in Canada. A party was formed in Congress known as the "War-Hawks," led by Henry Clay and John C. Calhoun, then in the flush of their young manhood, who clamored for war, insisting that we should no longer submit to the British indignities.

Congress met in the winter of 1811-12. Madison's first term was approaching its close, and if he continued in office he must, according to the usage of the day, receive his renomination.at the hands of his party friends in Congress. He was a man of peace, and was seeking every honorable expedient to avoid hostilities. He could hardly have held out much longer against the clamor of the party majority in Congress for war. Το even him it finally became apparent that there was no hope of maintaining our rights except by an appeal to force, and on June 1, 1812, he sent in a confidential message1 recapitulating the conduct of Great Britain, and submitted to Congress the momentous question. His closing language was: "Whether the United States shall continue passive under these progressive usurpations and these accumulating wrongs, or, opposing force to force in defense of their national rights, shall commit just cause into the hands of the Almighty Disposer of Events, is a solemn question which the Constitution wisely confides to the legislative department of the government." The message received prompt action in the House, but in the Senate the act declaring war was much debated, but was finally passed June 18, and war was again proclaimed against our old enemy.2

1 1 Richardson's Messages, 505. The official documents relating to the war will be found in 3 For. Rel. folio.

2 2 U. S. Stat. at Large, 755.

The vote in the House stood 79 to 49, and in the Senate 19 to 13, thus developing a decided opposition in both houses. It does not fall within the scope of this work to trace the progress of the war, but a few of its incidents cannot well be passed over. We have seen that the New England Federalists were against the acquisition of Louisiana, and that their leader in the House announced that it threatened at no distant day the subversion of the Union. When the bill for the admission of Louisiana as a State was being considered in Congress, Quincy of Massachusetts, referring to the vast enlargement of the South, made the startling declaration that the passage of the bill would be "virtually a dissolution of the Union," and that it would be the duty of his section to prepare for the separation. The embargo brought great embarrassment on New England commerce and ruin to many of its commercial houses, and much dissatisfaction was engendered thereby in that section.

One of the grievances enumerated in the acts of Great Britain which occasioned the war was a secret mission of one Henry to Boston in 1809, who was sent by Sir James Craig, British governor of Canada, to do all possible to ferment and increase the discontent in New England. Henry, not being compensated to his satisfaction by the British ministry, sold the documents relating to his confidential mission to the government at Washington, and they were sent to Congress in March, 1812, and published.2

So bitter was the feeling in Boston against the war

1 Supra, p. 202.

2 3 For. Rel. 545.

that federal agents soliciting loans were obliged to receive subscriptions from bankers of that city under pledge of secrecy. The anti-war party in New England received the title of "blue-light" Federalists, owing to the charge that their adherents gave night signals to the British blockading vessels off our ports. This disaffection culminated in the Hartford Convention, an assembly of delegates from the New England States, embracing some of their most able and distinguished men. Its sessions were secret, but it is clear that designs against the integrity of the Union were entertained. To this opposition Madison attributed "the source of our greatest difficulties in carrying on the war," and "certainly the greatest if not the sole inducement with the enemy to persevere in it." 1 It is a dark blot on our country's history, which only the steadfast loyalty of New England in after years has partially effaced.2

An incident of the war which brought everlasting disgrace upon British arms was the burning of Washington, the capital of the nation. The disgrace is the deeper because it was done under the direction and in the presence of the commanding officers, and so far as the greater portion of the buildings was concerned their destruction could not be called for as a military meaThe burning and destruction included the unfinished Capitol and Congressional Library, the Executive Mansion, the Treasury, and other department buildings,

sure.

1 2 Madison's Works, 593.

2 For account of New England disaffection and Hartford Convention, J. Q. Adams's New England Federation; 8 H. Adams's Hist. U. S.

with their valuable archives, printing-offices, and many private residences. It is related that Mrs. Madison, the wife of the President, carried away and preserved the original Declaration of Independence. No one at this day defends this act of vandalism. Even at the time there were London journals which denounced it. "Willingly," said the London Statesman, "would we throw a veil of oblivion over our transactions at Washington. The Cossacks spared Paris, but we spared not the capital of America."

The American army likewise gained little glory out of the British expedition against Washington and Baltimore, but it has left us one trophy out of the British repulse in the assault and bombardment of Fort McHenry - our most popular national song, "The Star-spangled Banner."

This war is one of the most singular in history in its diplomatic aspects. Seldom has a war been entered upon which involved so many questions of international law, and yet it was concluded without the settlement of a single one of the issues upon which it was fought; nevertheless, its conclusion was hailed with pleasure and satisfaction by both nations.

The negotiations which resulted in the treaty of peace are interesting because of the distinguished men representing the United States, and of the singular character of the results just indicated. The American commissioners were John Quincy Adams, Henry Clay, Albert Gallatin, James A. Bayard, and Jonathan Russell. Mr. Adams was recognized as our most experienced diplomat. Mr. Clay had been the leader of the

war party in Congress, and in the exuberance of his young statesmanship had, at the opening of the war, talked about dictating peace at Quebec or Halifax. Mr. Gallatin was then Secretary of the Treasury, a post he had also filled through Jefferson's administration with distinguished ability, probably the most able of the administration leaders, and an opponent of the declaration of war. Mr. Bayard was a Federalist member of the Senate of recognized influence, in which body the family has had an honored representative almost continuously to our day. Mr. Russell had served as chargé d'affaires in Paris, was acting in that capacity in London at the outbreak of hostilities, and when made a peace commissioner was minister to Sweden. Never has our country been represented abroad by a commission of men of more varied experience or distinguished services.

The negotiations took place at Ghent, and continued through the last four months of 1814. The British commissioners were haughty and overbearing, and seemed implacable in their demands; but the weary and anxious months were interspersed with formal dinners and the exchange of cheerless courtesies. The task of winning over the British to an agreement was hardly less difficult than that of reconciling the differences of the American commissioners. Adams and Clay, although utterly distinct in temperament, had one thing in common-an irascible disposition. Adams was severe and uncompromising in his opinions, and Clay was hasty in judgment and free of speech, and the two kept the councils of the Americans in a fer