Alexander Hamilton and to his age-the age of the Constitution itself-than the contrary notion was to Mr. Webster and to his school.

The Constitution of Massachusetts not only calls itself a compact, but the people therein acknowledge, with grateful hearts, that Providence has afforded them an opportunity of entering into this "original, explicit, and solemn compact." The same State, as we have seen, in her ordinance of ratification, makes the same acknowledgment of the goodness of the Supreme Ruler of the Universe for affording the people of the United States an opportunity of entering into "an explicit and solemn compact by assenting to, and ratifying a new Constitution." Now, both Story and Webster lay great stress on the fact that the Constitution of the United States does not call itself a compact. But here they have a Constitution, and it is that of their own State, which calls itself an explicit and solemn compact and how do they receive this language? There is not, perhaps in all literature an attempt more awkward, or a failure more signal, to explain away the clear and unequivocal language of a written instrument, than is here exhibited by these two great sophists. It deserves a most especial notice.

Mr. Justice Story first gets away from the plain language of the instrument, and then calls around him the darkness of one of the very darkest metaphysical theories of Europe, which he introduces to our notice, however, by a very just remark. "Mr. Justice Blackstone," says he, "has very justly observed that the theory of an original contract upon the first formation of society is a visionary notion." Granted; but what has this to do with the Constitution of Massachusetts? Every Constitution we admit is not a compact, any more than every compact is a Constitution. Most Constitutions have indeed grown, and only a few in these later ages of the world have been made. It has been the boast of America, and of Virginia especially, that she

was the first in the history of mankind to make a complete Constitution, to reduce it to writing, and, in the name of the people in Convention assembled, to adopt and sign it for the government of themselves and their posterity. By those authors, such as Blackstone, and Paley, and Hume, who reject the theory of an original contract as "a visionary notion," as having no foundation in history or in fact, it is not denied, but expressly admitted, that a people might, if they chose, enter into such a compact. Paley, in spite of his opposition to the theory of the social compact, admits that something of the kind has been entered into in America. "The present age has," says he, "been witness to a transaction which bears the nearest resemblance to this political idea (that of an original compact) of any of which history has preserved the account or memory. I refer to the establishment of the United States of North America. We saw the people assembled to elect deputies for the avowed purpose of framing the Constitution of a new empire. We saw this deputation of the people deliberating and resolving upon a form of government, erecting a permanent legislature, distributing the functions of sovereignty, establishing and promulgating a code of fundamental ordinances which were to be considered by succeeding generations, not merely as acts and laws of the State, but as the very terms and conditions of the Confederation." Indeed, Paley does not doubt that it was a compact; he only seems to question whether it may be called original, since "much was pre-supposed." For, "in settling the Constitution," says he, "many important parts were presumed to be already settled. The qualifications of the constituents who were admitted to vote in the election of members of Congress, as well as the modes of electing the representatives, were taken from the old forms of government." It is true that, in framing the Constitution of the Federal Union, these things were adopted from the State Governments; but if this prevented the compact from

being original it certainly did not keep it from being a compact. In fact, these words of Paley refer to the old Articles of Confederation, and not to the new Constitution, for they were written and published in 1785*, two years before the Convention met to frame this new instrument or plan of government. Both Webster and Story, like all others, admit that the old Articles of Confederation were a compact between the States."

The question is, whether the Constitution of Massachusetts is an instrument of the same nature, or, in other words, whether it is a compact? The more than doubtful metaphysical theories of Europe have nothing to do with this question. The darkness of those theories is not permitted either by Webster or Story to obliterate or obscure the fact that the Articles of Confederation, or the Constitution to which Paley refers, was a compact. Why, then, is it brought to bear on the Constitution of Massachusetts? Is the political history of this country, so widely and so amazingly different from that of all others, to be read and interpreted in the light, or rather in the darkness, of those vague and visionary theories respecting the origin of the governments of the Old World which have not the least semblance nor shadow of a foundation in their respective histories? The Constitution of Great Britain, for example, has grown; the Constitution of Massachusetts was made. The one is the slow but mighty product of the labor of ages; the other is the creation of yesterday. The one is written; the other is traditional. The most important and beneficent elements of the one resulted from the Norman Conquest, and the gradual rise of the lower orders in cultivation, in wealth, and in importance. Every provision of the other, without a single exception, was framed and adopted by the people of Massachusetts in Convention assembled. Hence the more than doubtful theories respecting the origin and the nature of the one have noth* See Paley's Life, attached to his works, p. 13.

ing to do with the interpretation of the plain and unquestionable facts of the other. These facts should be allowed to speak for themselves, and not to be discredited or obscured by involving them in the fate of any doubtful or false hypothesis whatever.

Nor is this all. As there is not the slightest foundation in history for the theory of an original contract in relation to the governments of Europe, so theorists have been forced to adopt the hypothesis of an "implied compact" as constituting at once the origin, the basis, and the binding authority of civil society. Mr. Justice Story finds this idea of an "implied" contract, or consent, in Blackstone; * and he does not hesitate to assert that it is in this sense that the Constitution of Massachusetts calls itself a com. pact. According to this hypothesis the consent of every subject is implied, and this implication is forced upon the unwilling. It is an implied consent, even in spite of an actual dissent. Did the people of Massachusetts then acknowledge, with grateful hearts, that Providence had afforded them an opportunity of entering into an "implied" compact? Did they thus pour forth in their Constitution devout thanks for a privilege which they could not possibly have avoided, and which has been fully enjoyed by every subject of every despotic government in the world? Did they thank the Supreme Ruler of the Universe for an opportunity of entering into a forced implication, and yet ignorant of their bonds, most foolishly style it an "original, explicit, and solemn compact?" If we may believe Mr. Justice Story, such was precisely the absurd and ridiculous farce enacted by the people of Massachusetts.

Mr. Webster treads in the footsteps of Mr. Justice Story. "The Convention," says the Massachusetts formula of ratification, "having impartially examined and fully considered the Constitution of the United States of America, * "Commentaries," vol. i., book iii., chap. iii., p. 298.

....submitted to us...... and acknowledging with grateful hearts the goodness of the Supreme Ruler of the Universe in affording the people of the United States, in the course of His providence, an opportunity, deliberately and peaceably, without fraud or surprise, of entering into an explicit and solemn compact with each other, by assenting to and ratifying a new Constitution," &c. Now is this the language of an implied or of an explicit and deliberate compact? Yet in the face of this language Mr. Webster asserts that the Convention of Massachusetts and New Hampshire merely speak of compact in the sense of "European writers!" Now, the European writers here referred to mean either an explicit or an implied consent. But the idea of an explicit consent or compact is rejected by Mr. Justice Story and Mr. Webster, as "a visionary notion," as well as by Blackstone, Hume, Paley, and a host of others. Hence Mr. Webster must be understood to refer to those European writers who maintain the hypothesis of an implied compact. Hence the people of Massachusetts are represented by him as being exceedingly grateful for the opportunity of freely and deliberately entering into an "implied compact," which, however, they blindly call "an explicit and solemn" one! They are represented as voluntarily entering into an implied compact, a thing which is never made or entered into at all, but is only an implication or fiction of law, from which there is no escape!

The Constitution, says Mr. Webster, is "certainly not a compact." He lays great stress on the fact that it does not call itself a compact. Nor do the old Articles of Confederation call themselves a compact; and yet Mr. Webster admits that they were "a compact between the States." They call themselves, it is true, "a league of friendship;" but then a league of friendship is not, ex vi termini, a social compact or a political union. "We speak of ordaining Constitutions," says Mr. Webster; "but we do not speak of ordaining leagues and compacts." True,