begun to infold itself in him or her? The truth is, that the Convention of 1787 indulged in no such contemptible trifling with the great practical questions demanding a

solution.

The States were exceedingly jealous of "the sovereignty, freedom, and independence," which they had expressly retained under the Articles of Confederation. The Federal Government claimed, on the other hand, an augmentation of its powers; a claim eloquently urged by the tongues and pens of many of the ablest men in America. Hence arose the great conflict between the States and the central Power; which, from that day to this, has agitated the minds of the Anglo-Americans. In approaching this conflict, the Convention first determined, in outline, the form of the General Government. It was readily agreed, that it should be a Rebublic, with a Legislature consisting of two branches, a Senate and House of Representatives, a Judiciary, and an Executive. The next question was, what powers shall the States delegate to this General Government, this grand Republic? After debating this question for some time, the Convention discovered that it had begun at the wrong end. None of the parties were willing to say with what powers the new Government should be invested, until it was ascertained what share they were to have in the exercise of those powers. Hence the Convention found it necessary to retrace its steps, and begin with the question of the distribution of power among the various members of the Union. In this contest for power, each and every party, of course, claimed "the lion's share." But each and every party could not have "the lion's share." Hence the two memorable quarrels or controversies of the Convention of 1787; the one between "the large and the small States," and the other between "the North and the South." Much is known about the first of these quarrels; but the history of the last yet remains to be written. Its very

first chapter is still enveloped in the most profound obscurity. I speak advisedly, and with the proofs on all sides around me, when I say that the Americans themselves have not studied this first chapter in the history of the great quarrel between "the North and the South." Let us look into it, then, and see what it teaches.

In order to adjust and settle the two quarrels above mentioned, Mr. Madison laid down the general principle, that "wherever there is danger of attack, there should be a constitutional power of defence." No principle could have been more reasonable or just; since the object of all government is to protect the weak, or those most exposed to danger, against the aggressions of the powerful. The Convention, without difficulty, agreed to the above principle, when only stated in general terms; but, as usual in such cases, a great difference of opinion arose in regard to the application of the principle.

The small States, for example, fearing lest the large States should "annex" them, or swallow them up in some other way, refused to increase their power in the Union. They insisted, that each State, whether small or great, should have precisely the same power in both branches of Congress. This would have placed all the powers of the Federal Legislature in the hands of the small States. They were willing, nay, they were eager to possess them all; just as if they had not the least fear that they could ever be tempted to do the least injury to the large States. But the large States, not having this perfect confidence in the justice of their little neighbors, refused to entrust them with the supreme control and destiny of the Union. Hence they refused "the lion's share" to the small States. They contended, however, for this share for themselves. They contended that each State should, in each branch of the Federal Legislature, have a power exactly proportioned to its size or population; an arrangement which would have given the absolute control of the whole gov

ernment of the thirteen States to three States alone. Yet those three States,-(Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia,-) with a perfect unanimity and a burning zeal, contended for this supreme dominion in the new Union. The small States, till then equal in constitutional power with the large ones, resented this as a design to degrade and enslave them. This contest was the most obstinate and violent one of the Convention of 1787. "The truth is," said Alexander Hamilton, in regard to this very quarrel, "it is a contest for power, not for liberty." Each party, in its eagerness to grasp the supreme power, neglected the rights and interests of the other.

This violent contest, which threatened to break up the Convention and blast all hope of a "more perfect Union," was finally settled by one of "the compromises of the Constitution." It was agreed, that the States should retain their equality in the Senate, each having two representatives in that body; and that they should be represented in the other branch of Congress in proportion to their populations. Thus the small States controlled the Senate; and the large ones, the House of Representatives. Hence neither party could oppress the other. As no law could be passed without the concurrence of both Houses of Congress; so it must obtain the consent of the small States in the one, and of the large States in the other. Each class of States held a check upon the power of the other. Thus, where "there was a danger of attack," there was, on both sides, given "a constitutional power of defence." This was, in deed as well as in word, to "establish and ordain liberty." Hence the most violent contest of the Convention of 1787 ceased to agitate the bosom of the new Union. This admirable arrangement was proposed by Oliver Ellsworth, of Connecticut, and recommended on the ground that, in a Republic, it is always necessary to protect the minority against the tyranny of the majority.

The same principles and policy governed the Conven

tion in its attempt to adjust and settle the great antagonism between the North and the South. Mr. Madison was so deeply impressed with the importance of arming each of these sections with a defensive power against the other, that he proposed "the numbers of free white inhabitants" as the basis of representation in one House of Congress, and the whole population, including blacks as well as whites, as the basis of representation in the other. This distribution of power would have given the North a majority in one branch of the Legislature, and the South a majority in the other. But the proposition failed. Mr. Madison did not urge it, indeed, because, as he said, it presented a cause of quarrel which was but too apt to arise of itself.

After the States were made equal in the Senate, each having two representatives in that body, the North had the entire control of it. As there were eight Northern States, (Delaware was then considered a Northern State), and only five Southern States; so the North had a majority in the Senate of 16 to 10. Hence, if the South was to have any defensive power at all, it should have had a majority of representatives in the other branch of Congress. Accordingly, Southern members insisted on the full representation of the whole population of the South, as well as of the North, in order that their section might have a majority in one branch of the common Legislature. The North, on the contrary, insisted that the slayes should be entirely excluded from the basis of representation; which would have given that section a decided majority in both branches of Congress. Thus, while the South contended for a power of self-defence or protection; the North -aimed at no less than absolute control and dominion. The South would not submit. The North and the South were then, as they afterward appeared to De Tocqueville, "more like hostile nations, than rival parties, under one government." The fierce contest for power between

them resulted in the compromise of the three-fifths clause of the Constitution. In proposing this clause, Mr. Wilson, of Pennsylvania, said it could not be justified on principle, whether property or population were regarded as the basis of representation, but that it was deemed "necessary as a compromise" between the North and the South. As such it was seconded by Mr. C. C. Pinckney, of South Carolina, and as such it was adopted by the Convention. This clause was, then, a compromise, not between abstract metaphysical principles of government, but between the opposite and conflicting claims of the two rival sections. Did the North, then, "truckle to the slave power"? It is certain, that she grasped at and gained a majority in both branches of the common Legislature. For, in spite of the clause in question, the North had a majority of 36 to 29 in the House of Representatives, as well as of 16 to 10 in the Senate; a share which certainly ought to have satisfied any ordinary lion.

But it is the fate of a democracy to be governed more by words than by ideas, more by "telling cries" than by truth. The cry has always been that the slaves, who had no wills of their own, were represented in Congress; and that this "singular provision," this "strange anomaly," had resulted from a base "truckling to the slave power." But for this provision, says Professor Cairnes, * there seemed to be nothing in the Constitution, "which was not calculated to give to numbers, wealth, and intelligence, their due share in the government of the country." Did the general clause, then, which places idiots, paupers, free negroes, and infants of all ages, in the basis of representation, provide for nothing but a representation of "the intelligence and wealth of the country?" The truth is, that none of these clauses were represented in Congress; they were merely considered in the difficult question of the distribution of power among the States *The Slave Power, p. 164.