to be the "conductor of the army in their plans for redress," to the exclusion of a leader like Horatio Gates.*

With these convictions and with exceeding caution, he, on the seventh of February, addressed himself directly to Washington in a letter, of which Brooks, on his return to the camp, was the bearer. We," so he wrote of congress, "are a body not governed by reason or foresight, but by circumstances. It appears to be a prevailing opinion in the army that, if they once lay down their arms, they part with the means of obtaining justice. Their claims, urged with moderation but with firmness, may operate on those weak minds which are influenced by their apprehensions more than by their judgments, so as to produce a concurrence in the measures which the exigencies of affairs demand. To restore public credit is the object of all men of sense; in this the influence of the army, properly directed, may co-operate." And he invited Washington to make use of General Knox, t to whom Gouverneur Morris wrote on the same day and by the same channel.

To ensure the concerted action of the southern army, Gouverneur Morris wrote privately to Greene: "The main army will not easily forego their expectations. Their murmurs, though not loud, are deep. If the army, in common with all other public creditors, insist on the grant of general, permanent funds for liquidating all the public debts, there can be little doubt that such revenues will be obtained, and will afford to every order of public creditors a solid security. With the due exception of miracles, there is no probability that the states will ever make such grants unless the army be united and determined in the pursuit of it, and unless they be firmly supported by and as firmly support the other creditors. That this may happen must be the entire wish of every intelligently just man and of every real friend to our glorious revolution." ‡

The letter of Gouverneur Morris to Knox, which was in reality a communication through Knox to Washington, cannot be found. It evidently expressed the opinion that the army might be made to co-operate in bringing about a closer union

Hamilton to Washington, 7 February 1783. Hamilton, i., 327.

G. Morris to Greene, 15 February 1783. Sparks's G. Morris, i., 250.

of the states and a stronger government. The answer of Knox expresses the advice of Washington: "The army are good patriots, and would forward everything that would tend to produce union and a permanent general constitution; but they are yet to be taught how their influence is to effect this matA hoop to the barrel' is their favorite toast. America will have fought and bled to little purpose if the powers of government shall be insufficient to preserve the peace, and this must be the case without general funds. As the present constitution is so defective, why do not you great men call the people together and tell them so that is, to have a convention of the states to form a better constitution? This appears to us, who have a superficial view only, to be the most efficacious remedy." *

On the thirteenth of February the speech of the king of Great Britain, at the opening of parliament in December, was received. His announcement of provisional articles of peace with the United States produced great joy; yet that joy was clouded by apprehensions from the impossibility of meeting the just claims of the army.

Congress was brought no nearer to decisive action. Hamilton proposed that the doors of congress should be thrown wide open whenever the finances were under discussion, though the proposal, had it been accepted, would have filled the galleries with holders of certificates of the public debt. †

On the other side, John Rutledge again and again moved that the proceeds of the impost should be appropriated exclusively to the army, but was supported only by his own state. Ruffled by his indifference to the civil creditors, Wilson had one day answered with warmth: "Pennsylvania will take her own measures without regard to those of congress, and she ought to do so. She is willing to sink or swim according to the common fate; but she will not suffer herself, with a millstone of six millions of the continental debt, to go to the bottom alone."

The weakness of the friends of a general revenue appeared from their consenting to leave to the several states the ap*Knox to G. Morris, 21 February 1783, in Sparks's G. Morris, i., 256. Gilpin, 336, 341; Elliot, 50, 52.

pointment of the collectors of taxes, and to limit the grant of the impost to twenty-five years.*

Once more Mercer and Arthur Lee renewed their war upon Madison, who in reply made a convincing plea for the necessity of a permanent general revenue. "The purse," repeated Arthur Lee, "ought never to be put in the same hand with the sword. I will be explicit; I would rather see congress a rope of sand than a rod of iron. Virginia ought not to concur in granting to congress a permanent revenue." "If the federal compact is such as has been represented," said Mercer, "I will immediately withdraw from congress, and do everything in my power to destroy its existence." Chafed by these expressions, Gorham of Massachusetts cried out: "The sooner this is known the better, that some of the states may form other confederacies adequate to their safety." +

The assiduous labors of congress for two months had failed to devise the means for restoring public credit. In February some of its members thought the time had arrived when order and credit could come, if the army would support its demands by its strength. Robert Morris extorted from congress a removal of the injunction of secrecy on his letter of resignation, and forthwith sent it not only to Washington but to the public press, through which it immediately reached the army.

*Gilpin 314, 347, 348; Elliot, 43, 54.

Gilpin, 357, 511; Elliot, 57.

CHAPTER VI.

THE AMERICAN ARMY AND ITS CHIEF.

MARCH 1783.

THE Commander-in-chief suppressed the wish to visit Mount Vernon during the winter, for the army at Newburg was more unquiet than at any former period.* The Massachusetts line formed more than half of it, and so many of the remainder were from other eastern states that he could describe them all as New England men. † He had made the delicate state of affairs "the object of many contemplative hours," and he was aware of the prevailing sentiment that the prospect of compensation for past services would terminate with the war. ‡

Now that peace was at hand, his first act was by a letter to Harrison, then governor of Virginia, to entreat his own state to enter upon a movement toward a real union. "From the observations I have made in the course of this war-and my intercourse with the states in their united as well as separate capacities has afforded ample opportunities of judging-I am decided in my opinion," such were his words, "that, if the powers of congress are not enlarged and made competent to all general purposes, the blood which has been spilt, the expense that has been incurred, and the distresses which have been felt, will avail nothing; and that the band which holds us together, already too weak, will soon be broken; when anar

*Sparks, viii., 355, 369.

Gorham in Gilpin, 315. Elliot, 43. Washington to Joseph Jones. Sparks, viii., 383; and compare Sparks, viii., 456.

Washington to Hamilton, 4 March 1783. Sparks, viii., 389, 390.

chy and confusion will prevail.* I shall make no apology for the freedom of these sentiments; they proceed from an honest heart; they will at least prove the sincerity of my friendship, as they are altogether undisguised." The governor received this letter as a public appeal, and placed it among the archives of Virginia.

Before the officers had taken into consideration the cautious report of their committee to congress, Colonel Walter Stewart, an inspector of troops, coming back from Philadelphia, presented himself at the quarters of Gates as "a kind of agent from the friends of the army in congress;" + and rumors were immediately circulated through the camp that it was universally expected the army would not disband until they had obtained justice; that the public creditors looked up to them for aid, and, if necessary, would even join them in the field; that some members of congress wished the measure might take effect, in order to compel the public, particularly the delinquent states, to do justice. ‡

A plan of action was in the utmost secrecy devised by Gates and those around him. To touch with ability the several chords of feeling which lay slumbering in the army, his aide-de-camp, Major John Armstrong, was selected to draft an address. This was copied, and Colonel Barber, the assistant adjutant-general of the division of Gates, taking care not to be tracked, put it in circulation through the line of every state,# with a notice for a meeting of the general and field officers on the next day, to consider what measures should be adopted to obtain that redress of grievances which they seemed to have solicited in vain. |

"My friends!" so ran the anonymous appeal, "after seven long years your suffering courage has conducted the United States of America through a doubtful and a bloody war; and

* Washington to Harrison, 4 March 1783. Maxwell's Virginia Historical Register, vi., 36, 37.

+ Gates to Armstrong, 22 June 1783. I follow a manuscript copy received from J. K. Armstrong. The letter has been printed in United States Magazine, i., 40. Washington to Joseph Jones, 12 March 1783. Sparks, viii., 393, 394. Washington to Hamilton, 12 March 1783. Hamilton, i., 343.

#Gates to Armstrong, 22 June, 1783.

Journal of Congress, iv., 208.