union; which might then protect the carrying trade, and encourage domestic industry by a tax on foreign industry. He asked himself if the carrying trade would increase the wealth of the South; and he cited "a Mr. Smith on the Wealth of Nations," as having written "that the doctrine of the balance of trade is a chimera." *

The southernmost states began to reason that Maryland had a great commercial port, and, like Delaware, excelled in naval architecture; and these, joining the seven northern states, might vote to themselves the monopoly of the transport of southern products. Besides, Virginia, more than any other state in the union, was opposed to the slave-trade; and Virginia and all north of her might join in its absolute prohibition. The three more southern states were, therefore, unwilling to trust a navigation act to the voice even of ten; and in his report Monroe substituted eleven states for his first proposal of nine.†

At last, on the thirteenth and fourteenth of July, the report was considered in a committee of the whole. It was held that the regulation of trade by the union was desirable, because it would open a way to encourage domestic industry by imposing a tax upon foreign manufactures; because it was needed in order to secure reciprocity in commercial intercourse with foreign nations; because it would counteract external commercial influence by establishing a commercial interest at home; and because it would prepare the way for a navy. These ends could never be obtained unless the states should act in concert, for their separate regulations would impede and defeat each other.

The opponents of the measure left their cause in the hands of Richard Henry Lee, as their only spokesman; and his mature age, courteous manner, skill as an orator and debater, and his rank as president of congress, gave him great authority. He insisted that the new grant of power would endanger public liberty; that it would be made subservient to further attempts to enlarge the authority of the government; that the concentration of the control of commerce would put the country more in the power of other nations; that the interests of * Monroe to Jefferson, 16 June 1785. Monroe to Madison, 26 July 1785.

the North were different from the interests of the South; that the regulation of trade which suited the one would not suit the other; that eight states were interested in the carrying trade, and would combine together to shackle and fetter the five southern states, which, without having shipping of their own, raised the chief staples for exportation; and, finally, that any attempt whatever at a change in the articles of confederation had a tendency to weaken the union.

In these objections Lee was consistent. He pressed upon Madison, with earnest frankness, that power in congress to legislate over the trade of the union would expose the five staple states, from their want of ships and seamen, to a most pernicious and destructive monopoly; that even the purchase, as well as the carrying, of their produce, might be at the mercy of the East and the North; and that the spirit of commerce throughout the world is a spirit of avarice.*

A plan of a navigation act originated with McHenry of Maryland; but it came before congress only as a subject of conversation. Nothing was done with the report of Monroe, who said of it: "The longer it is delayed, the more certain is its passage through the several states ultimately;"† and his committee only asked leave to sit again. "We have nothing pleasing in prospect," wrote Jacob Read to Madison; “and, if in a short time the states do not enable congress to act with vigor and put the power of compulsion into the hand of the union, I think it almost time to give over the form of what I cannot consider as an efficient government. We want, greatly want, the assistance of your abilities and experience in congress; one cannot help drawing comparisons between the language of 1783 and 1785." +

From the delegation of Virginia no hope could spring; but the state which exceeded all others in the number of its freemen and in age was second only to the Old Dominion, had directed its delegates to present to congress, and through congress to the states, an invitation to meet in a convention and

* R. H. Lee to Madison, 11 August 1785. Rives, ii., 31, 32. Compare Monroe to Madison, 26 July 1785.

Monroe to Jefferson, 15 August 1785.

Jacob Read of South Carolina to Madison, 29 August 1785.

revise the confederation. And now Gerry, Holten, and Rufus King saw fit to disobey their instructions, and suppressed the acts and resolves of Massachusetts, writing: "Any alteration of the confederation is premature; the grant of commercial power should be temporary, like the proposed treaties with European powers; and for its adoption should depend on an experience of its beneficial results. Power over commerce, once delegated to the confederation, can never be revoked but by the unanimous consent of the states. To seek a reform through a convention is a violation of the rights of congress, and, as a manifestation of a want of confidence in them, must meet their disapprobation. A further question arises whether the convention should revise the constitution generally or only for express purposes. Each of the states in forming its own, as well as the federal constitution, has adopted republican principles; yet plans have been laid which would have changed our republican government into baleful aristocracies. The same spirit remains in their abettors. The institution of the Cincinnati will have the same tendency. The rotation of members is the best check to corruption. The requirement of the unanimous consent of the legislatures of the states for altering the confederation effectually prevents innovations by intrigue or surprise. The cry for more power in congress comes especially from those whose views are extended to an aristocracy that will afford lucrative employments, civil and military, and require a standing army, pensioners, and placemen. The present confederation is preferable to the risk of general dissensions and animosities."*

Bowdoin replied: "If in the union discordant principles make it hazardous to intrust congress with powers necessary to its well-being, the union cannot long subsist."+ Gerry and King rejoined: "The best and surest mode of obtaining an addition to the powers of congress is to make the powers temporary in the first instance. If a convention of the states is necessary, its members should be confined to the revision of

*This paper, and a letter which preceded it of 18 August 1785, I found only as copied into the Letter Book in the office of the Secretary of State of Massachusetts, Letter Book, viii., 204, 205, 210-213.

Bowdoin to Massachusetts Delegates in Congress, 24 October 1785.

such parts of the confederation as are supposed defective; and not intrusted with a general revision of the articles and the right to report a plan of federal government essentially different from the republican form now administered." *

These letters of Gerry and King met with the concurrence of Samuel Adams,† and had so much weight with the general court as to stay its further action. Nor did the evil end there. All the arguments and insinuations against a new constitution as sure to supersede republican government by a corrupt and wasteful aristocracy, were carried into every village in Massachusetts, as the persistent judgment of their representatives in congress with the assent of the home legislature.

It remained to see if anything could come from negotiations in Europe. A treaty with England was in importance. paramount to all others. In 1783 Adams with Jay had crossed the channel to England, but had been received with coldness. The assent of the United States to the definitive treaty of peace was long delayed by the difficulty of assembling in congress nine states for its confirmation. At length, on the twelfth of May 1784, the exchange of ratifications took place at Paris. The way being thus opened, the three American commissioners for negotiating treaties-Franklin, John Adams, and Jefferson -informed the duke of Dorset, then British ambassador at Paris, that they had full powers to negotiate a commercial treaty with Great Britain, and for that end were ready to repair to London. The British government consulted the English merchants trading with North America; and near the end of March of the following year the duke answered: "I have been instructed to learn from you, gentlemen, what is the real nature of the powers with which you are invested; whether you are merely commissioned by congress, or have received separate powers from the separate states. The apparent determination of the respective states to regulate their own separate interests renders it absolutely necessary, toward forming a permanent system of commerce, that my court should be informed how far the commissioners can be duly authorized to enter into

* Gerry and King to Governor Bowdoin, 2 November 1785.

† Adams to Gerry, 19 September 1785, in reply to a letter from Gerry of 5 September.

any engagements with Great Britain, which it may not be in the power of any one of the states to render totally fruitless. and ineffectual."

When Franklin, taking with him the love of France,* prepared to sail for America, congress, breaking up their triumviral commission in Europe, appointed Jefferson to be minister to France, John Adams to Great Britain. Adams gave the heartiest welcome to his "old friend and coadjutor," in whom he found undiminished "industry, intelligence, and talents," and, full of courage if not of hope, hastened to London. On the first day of June Lord Carmarthen, the secretary of state, presented him to the king. Delivering his credentials, he in perfect sincerity declared: "I shall esteem myself the happiest of men if I can be instrumental in recommending my country more and more to your Majesty's royal benevolence, and of restoring the old good nature and the old good humor between people who, though separated by an ocean and under different governments, have the same language, a similar religion, and kindred blood."

The king answered with more tremor than the bold republican had shown: "I wish it understood in America that I have done nothing in the late contest but what I thought myself indispensably bound to do by the duty which I owed to my people. I will be very frank with you. I was the last to consent to the separation; but, the separation having been made, I have always said, as I say now, that I would be the first to meet the friendship of the United States as an independent power. The moment I see such sentiments and language as yours prevail, and a disposition to give to this country the preference, that moment I shall say, let the circumstances of language, religion, and blood have their natural and full effect." +

The suggestion of a preference by treaty was out of place. The English had it without a treaty by their skill, the reciprocal confidence of the merchants of the two nations, and the habits of the Americans who were accustomed only to the consumption of British goods. But a change had come over the

* Rayneval to Franklin, 8 May 1785. Diplomatic Correspondence, ii., 47. Diplomatic Correspondence, iv., 200, 201.