the strength of independence, foresaw its expansion. The rising states beyond the mountains were clamorous for the unobstructed navigation of the Mississippi, which might lead to the acquisition by treaty of all the land east of that river; and the boundary on the south, as well of Georgia as of Florida, had never been adjusted with Spain. Gouverneur Morris had at an early day desired to restrict the limits of the United States; he now gave his ancient fears to the winds, and, acceding in advance to the largest eventual annexations, he proposed these few and simple words: "New States may be admitted by the legislature into the union," with the full understanding and intention that an ordinary act of legislation should be sufficient by a bare majority to introduce foreign territory as a state into the union.* This clause the convention accepted without a debate, and without a division. On the thirtieth, Maryland, impelled by a desire to guard the right of the United States to the back lands, and to be the champion of Kentucky, of Maine, of Vermont, and of the settlements on the Tennessee river and its branches, would have granted to the legislature of the United States unlimited power to dismember old states, but was supported only by Delaware and New Jersey. Vermont might once have been included within "the limits" of New York, but certainly remained no longer within its jurisdiction. By changing the word "limits" to "jurisdiction," the convention, still following Gouverneur Morris, provided for its future admission to the union without the consent of New York. In regard to the south-western settlements, the preliminary consent of the states of which they then formed a part was not dispensed with. In like manner no state could be formed by the junction of two or more states or parts thereof without the concurrence of such states. The country north-west of the Ohio having already been provided for, the rule for the admission of new states was thus completed for every part of the territory of the states or of the United States. The convention, still using the language of Gouverneur Morris, and no one but Maryland dissenting, assigned to the legislature the power to dispose of and make * Gilpin, 1458; Elliot, 493. Life and Writings of Gouverneur Morris by Sparks, iii., 183, 185, 290. Cooley's Story, 1282, etc. all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States. Every word in the constitution bearing on the subject of slavery was chosen with the greatest caution; every agreement was jealously guarded. After the section relating to the slavetrade, the committee of detail inserted: "No capitation tax shall be laid unless in proportion to the census hereinbefore directed to be taken." * This was intended to prevent congress from enforcing a general emancipation by the special taxation of slaves.† * Gilpin, 1234, 1415; Elliot, 379, 471. + Speech of Baldwin in the house of representatives, 12 February 1790. CHAPTER IX. THE PRESIDENT. JULY, AUGUST, AND SEPTEMBER 1787. How to call forth one of the people to be their executive chief for a limited period of years, and how to clothe him with just sufficient powers, long baffled the convention. Federal governments, in Greece, in Switzerland, and in Holland, like the confederation of the United States, had been without a separate executive branch; and the elective monarchies of Poland, of the Papal states, and of Germany, offered no available precedents. The report of the committee of detail of the sixth of August introduced no improvement in the manner of selecting a president; and it transferred to the senate the power to make treaties and to appoint ambassadors and judges of the supreme court.* Questions relating to the duties of the president long remained in doubt; the mode of his election was reached only just before the close of the convention. The Virginia plan confided the choice of the executive to the national legislature. "An election by the national legislature," objected Gouverneur Morris, on the seventeenth of July, will be the work of intrigue, of cabal, of corruption. and of faction; it will be like the election of a pope by a conclave of cardinals; of a king by the diet of Poland; real merit will rarely be the title to the appointment." He moved for an election by the "citizens of the United States."+ Sherman preferred a choice by the national legislature. Wilson insisted on an election by the people; should no one have a majority, then, and then only, the legislature might decide between the Gilpin, 1234; Elliot, 379. Gilpin, 1120; Elliot, 322. candidates.* Charles Pinckney opposed the election by the people, because it would surrender the choice to a combination of the populous states led by a few designing men.† "To refer the choice of a proper character for a chief magistrate to the people," protested Mason, "would be as unnatural as to refer a trial of colors to a blind man." "An election by the people," observed Williamson, "is an appointment by lot." On the first vote Pennsylvania stood alone against nine states. Martin proposed to intrust the appointment to the legislatures of the states; and was supported only by Delaware and Maryland. On the mode of choosing the president, the length of his period of office and his re-eligibility would be made to depend. The convention, in committee, had fixed that period at seven years with a prohibition of re-election. On the motion of William Houston of Georgia, supported by Sherman and Gouverneur Morris, this compulsory rotation was struck out by six states, against Delaware, Virginia, and the two Carolinas. The executive becoming re-eligible, Jacob Broom of Delaware revived the idea of a shorter period of service. McClurg held that the independence of the executive was no less essential than the independence of the judiciary; that a president, elected for a small number of years by the national legislature, and looking to that body for re-election, would be its dependent. To escape from corrupt cabals and yet preserve a good officer in place, he moved that the tenure of office should be good behavior. Gouverneur Morris beamed with joy. Broom found all his difficulties obviated. "Such a tenure," interposed Sherman, "is neither safe nor admissible; re-election will depend on good behavior." # Madison, who to the last refused with unabated vigor to intrust the choice of the national executive to the national legislature, and at heart would not have been greatly disinclined. to the longest period of service for the executive if "an easy and effectual removal by impeachment could have been settled," argued from the necessity of keeping the executive, legislative, and judiciary powers independent of each other, * Gilpin, 1121; Elliot, 323. Gilpin, 1121; Elliot, $23. # Gilpin, 1123; Elliot, 324. Gilpin, 1125, 1126; Elliot, 325. Madison's Writings, i, 345; Gilpin, 1127; Elliot, 326. that the tenure of good behavior for the executive was a less evil than its dependence on the national legislature for reelection. Mason replied: "An executive during good behavior is only a softer name for an executive for life; the next easy step will be to hereditary monarchy. Should the motion succeed, I may myself live to see such a revolution." "To prevent the introduction of monarchy," rejoined Madison, "is, with me, the real object. Experience proves a tendency in our governments to throw all power into the legislative vortex. The executives of the states are in general little more than ciphers; the legislatures omnipotent. If no effectual check be devised on the encroachments of the latter, a revolution will be inevitable." After explanations by McClurg, four statesNew Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Virginia, Madison voting with McClurg-expressed their preference for the tenure of good behavior to the tenure of seven years with a perpetual re-eligibility by the national legislature.* Massachusetts was among the six states in the negative, though to King, who "relied on the vigor of the executive as a great security for the public liberties," the tenure of good behavior would have been most agreeable, "provided an independent and effectual forum could be devised for the trial of the executive on an impeachment.” † This discussion brought the convention unanimously to the opinion that if the executive was to be chosen by the national legislature, he ought not to be re-eligible. Those, therefore, who agreed with Sherman, that the statesman who had proved himself most fit for an office ought not to be excluded by the constitution from holding it, were bound to devise some other acceptable mode of election. The first thought was an immediate choice by the people. But here Madison pointed out that "the right of suffrage was much more diffusive in the northern states than in the southern; and that the latter would have no influence in the election on the score of the negroes." # To meet this difficulty, King revived Wilson's proposition for the appointment of the ex *Gilpin, 1127, 1128, 1129; Elliot, 326, 327. Gilpin, 1157; Elliot, 342. Gilpin, 1147; Elliot, 337. #Gilpin, 1148; Elliot, 837. |