objection had lain against the renewal of the charter other than that derived from the Constitution, he should have voted for the renewal.

"Other provisions of the Constitution, but little noticed, if noticed at all, on the discussions in Congress in 1811, would seem to urge that body to exert all its powers to restore to a sound state the money of the country. That instrument confers upon Congress the power to coin money, and to regulate the value of foreign coins; and the States are prohibited to coin money, to emit bills of credit, or to make any thing but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts. The plain inference is, that the subject of the general currency was intended to be submitted exclusively to the general government. In point of fact, however, the regulation of the general currency is in the hands of the State governments, or, which is the same thing, of the banks created by them. Their paper has every quality of money, except that of being made a tender, and even this is imparted to it by some States, in the law by which a creditor must receive it, or submit to a ruinous suspension of the payment of his debt. It was incumbent upon Congress to recover the control which it had lost over the general currency. The remedy called for, was one of caution and moderation, but of firmness. Whether a remedy directly acting upon the banks and their paper thrown into circulation, was in the power of the general government or not, neither Congress nor the community were prepared for the application of such a remedy. An indirect remedy, of a milder character, seemed to be furnished by a National bank. Going into operation, with the powerful aid of the Treasury of the United States, he believed it would be highly instrumental in the renewal of specie payments. Coupled with the other measure adopted by Congress for that object, he believed the remedy effectual. The local banks must follow the example which the national bank would set them, of redeeming their notes by the payment of specie, or their notes will be discredited and put down.

"If the Constitution, then, warranted the establishment of a bank, other considerations, beside those already mentioned,

strongly urged it. The want of a general medium is everywhere felt. Exchange varies continually, not only between different parts of the Union, but between different parts of the same city. If the paper of a national bank were not redeemed in specie, it would be much better than the current paper, since, although its value in comparison with specie might fluctuate, it would afford a uniform standard.

"If political power be incidental to banking corporations, there ought, perhaps, to be in the General Government some counterpoise to that which is exerted by the States. Such a counterpoise might not, indeed, be so necessary, if the States exercised the power to incorporate banks equally, or in proportion to their respective populations. But that is not the case. A single State has a banking capital equivalent, or nearly so, to one fifth of the whole banking capital of the United States. Four States combined, have the major part of the banking capital of the United States. In the event of any covulsion, in which the distribution of banking institutions might be important, it may be urged, that the mischief would not be alleviated by the creation of a National bank, since its location must be within one of the States. But in this respect the location of the bank is extremely favorable, being in one of the middle States, not likely from its position, as well as its loyalty, to concur in any scheme for subverting the Government. And a sufficient security against such contingency is to be found in the distribution of branches in different States, acting and re-acting upon the parent institution, upon each other."

and

ON INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MARCH 13, 1818.

The views of HENRY CLAY, upon the subject of Internal Improvements, may be learned from the following able speech, delivered by him in the House of Representatives, March 13, 1818.

I HAVE been anxious to catch the eye of the chairman for a few moments, to reply to some of the observations which have fallen from various gentlemen. I am aware that, in doing this, I risk the loss of what is of the utmost value,—the kind favor of the House, wearied as its patience is, by this prolonged debate. But when I feel what a deep interest the Union at large, and particularly that quarter of it whence I come, has, in the decision of the present question, I can not omit any opportunity of earnestly urging upon the House the propriety of retaining the important power which this question involves. It will be recollected that if, unfortunately, there should be a majority both against the abstract proposition asserting the power, and against its practical execution, the power is gone forever,the question is put at rest, so long as the Constitution remains as it is; and with respect to any amendment, in this particular, I confess I utterly despair. It will be borne in mind, that the bill which passed Congress on this subject, at the last session, was rejected by the late President of the United States; that at the commencement of the present session, the President communicated his clear opinion, after every effort to come to a different conclusion, that Congress does not possess the power contended

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for, and called upon us to take up the subject, in the shape of an amendment to the Constitution; and, moreover, that the predecessor of the present and late Presidents, has also intimated his opinion, that Congress does not possess the power. With the great weight and authority of the opinions of these distinguished men against the power, and with the fact, solemnly entered upon the record, that this House, after a deliberate review of the ground taken by it at the last session, has decided against the existence of it (if such, fatally, shall be the decision), the power, I repeat, is gone,-gone forever, unless restored by an amendment of the Constitution. With regard to the practicability of obtaining such an amendment, I think it altogether out of the question. Two different descriptions of persons, entertaining sentiments directly opposed, will unite and defeat such an amendment; one embracing those who believe that the Constitution, fairly interpreted, already conveys the power; and the other, those who think that Congress has not and ought not to have it. As a large portion of Congress, and probably a majority, believes the power to exist, it must be evident, if I am right in supposing that any considerable number of that majority would vote against an amendment which they do not believe necessary, that any attempt to amend would fail. Considering, as I do, the existence of the power as of the first importance, not merely to the preservation of the union of the States, paramount as that consideration ever should be over all others, but to the prosperity of every great interest of the country, agriculture, manufactures, commerce, in peace and in war, it becomes us solemnly, and deliberately, and anxiously, to examine the Constitution, and not to surrender it, if fairly to be collected from a just interpretation of that instrument.

With regard to the alarm sought to be created, as to the nature of the power, by bringing up the old theme of "State Rights," I would observe, that if the illustrious persons just referred to are against us in the construction of the Constitution, they are on our side as to the harmless and beneficial character of the power. For it is not to be conceived, that each of them would have recommended an amendment to the Constitution, if they

believed that the possession of such a power, by the General Government, would be detrimental, much less dangerous, to the independence and liberties of the States. What real ground

is there for this alarm? Gentlemen have not condescended to show how the subversion of the rights of the States is to follow from the exercise of the power of internal improvements by the General Government. We contend for the power to make roads and canals, to distribute the intelligence, force and productions of the country, through all its parts; and for such jurisdiction only over them, as is necessary to their preservation from wanton injury and from gradual decay. Suppose such a power is sustained and in full operation; imagine it to extend to every canal made, or proposed to be made, and to every post road; how inconsiderable and insignificant is the power in a political point of view, limited, as it is, with regard to place and to purpose, when contrasted with the great mass of powers retained by the State sovereignties! What a small subtraction from the mass! Even upon these roads and canals, the State governments, according to our principles, will still exercise jurisdiction over every possible case arising upon them, whether of crime or of contract, or any other human transaction, except only what immediately affects their existence and preservation. Thus defined, thus limited, and stripped of all factitious causes of alarm, I will appeal to the candor of gentlemen to say, if the power really presents any thing frightful in it? With respect to post roads, our adversaries admit the right of way in the General Government. There have been, however, on this question, some instances of conflict, but they have passed away without any serious difficulty. Connecticut, if I have been rightly informed, disputed, at one period, the right of passage of the mail on the Sabbath. The general government persisted in the exercise of the right, and Connecticut herself, and every body else, have acquiesced in it.

That there are two classes of powers in the Constitution, I believe has never been controverted by an American politician. We can not foresee and provide specifically for all contingencies. Man and his language are both imperfect. Hence the existence