ecutive by electors chosen by the people expressly for the purpose; and Madison promptly accepted it as, "on the whole, liable to fewest objections." So, too, in part, thought the convention, which, on the motion of Ellsworth, decided, by six states to three, that the national executive should be appointed by electors; and, by eight states to two, that the electors should be chosen by the state legislatures. From confidence in the purity of the electoral body thus established, the re-eligibility of the executive was again affirmed by a vote of eight states against the two Carolinas ; # and, in consequence of the re-eligibility, the term of office was, at Ellsworth's motion, reduced by the vote of all the states but Delaware from seven years to six. So the convention hoped to escape from the danger of a corrupt traffic between the national legislature and candidates. for the executive by assembling in one place one grand electoral college, chosen by the legislatures of the several states for the sole purpose of electing that officer. To this system Caleb Strong of Massachusetts started this grave objection: "A new set of men, like the electors, will make the government too complex; nor will the first characters in the state feel sufficient motives to undertake the office." A On the previous day Houston of Georgia had directed the thoughts of the convention "to the expense and extreme inconvenience of drawing together men from all the states for the single purpose of electing the chief magistrate."◊ To him, likewise, it now seemed improbable that capable men would undertake the service. He was afraid to trust to it. Moved by these considerations, but still retaining its conviction of the greater purity of an electoral college, the convention, by seven votes against four, in the weariness of vacillation, returned to the plan of electing the national executive by the national legislature. But the vote was sure to reopen the question of his re-eligibility. The convention was now like a pack of hounds in full chase, suddenly losing the trail. It fell into an anarchy of opinion, * Gilpin, 1147; Elliot, 336. # Gilpin, 1148; Elliot, 337. Gilpin, 1150; Elliot, 338. Gilpin, 1150, 1151; Elliot, 338. | Gilpin, 1151, 1152; Elliot, 339. A Gilpin, 1189; Elliot, 358. ◊ Gilpin, 1186; Elliot, 357. Gilpin, 1190; Elliot, 359. William and one crude scheme trod on the heels of another. son, pleading the essential difference of interests between the northern and southern states, particularly relating to the carrying trade, "wished the executive power to be lodged in three men, taken from three districts, into which the states should be divided." * "At some time or other," said he, 66 we shall have a king; to postpone the event as long as possible, I would render the executive ineligible." + In the event of the ineligibility of the executive, Martin, forgetting the state of anarchy and faction that would attend a long period of service by an incompetent or unworthy incumbent, proposed that the term of executive service should be eleven years. "From ten to twelve," said Williamson.# "Fifteen," said Gerry; and King mocked them all by proposing "twenty years, the medium life of princes." | Wilson, seeing no way of introducing a direct election by the people, made the motion that the executive should be chosen by electors to be taken from the national legislature by lot. Ellsworth, on the twenty-fifth, pointed out that to secure a candidate for re-election against an improper dependence on the legislature, the choice should be made by electors.◊ Madison liked best an election of the executive by the qualified part of the people at large. "Local considerations,” he said, "must give way to the general interest. As an individual from the southern states, I am willing to make the sacrifice." + And now came into consideration an element which exercised a constant bias on the discussion to the last. Ellsworth complained that the executive would invariably be taken from one of the larger states. "To cure the disadvantage under which an election by the people would place the smaller states,” Williamson proposed that each man should vote for three candidates. Gouverneur Morris accepted the principle, but desired to limit the choice of the voters to two, of whom at least Gilpin, 1189; Elliot, 358. Gilpin, 1191; Elliot, 360. ▲ Gilpin, 1196; Elliot, 362. ◊ Gilpin, 1198; Elliot, 363. Gilpin, 1201; Elliot, 365. Gilpin, 1204; Elliot, 366. one should not be of his own state. This Madison approved, believing that the citizens would give their second vote with sincerity to the next object of their choice.* We shall meet the proposition again. Lastly, Dickinson said: "Insuperable objections lie against an election of the executive by the national legislature, or by the legislatures or executives of the states. I have long leaned toward an election by the people, which I regard as the best and the purest source. Let the people of each state choose its best citizen, and out of the thirteen names thus selected an executive magistrate may be chosen, either by the national legislature or by electors appointed by it."+ From hopelessness of an agreement, Gerry and Butler were willing to refer the resolution relating to the executive to a committee, but Wilson insisted that a general principle must first be fixed by a vote of the house. ‡ On the morning of the next day # Mason recapitulated all the seven different ways that had been proposed of electing the chief magistrate: by the people at large; by the legislatures of the states; by the executives of the states; by electors chosen by the people; by electors chosen by lot; by the legis lature on the nomination of three or two candidates by each several state; by the legislature on the nomination of one candidate from each state. After reviewing them all, he concluded that an election by the national legislature, as originally proposed, was the best. At the same time he held it to be the very palladium of civil liberty, that the great officers of state, and particularly the executive, should at fixed periods return to that mass from which they were taken. Led for the moment by this train of thought, the convention by six states, against Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland, with Virginia equally divided, resolved that a national executive be instituted; to consist of a single person; who should be chosen by the national legislature; for the term of seven years; and be ineligible a second time. || Foremost in undiminished disapproval of the choice of the executive by the legislature were Washington, Madison, Wil * Gilpin, 1205; Elliot, 367. Gilpin, 1206; Elliot, 367. VOL. VI.-23 Gilpin, 1207; Elliot, 368. # Ibid. Gilpin, 1211; Elliot, 370. son, Gouverneur Morris, and Gerry; foremost for the election. by that body were Rutledge, Mason, and, in a moderate degree, Strong. During the debate Gouverneur Morris had declared: "Of all possible modes of appointing the executive, an election by the people is the best; an election by the legislature is the worst.* I prefer a short period and re-eligibility, but a different mode of election." + In this he spoke the mind of Pennsylvania; and he refused to accept the decision of that day as final. On the twenty-fourth of August the report of the committee of detail relating to the executive came before the convention. All agreed that the executive power should be vested in a single person, to be styled: the President of the United States of America; and none questioned that his title might be: His Excellency. According to the report, he was to be elected by ballot by the legislature for a term of seven years, but might not be elected a second time.# The strife on the manner of his election revived. Daniel Carroll of Maryland, seconded by Wilson, renewed the motion, that he should be elected by the people; but the house was weary or unprepared to reopen the subject, and at the moment the motion received only the votes of Pennsylvania and Delaware. Rutledge then moved that the election of the president be made by the legislature in "joint ballot." The conducting of business, especially of elections, by the two branches of the legislature in joint session was from early days familiar to the states, and was at that time established in every one of them which had prepared a constitution of its own with two branches of the legislature, so that the regulations for that mode of choice were perfectly well understood. New Hampshire had had the experience of both methods; many of its officers were chosen annually by joint ballot, while its representatives to congress were appointed by the concurrent vote of the two houses. Unhappily, throughout this part of the work, the equal vote of the smaller states with the larger * Gilpin, 1193, 1204; Elliot, 361, 366. Gilpin, 1195; Elliot, 362. Gilpin, 1417; Elliot, 472. #Gilpin, 1236; Elliot, 380. ones in the senate persistently biased the movements of the convention. * In the special interest of the smaller states Sherman objected to a vote of the two houses in joint ballot, because it would deprive the senate of a negative on the more numerous branch. "It is wrong," said Gorham, "to be considering at every turn whom the senate will represent; the public good is the object to be kept in view; delay and confusion will ensue if the two houses vote separately, each having a negative on the choice of the other." Dayton and Brearley, following in the wake of Sherman, opposed a joint ballot, as impairing the power of the smaller states; but Langdon of New Hampshire, enlightened by experience at home, dwelt on the great difficulties of which the mode of separate votes by the two houses was productive; and, like a good patriot as he was, he approved the joint ballot, "though unfavorable to New Hampshire as a small state." Wilson remarked "that the senate might have an interest in throwing dilatory obstacles in the way, if its separate concurrence should be required." On the same side spoke Madison; and the motion of Rutledge prevailed by seven states, against Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland, and Georgia.† These four states, joined by Delaware, then demanded that, on the joint ballot, the vote should be taken by states; the decision turned on New Hampshire; and following the patriotic opinion of Langdon, it joined the five larger states and negatived the proposal. For an election of president, a majority of the votes of the members present was required, New Jersey alone dissenting. "In case the votes of the two highest should be equal," Read of Delaware, taking a clause from the constitution of his own state, moved that the president of the senate should have an additional vote; but it was disagreed to by a general negative. At this moment Gouverneur Morris interposed with decisive effect. He set forth the danger of legislative tyranny that would follow from leaving the executive dependent on the legislature for his election; he dwelt once more on the Gilpin, 1419; Elliot, 473. *Gilpin, 1418; Elliot, 472. Gilpin, 1420; Elliot, 473. |