Judicial Misconduct and Discipline: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fifth Congress, First Session, May 15, 1997 |
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6th Circuit abortion Alexander Hamilton amendment appeal appointed BONO Brookline Bruce Fein BRYANT CANADY capital punishment Chairman Chief Justice Civil Rights clinic COBLE College of Law committee complaints Congress conservatives CONYERS Court-packing scheme crimes and misdemeanors criticism Dean death penalty deci decision DELAHUNT delays District Court enforce example Federal courts federal judges Fein FRANK gentleman habeas hearing HENDERSON high crimes impeachment interpret issue JIPPING John John Salvi Judge Nixon Judge RADER Judge Sprizzo judicial activism judicial independence judicial misconduct judicial power judicial review judiciary Leadership Conference legislative Lino Graglia LOFGREN mean ment Merritt Nixon's court opinion overturned peachment pending PILON Planned Parenthood political PREPARED STATEMENT President problem protection question Rehnquist remedy Roger Pilon role rule School of Law Senate separation of powers stitution Stout subcommittee Supreme Court system of government Tennessee testimony Thank tion unconstitutional University violate
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Page 12 - The Congress, the executive, and the court must each for itself be guided by its own opinion of the Constitution. Each public officer who takes an oath to support the Constitution swears that he will support it as he understands it, and not as it is understood by others.
Page 12 - The opinion of the judges has no more authority over congress than the opinion of congress has over the judges, and on that point the president is independent of both. The authority of the supreme court must not, therefore, be permitted to control the congress or the executive, when acting in their legislative capacities, but to have only such influence as the force of their reasoning may deserve.
Page 15 - At the same time, the candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the Government upon vital questions affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made in ordinary litigation between parties in personal actions the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically resigned their Government into the hands of that eminent tribunal.
Page 13 - You seem, in pages 84 and 148, to consider the judges as the ultimate arbiters of all constitutional questions— a very dangerous doctrine indeed, and one which would place us under the despotism of an oligarchy.
Page 66 - Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing.
Page 35 - In all very numerous assemblies, of whatever characters composed, passion never fails to wrest the scepter from reason. Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob.
Page 57 - there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers'.
Page 12 - boni judicis est ampliare jurisdictionem," and their power the more dangerous as they are in office for life, and not responsible, as the other functionaries are, to the elective control. The constitution has erected no such single tribunal, knowing that to whatever hands confided, with the corruptions of time and party, its members would become despots. It has more wisely made all the departments co-equal and co-sovereign within themselves.
Page 12 - Our judges are as honest as other men, and not more so. They have, with others, the same passions for party, for power, and the privilege of their corps. Their maxim is, 'boni judicis est ampliare jurisdictionem...
Page 67 - We regard the decision of the Supreme Court in the school cases as a clear abuse of judicial power. It climaxes a trend in the Federal judiciary undertaking to legislate, in derogation of the authority of Congress, and to encroach upon the reserved rights of the States and the people.