cong. 1st Sess. vol. 5, pp. 5, 10. 25 Calhoun's Works, 363. |