which was to be the centre of the government were introduced, and, except the last, were with common consent established in their outlines. On points essential to union, Yates and Hamilton, New Jersey and Pennsylvania voted together. On the first day of June the convention took into consideration the national executive. The same spirit of conciliation prevailed, but with a chaos of ideas and a shyness in the members to declare their minds. Should the national executive be one or many?-a question which, from a difference among themselves, the plan of the Virginia delegates had left undecided. Should it be chosen directly by the people? or by electors? or by the state legislatures? or by the executives of the states? or by one branch of the national legislature? or by both branches? And, if by both, by joint or concurrent ballot? or by lot? How long should be its term of service? And how far should its reeligibility be limited? Should it have the sole power of peace and war? Should it have an absolute or a qualified veto on acts of legislation, or none at all? Should its powers be exercised with or without a council? Should it be liable to removal by the legislatures of the states, or by the national legislature? or by the joint action of both? or by impeachment alone? Here the convention marched and countermarched for want of guides. Progress began to be made on the ascertainment that the members inclined to withhold from the executive the power over war and peace. This being understood, Wilson and Charles Pinckney proposed that the national executive should consist of a single person. A long silence prevailed, broken at last by the chairman asking if he should put the question. Franklin entreated the members first to deliver their sentiments on a point of so great importance. Rutledge joined in the request, and for himself supported Pinckney and Wilson.* On the other hand, Sherman, controlled by the precedents of the confederacy which appointed and displaced executive officers just as it seemed to them fit, replied: "The legislature are the best judges of the business to be done by the executive, and should be at liberty from time to time to appoint one or more, as experience may dictate." † * Gilpin, 762; Elliot, 140. VOL. VI.-16 Gilpin, 763; Elliot, 140. 66 "I do not mean to throw censure on that excellent fabric, the British government," said Randolph; "if we were in a situation to copy it, I do not know that I should be opposed to it. But the fixed genius of the people of America requires a different form of government. The requisites for the executive department-vigor, dispatch, and responsibility-can be found in three men as well as in one. Unity in the executive is the fœtus of monarchy."* "Unity in the executive," retorted Wilson, "will rather be the best safeguard against tyranny. From the extent of this country, nothing but a great confederated republic will do for it." To calm the excitement, Madison led the convention, before choosing between unity or plurality in the executive, to fix the extent of its authority; and the convention agreed to clothe it "with power to carry into effect the national laws and to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for." + On the mode of appointing the executive, Wilson said: "Chimerical as it may appear in theory, I am for an election by the people. Experience in New York and Massachusetts shows that an election of the first magistrate by the people at large is both a convenient and a successful mode. The objects of choice in such cases must be persons whose merits have general notoriety." "I," replied Sherman, "am for its appointment by the national legislature, and for making it absolutely dependent on that body whose will it is to execute. An independence of the executive on the supreme legislature is the very essence of tyranny." Sherman and Wilson were for a period of office of three years and "against the doctrine of rotation, as throwing out of office the men best qualified to execute its duties." Mason asked for seven years at least, but without re-eligibility. "What," inquired Gunning Bedford of Delaware, "will be the situation of the country should the first magistrate elected for seven years be discovered immediately on trial to be incompetent?" He argued for a triennial election, with an ineligibility after three successive elections. The convention, by a vote of five and a half states against four and a half, decided for the period of seven years; ‡ and by at least *Gilpin, 763, 764; Elliot, 141. + Gilpin, 765; Elliot, 141. Gilpin, 767; Elliot, 143. seven states against Connecticut, that the executive should not be twice eligible.* How to choose the executive remained the perplexing problem. Wilson, borrowing an idea from the constitution of Maryland, proposed that electors chosen in districts of the several states should meet and elect the executive by ballot, but not from their own body.† He deprecated the intervention of the states in its choice. + Mason favored the idea of choosing the executive by the people; Rutledge, by the national senate.# Gerry set in a clear light that the election by the national legislature would keep up a constant intrigue between that legislature and the candidates; nevertheless, Wilson's motion was at that time supported only by Pennsylvania and Maryland; and from sheer uncertainty what else to do, the convention left the choice of the executive to the national legislature. Sher For relief from a bad selection of the executive, John Dickinson of Delaware, who did not like the plan of impeaching the great officers of state, proposed a removal on the request of a majority of the legislatures of the individual states. man would give that power to the national legislature. "The making the executive the mere creature of the legislature," replied Mason, "is a violation of the fundamental principle of good government." ◊ "The occasion is so important," said Dickinson, "that no man ought to be silent or reserved. A limited monarchy is one of the best governments in the world. Equal blessings have never yet been derived from any of the republican forms. But, though a form the most perfect perhaps in itself be unattainable, we must not despair. Of remedies for the diseases of republics which have flourished for a moment only and then vanished forever, one is the double branch of the legislature, the other the accidental lucky division of this country into distinct states, which some seem desirous to abolish altogether. This division ought to be maintained, and considerable powers to be left with the states. This is the ground of my consola Gilpin, 779; Elliot, 149. A Gilpin, 770; Elliot, 144. Gilpin, 776; Elliot, 147. ◊ Gilpin, 776; Elliot, 147. tion for the future fate of my country. In case of a consolidation of the states into one great republic, we may read its fate in the history of smaller ones. The point of representation in the national legislature of states of different sizes must end in mutual concession. I hope that each state will retain an equal voice, at least in one branch of the national legislature." * The motion of Dickinson was sustained only by Delaware; and the executive was made removable on "impeachment and conviction of malpractice or neglect of duty." But the advice on the distribution of suffrage in the national legislature sank deep into the minds of his hearers. Randolph pleaded anew for an executive body of three members, one from each of the three geographical divisions of the country. "That would lead to a constant struggle for local advantages," replied Butler, who had travelled in Holland; and from his own observation he sketched the distraction of the Low Countries from a plurality of military heads. ‡ "Executive questions," said Wilson on the fourth, "have many sides; and of three members no two might agree.# All the thirteen states place a single magistrate at the head. Unity in the executive will favor the tranquillity not less than the vigor of the government." | Assenting to unity in the executive, Sherman thought a council necessary to make that unity acceptable to the people. "A council," replied Wilson, "oftener covers malpractices than prevents them." The proposal for a single executive was sustained by seven states against New York, Delaware, and Maryland. In the Virginia delegation there would have been a tie but for Washington. The decision was reached after mature deliberation, and was accepted as final. Wilson and Hamilton desired to trust the executive with an absolute negative on acts of legislation; but this was opposed, though from widely differing motives, by Gerry, Franklin, Sherman, Madison, Butler, Bedford, and Mason,◊ and was unanimously negatived. * Gilpin, 778; Elliot, 148. † Gilpin, 779; Elliot, 149. Gilpin, 780; Elliot, 149. #Gilpin, 782; Elliot, 150. | Gilpin, 781; Elliot, 150. A Gilpin, 782, 783; Elliot, 151. When Wilson urged upon the convention the Virginia plan of vesting a limited veto on legislation in a council of revision composed of the executive and a convenient number of the judiciary, Gerry called to mind that judges had in some states, and with general approbation, set aside laws as being against the constitution; but that from the nature of their office they were unfit to be consulted on the policy of public measures; and, after the example of his own state, he proposed rather to confide the veto power to the executive alone, subject to be overruled by two thirds of each branch. "Judges," said Rufus King of Massachusetts, "should expound the law as it may come before them, free from the bias of having participated in its formation."* Gerry's motion was carried by eight states against Connecticut and Maryland.† In a convention composed chiefly of lawyers, the organization of the judiciary engaged eager attention; at the close of a long sitting, the Virginia resolution, that a national judiciary be established, passed without debate and unanimously, with a further clause that the national judiciary should consist of one supreme tribunal and of one or more inferior tribunals. A night's reflection developed a jealousy of transferring business from the courts of the states to the courts of the union; and on the fifth Rutledge and Sherman insisted that state tribunals ought, in all cases, to decide in the first instance, yet without impairing the right of appeal. Madison replied: "Unless inferior tribunals are dispersed throughout the republic, in many cases with final jurisdiction, appeals will be most oppressively multiplied. A government without a proper executive and judiciary will be the mere trunk of a body, without arms or legs to act or move." The motion to dispense with the inferior national tribunals prevailed; but Dickinson, Wilson, and Madison, marking the distinction between establishing them and giving a discretion to establish them, obtained a great majority for empowering the national legislature to provide for their institution. On the thirteenth it was unanimously * Gilpin, 783; Elliot, 151. Gilpin, 791; Elliot, 155; and Elliot, i., 160. #Gilpin, 798, 799; Elliot, 159. Gilpin, 790, 791; Elliot, 155. Gilpin, 800; Elliot, 160. Compare Elliot, i., 163, 397. |