had no desire to separate from the Danish Crown. Under these circumstances therefore I had no hesitation, I said, in advising the Danish Government most strongly to avert the dangers alluded to by losing no time in convoking the new Diet, and endeavouring to come to an understanding with it on the points at issue. But, I added, I was convinced it was at the same time absolutely necessary to ameliorate the state of things in Schleswig.

His Excellency had, I said, admitted the binding force of the engagements undertaken by Denmark; why not therefore, I inquired, approach the question manfully and frankly, and carry out the reforms which every one acknowledged to be necessary? The Danish Government might be assured, I said, that so long as they did not fulfil these engagements it was impossible for other Powers to plead their cause with effect.

M. Hall did not offer any objection to the above arguments. I may say, indeed, that he appeared to admit their truth and justice. He said that he had very great difficulties to contend with-and this I believe to be true-but that he would do what he could to overcome them. He said that it was undesirable that the Danish Diet and the Holstein Assembly should be sitting at one and the same time, but that the Session of the former would be over about the middle of January, and the latter should then be convoked.

Finally, M. Hall said it was his intention to reply to your Lordship's despatch through M. Bille, but that his answer might be delayed for a short time, as he was anxious, if possible, to accompany it by the communication to your Lordship of some practical proof that the Danish Government was not insensible to the interest which is manifested in this question by Her Majesty's Government, or deaf to the counsels which they have given.

From all I have heard since leaving England I am more than ever persuaded that unless something is done to prevent it, events will take the course which I indicated to your Lordship in the conversations with which you honoured me, viz., that the Decree of the Diet for Federal execution will be carried out at the expiration of the present financial period, and I shall therefore continue to use every exertion with the Danish Government to induce them to take such measures as may be best calculated to avert this great calamity.

A. PAGET.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

No. 91.

My Lord,

Earl Cowley to Lord J. Russell.-(Received December 29.)

Paris, December 28, 1860

IN compliance with the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch of the 12th instant, I communicated to M. Thouvenel the substance of the instructions inclosed in that despatch to Mr. Paget and to Mr. Lowther, respecting the question of the Danish Duchies; and his Excellency has since informed me that he concurs entirely in your Lordship's views, which are those which the Imperial Government has advocated since the commencement of this vexed question.

I have, &c.

Consul-General Crowe to Lord J. Russell.—(Received December 31.)

(Extract.)

Leipsic, December 28, 1860.

IN the belief that every fact likely to throw light on the present state of the Duchy of Schleswig will be of interest to your Lordship, I beg to inclose a précis of a Memorandum drawn up within the last few weeks, and giving a very precise idea of the actual state of opinion in the northern and southern portions of the Duchy. The Danish Government, no doubt, is averse from the idea of a partition of Schleswig, and in order to divert the attention of the Powers from this, the solution which, by Germany, is considered best suited to the temper of

the people and the necessities of the situation, they pretend that on the borders of the line of partition advocated by the Germans there is a piece of debateable land which is neither Danish nor German, respecting which it is impossible to say whether it would prefer to cast in its destinies with either.

The Memorandum of which the précis is inclosed, though written by a Schleswig-Holsteiner, establishes pretty clearly the fact that the line running through Bau, Medelby, and Hoyer, is the line which now separates the two nationalities. The elections of 1855 gave German members to the States of Schleswig from that line southwards. The churches and schools on that line and south of it were all in the hands of Germans in 1848. The efforts of Denmark to danify" (a new German word) Schleswig south of the line of Bau, by prohibiting the German tongue in schools and churches, only rouses the German element to greater exertions.

As far as Schleswig is concerned, it is evident that partition is the course most naturally leading to a settlement. The people of the Duchies would hail such a settlement with satisfaction; Germany would accept it willingly, and the German Governments would see in it a termination of great perplexities. For it is not to be concealed that the question of the Duchies divides itself into two very distinct branches. The question has a national and a political side. I shall not weary your Lordship with a recapitulation of the promises made by Denmark in favour of Schleswig in 1850-51. It is sufficient to say that Germany and by Germany I mean the whole German nation—has taken part with the Schleswigers, and that this is the national side of the question.

Inclosure in No. 92.

Précis of a Memorandum on the Present State of Feeling in the Duchy of

Schleswig.

THE Memorandum begins by stating that the north of Schleswig, i. e., the district north of the line drawn by Bau, Medelby, and Hoyer, up to the Königsau, is perfectly devoid of German feeling and sympathies, which have always been carefully stifled by the Danish propaganda. Although the intelligent portion of the community in the towns are German, yet those towns are not of sufficient importance to be able to exercise any considerable influence on the rural districts.

Under such circumstances, it was an easy task for the Danish Government and the propaganda almost completely to destroy what sympathy, arising from community of interests, yet remained in North Schleswig for the South and for Holstein. This was shown in the year of the war of 1848-49, when the Provisional Government, anxious to know the state of feeling in the North, sent a confidential person to the districts of Apenrade, Tondern, and Hadersleben. The result of the inquiry showed that the people had either no ideas, or completely false ones, of what was taking place in 1848. The prevailing belief was that there was only one object in view, namely, the annexation of Schleswig to Prussia; the people seemed to be unaware that the struggle was on behalf of the whole of the Schleswigers, including necessarily those of South Schleswig; nay, they were so completely befooled by the Danish propaganda, that they believed there was an intention to enlist them as soldiers to fight against the Turks.

These perverted views are only to be understood if we remember how assiduously the influence of German education has been opposed. Formerly most of the North Schleswigers were enrolled into the German regiments, and quartered in German garrisons. King Christian VIII sent all the North Schleswig regiments to Denmark, where the propaganda lost no time in prejudicing them against everything German. At the same time, care was taken never to demand of North Schleswig that it should become a part of Denmark. The Northerns were rather designated as faithful subjects of the King-Danish Schleswigers, in fact.

An appeal was made to the character of this portion of the population, and to the Danish language, to which it was accustomed. The absence of national feeling was used by the Danes with so much tact that it became easy to induce the North Schleswigers to desire that they should only be considered as Danish Schleswigers.

On war breaking out, the young men of North Schleswig fled into Jutland, not for the purpose of serving in the Danish army, but in order to avoid serving altogether. The Danes wisely spared these people. The young men in the towns of Hadersleben and Apenrade took service in the Schleswig-Holstein army. South of the line of Bau, Medelby, and Hoyer, the Schleswig-Holstein army was received everywhere with open arms; north of that line, it found the villages dead and the houses closed. In the South of Schleswig the war taxes were paid with alacrity; in the North they were collected by force. To such a degree had Denmark succeeded in separating the North from the South at the death of Christian VIII. This was effected during periods when an appearance of paternal tenderness and care was kept up. The excellent administration of the law and of the government served to prevent North Schleswig from feeling the dependence to which it was being subjected.

That which the Crown of Denmark had assiduously laboured to bring about previous to 1850, it attempted to maintain, and almost succeeded in enforcing by revolutionary zeal in that year. Danish currency was introduced in place of that of Schleswig-Holstein; officials, educated in Copenhagen, ignorant of civil or criminal law, were appointed in Schleswig-no regard was had, even to the moral character of these persons; the taxes were increased, and an excise was levied on brandy, in order that the systems of taxation in Denmark and the Duchy should be assimilated; lastly, the German language was totally suppressed in North Schleswig, so that it became impossible for fathers to educate their children without private tutors. Credit became so low that loans on mortgage could be obtained no longer from South Schleswig, whence money had hitherto plentifully flowed.

That this state of things failed to make Denmark more unpopular in North Schleswig generally (the quasi German towns of Apenrade and Hadersleben must be excepted), shows that Germanism has no root there amongst the mass of the population. There is, it is true, great bitterness and discontent of the Danish Government, but it is such a bitterness and discontent as might be felt in Denmark by oppressed Danes. The feeling of the people that they are Danish Schleswigers is so strong that they have no idea of improving their condition in the event of their becoming German.

As has been previously remarked, the contrast is striking in the country south of the line by Bau, Medelby, and Hoyer. Everything, indeed, tends to make this line daily more clearly defined, and to create, in the end, a total separation. Whilst the youth in the North accept the circumstances forced on them by the Danish Government, the reverse is the case in the South. There the rising generation, encouraged by its elders, perseveres in resisting everything Danish. It is even more German than its elders. In a short time, if circumstances remain unchanged, there will be the same difference between South and North Schleswigers as between Danes and Holsteiners. The Danish Government neglects nothing for this end. No newspaper which is not perfectly favourable to the Danish Government is allowed to appear. The learned German school in Hadersleben has been suppressed, and in its place a Danish one has been established, in which the German language is considered a foreign tongue. The clergy preach, not sermons on religious subjects, but essays in favour of Danish government. North Schleswig is further pecuniarily dependent on Denmark, because the introduction of the rixdollar, to which the people are not accustomed, tends to straighten trade, and thereby increases the price of commodities. Many peasants who were of old prosperous are now reduced in circumstances. The absence of a local Tribunal of Appeal in mortgages is one of the causes of depression. The necessity of title-deeds in Danish increases expense, and creates difficulties.

The monetary distress began soon after the South Schleswig capitalists ceased to give credit, and the Kiel money market refused supplies. Even the Flensburg Savings' Bank claimed its North Schleswig mortgages, and refused to lend any more money in that country. An appeal to Hamburgh proved unsuccessful. The South Schleswigers were thus forced to have recourse to the Danish officials, so as to obtain assistance from Danish capital by their means. Assistance of this kind is, however, only granted to those who are recommended as zealous Danish patriots. The recommendation of the " Amtmann" is more taken into consideration than the value of the security. The increase of the communal debt of the towns is also considerable.

The mainland of North Schleswig is yet, after all, better treated than the Island of Alsen, which is looked upon as a fortress, and from which everything German is carefully excluded.

Supposing the case that North Schleswig were permitted to decide on its fate by voting, it would refuse doing so unless in conjunction with the South; alleging as a reason that whichever way the result might go, it would be to the prejudice of the North, because it would be illtreated equally by Dane or German. But supposing that the whole of Schleswig were called upon to vote collectively, the result would vary according to the questions put. If in this form: "Do you desire to remain Schleswigers, or to be incorporated into Denmark?" the votes of the North, irrespective of the South, would be against incorporation. But if put so: "Do you choose to belong to Germany or to Denmark?" the majority of the North would undoubtedly be on the side of Denmark. The same result would be obtained if the North were to choose between Denmark and the restoration of Schleswig-Holstein, which has been represented to the Northerns as equivalent to an incorporation into the Germanic Confederation; of the disastrous consequences of this they have the most extravagant ideas.

The Island of Alsen would, under every circumstance, with scarce a dissenting voice, vote for incorporation with Denmark.

No. 93.

Count Gruner to Count Bernstorff.—(Communicated to Lord J. Russell by Count Bernstorff, January 3, 1861.)

(Translation.)

Berlin, December 29, 1860.

MY communication of the 8th of November last, with which I had the honour of forwarding to your Excellency the Memorandum of the Cabinet of London, relating to the discussions between the German Confederation and Denmark, has induced Lord John Russell, in a despatch of the 8th instant to Mr. Lowther, to give some further explanations as to the object and meaning of that Memorandum. I have, therefore, no hesitation to send to your Excellency herewith a copy of this despatch likewise, for the completion of my former communication.

As your Excellency will have understood from my communication of the 8th ultimo, we also have regarded the proposals contained in the Memorandum as proposals of the Danish Government. But we thought ourselves obliged to assume, on the whole, that England approved of them, not simply because the London Cabinet had shown its readiness to be the medium of communicating the same to us, but more especially because of that part of the Memorandum which expressly intimated a hope that Prussia would support them if they were brought forward at Frankfort.

To our satisfaction, we may understand from Lord John Russell's last despatch, that it was not the intention of the British Government to recommend the acceptance of the propositions of the Copenhagen Cabinet, nor even to mention them as suited to form the basis for a settlement.

It was also offered by the Danish Government that the contribution of Holstein to the common expenses of the Monarchy, which had been calculated hitherto upon its partial estimate, should be fixed once for all, and that this should be reckoned on the average amount of the last years. But in this it was expressly added that so long as there should be no necessity to increase this ontribution, no control should be allowed to the States of Holstein over the appropriation thereof. It must be obvious how unequal this would make the position of Holstein, compared with that of the territories represented in the Reichsrath; as the Reichsrath has to agree to the Budget in all its separate positions, and to superintend its appropriation.

Your Excellency will now see from the inclosure that the London Cabinet also did not understand that the States of Holstein should be deprived of the right to inquire into the appropriation of the contribution.

Lord John Russell says, in the further course of his despatch, that the British Government would be glad to see all parts of the Danish Monarchy fairly represented in a Parliament at Copenhagen, and, if this be unattainable, that the Kingdom and the Duchies should each bear a proportionate part of the

common burthens. We have not the smallest objection to this on our part. It, therefore, Lord John Russell thinks he should infer from my communication of the 8th ultimo, that we should reject a plan having this object, it can only arise from a misunderstanding, as must be the case if it be supposed that we rejected in a former instance the plan of an equal representation of the different parts of the territory; on the contrary, we have always urged that the promise given, according to which the Monarchy should have a constitution in which the individual portions of the country should hold a position of equal right with one another, should finally be fulfilled.

We have been especially satisfied by the last part of the despatch of the 8th instant, in which the British Government does not hesitate to acknowledge expressly the existing international obligations of Denmark towards the German Confederation, in respect of Schleswig, which have, on the part of Denmark, hitherto been constantly denied. It is a matter of course that these obligations cannot involve any interference of the Confederation with the details of the administration; but, indeed, no interference of this nature has hitherto ever been claimed.

We feel ourselves assured that the candid intimation to us of Lord John Russell's conviction, in reference to Denmark's obligations on account of Schleswig, cannot fail to have its influence on the Cabinet of Copenhagen, the more especially as the latter can have no doubt that the English Court is unprejudiced in the question, and that its dispositions are benevolent and

amicable.

One word more in conclusion, to which I am led by an observation of Lord John Russell towards the close of his despatch.

When I, in my communication of the 8th November, made a reference to Lord John Russell's despatch to Sir James Hudson, then recently issued, my allusion was not intended to be to the principles therein expressed, as to the right of the nationality, but rather to the principles respecting the right of a people in regard to its Government. I must look to those principles for a security that England will interest herself also for the rights of the States of Holstein in regard to their Government.

Your Excellency will communicate the contents of this despatch confidentially to Lord John Russell, with assurances of our thanks for the explanations given to us.

Sir A. Malet to Lord J. Russell.-(Received January 10.)

My Lord, Frankfort, January 7, 1861. I HAVE learnt that the project of arresting the Diet's proceedings in the matter of the Danish Duchies has not been approved at Berlin, and that no further delay will be allowed in dealing with the question vigorously, that instructions have arrived here to hasten the steps which must necessarily precede execution, and that the Mixed Commission will deliberate to-day on the numbers and description of forces to be employed in the occupation of Holstein and Lauenburg.

I am informed that one division of not less than from 15,000 to 16,000 men will be the effective employed on this service, and it is hoped that so large a force will preclude all idea of armed resistance.

A preliminary summons to Denmark having been already given in February 1858, the formalities to be gone through (after the vote of the Diet), which will not, I believe, be taken before Thursday, the 10th instant, will be the choice of the State which will have to carry out the measure of execution. This State will then have to name one or more Civil Commissaries, and must notify the intention of military occupation to the Danish Government as about to take place within a certain time.

This term, it is generally believed, will be three weeks, and in the case of non-compliance on the part of Denmark with the Diet's demand, the Civil Commissaries would, at the expiration of that time, enter the Duchies under escort of troops, and establish a Provisional Government.