strength north of the Chattahoochee River. If dislodged from that, Johnston would be compelled to fall back of that river, or fight upon more equal ground. Such being the situation, General Sherman determined not to attack Johnston in his intrenchments, and to force him to abandon them.

It being determined to change position so as to force Johnston into the field, after a few days' delay, Sherman renewed orders to McPher son to move to his left about five miles and occupy Thomas's position in front of New Hope Church, and Thomas and Schofield were ordered to move a corresponding distance to their left. This move was effected with ease and safety on the 1st of June, and by pushing the left well around, Sherman occupied all the roads leading back to Allatoona and Acworth, after which he pushed Stoneman's Cavalry rapidly into Allatoona, at the east end of the Pass, and Garrard's Cavalry around by the rear to the west end of the Pass. Both of these commands reached the points designated without trouble, and we thereby accomplished the real purpose of turning the Allatoona Pass. Our line was about seven miles in length. The extreme right, held by the Army of the Tennessee, was the longest relatively, and the weakest.

Contemporaneous with the withdrawal of the right wing, or immediately after its discovery, the rebels changed the position of their left, Hardee's Corps being moved to the centre. About midnight of June 4th, General Logan received information that the enemy in his front were evacuating their works and moving in some direction. The night was rainy and very dark. Logan gave orders to advance his skirmishers so soon as it should be light enough to move. The line moved about four, and found the works in the front of his corps entirely abandoned and his whole force withdrawn, save a few pickets, who were captured. Johnston was too shrewd to be cut off from his base, and on the 4th, discovering the Union troops moving round his right flank, he abandoned his position, and moved eastward to the railroad, to cover Marietta.

On the 6th the Army of the Tennessee marched at daylight to Acworth, on the railroad, some fifteen or sixteen miles northwest of Marietta by rail, and two-thirds that distance on a straight line. Thus Johnston was again obliged by General Sherman's strategy to abandon a strong position, and move out of his carefully and thoroughly prepared fortifications. Sherman, having examined Allatoona Pass, resolved to make it a secondary base.

Here, on the 7th, was Sherman, in sight of the enemy's signal stations at Lost Mountain-on the direct road from Dallas to Marietta, seven miles from the latter place-and Kenesaw Mountain, ten miles from Lost Mountain, a little east of north from it, on the railroad. These two points were the right and left of the enemy's position, their army stretching along the hills between the two. They are detached peaks, overlooking the plain beyond, and connected by a ridge, or series of low hills. Kenesaw Mountain, the larger of the two, rises to an elevation of one thousand eight hundred and twenty-eight feet above the sea-level, extending some nine hundred yards on its summit from northeast to southwest. It is situated two and one-half miles northwest of

HISTORY OF THE GREAT REBELLION.

Marietta, and directly upon the line of the railroad, which here makes Lost Mountain, whose a bend to the east, to escape the mountain. lies some miles west of southwest isolated situation explains its name, of Marietta, directly north of the railroad running from that place to Dallas. Between Kenesaw and Lost Mountain, and half a mile to the north, is Pine Mountain, a lesser elevation, constituting the apex of a triangle, of which the other two may be said to form the base. The three hills and their connecting ridges were fortified, and afforded an admirable defensive position against an attacking army.

On the 9th of June the army was once more put in motion for Atlanta. By means of the railroad, which was kept in good running order from Chattanooga to the front, supplies of all kinds had come forward in abundance, and on the 8th the Seventeenth Army Corps, General Blair, reached Acworth, and was incorporated with the Army of the Tennessee. It compensated for Union losses in battle and for garrisons left at Rome, Kingston, and elsewhere, and Sherman was enabled to renew the attack upon his wary adversary with as strong a force as at the commencement of the campaign. The order of advance was now somewhat different from that previously observed during the campaign, McPherson being shifted to the left wing and Schofield to McPherson was ordered the right, while Thomas still held the centre.

to move towards Marietta, his right on the railroad, Thomas on Kenesaw and Pine Mountains, and Schofield off towards Lost Mountain; Garrard's Cavalry being on the left, Stoneman's on the right, while Our dépôt was at McCook looked to our rear and communications.

Big Shanty.

By the 11th of June our lines were close up, and dispositions were made to break the line between Kenesaw and Pine Mountains. Hooker was on its right and front, Howard on its left and front, and Palmer between it and the railroad. During a sharp cannonading from Howard's right or Hooker's left, the rebel general Polk was killed on the 14th, and on the morning of the 15th Pine Mountain was found abandoned by the enemy. Thomas and Schofield advanced, and found him again strongly intrenched along the line of rugged hills connecting Kenesaw and Lost Mountain. At the same time McPherson advanced his line, gaining substantial advantages on the left. Pushing our operations on the centre as vigorously as the nature of the ground would permit, an assault was ordered on the centre. On the 17th, the enemy abandoned Lost Mountain and the long line of admirable breast works connecting it

*Leonidas Polk was born in Raleigh, North Carolina, in 1806, and graduated at West Point in 1827, but resigned his commission in the army in the same year, in order to study for the ministry. In 1830 he was ordained a deacon of the Protestant Episcopal Church; in 1888 he was consecrated Missionary Bishop of Arkansas and the Indian Territory south of 36° 30', and in 1841 he became He embraced with ardor Bishop of Louisiana, the doctrines of secession, was commissioned a major-general in the rebel army, and until the spring of 1862 held command in Tennessee and Kentucky. He commanded a division at Shiloh, and, during the siege of Corinth, participated in Bragg's invasion of Kentucky in the autumn of 1862, and distinguished himself at the hard-fought

battle of Murfreesboro'. For alleged disobedience
of orders at the battle of Chickainauga, whereby,
according to General Bragg, the Union army was
alone saved from annihilation, he was placed
In the early part of
under temporary arrest.
1864 he regained his prestige by skilful disposi-
tions to prevent the junction of Sherman and
Smith in Mississippi, and in consequence was
appointed to command a corps in Johnston's
He was killed by a cannon-shot while
army.
At the time
reconnoitring on Pine Mountain.
of his death he held the rank of lieutenant-gen-
eral in the rebel service. He never resigned his
diocese, and intended, at the close of the war, to
resume his episcopal functions.

with Kenesaw, to prevent being flanked by Schofield, who had wheeled around Pine Knob, and was pressing along the Dallas and Marietta road. An additional motive for this movement was found in the fact that while our forces had been so successfully at work upon their centre and left, McPherson on our left had put them in a dangerous position on their right, pressing it on that flank beyond Big Shanty and Brush Mountain. Sherman continued to press at all points, skirmishing in dense forests of timber and across most difficult ravines, until the enemy was found again strongly posted and intrenched, with Kenesaw as his salient, his right wing thrown back to cover Marietta, and his left behind Nose's Creek, covering his railroad back to the Chattahoochee. This enabled him to contract his lines and strengthen them accordingly.

Our right, meanwhile, forced its way across and two miles beyond Nose's Creek, on the Dalton and Marietta road. This creek it had been found impossible to cross before, because of the swollen condition of the stream. The stream was to be crossed by a bridge, close beyond which the rebels had a heavy line of skirmishers to repel any attempt to cross. In the face of a raking fire of musketry, four regiments charged over the bridge at a double-quick, driving the enemy before them, and making way for our advance forces. No serious opposition appears, however, to have been made to this advance, the rebel left being already refused. Their position in front of our right to the northeast remained at this time unchanged, their troops resting there behind strong works. Our centre had worked up the base of Kenesaw Mountain, and had carried some knobs west of the mountain, thus securing a position for an annoying enfilading fire upon the mountain. These points, which had been lost by the enemy through negligence, were held by our troops so firmly that all efforts to dislodge them were in vain.

Kenesaw Mountain is made up of two elevations, joined almost at their summits, one being about eight hundred feet high and the other about one hundred feet higher. Looking at them from the north side, they have the appearance of two immense mounds, surrounded at the base by gentle irregularities of surface adapted to every department of agricultural labor. The outline of the mountain rises on the east side rather gradually, describing almost a half circle, thence falling upon the west, about two hundred feet. The other portion joins the first and rises to a still greater height, and being a trifle more irregular. On the west side it then loses itself somewhat abruptly in a small valley beyond, by which the country is deprived of a mountainous character. The base of the Kenesaw is about four miles from east to west, drawing a straight line, and in breadth is about one mile. Its sides are covered with thick forests, brush, and rock and bowlders of various dimensions. It would be impossible to take it in front. The defences of the mountain consisted of a line of works on the summit, upon which were erected several batteries. Upon the sides, single guns were located at commanding points. The flanks of the mountain were held by heavy bodies of infantry and artillery, and its rear was protected in a similar manner.

It was no longer possible for our wings to make a further advance

without cutting themselves loose from the centre, whose further progress was stayed by the formidable defences of Kenesaw Mountain, the enemy on which was watched by McPherson, working his left forward, while Thomas was swinging as it were on a grand left wheel, his left on Kenesaw, connecting with General McPherson, and General Schofield was all the time working to the south and east along the old Sandtown road.

On the 22d, as Hooker had advanced his line, with Schofield on his right, the enemy, Hood's Corps, with detachments from the others, suddenly sallied and attacked. The blow fell mostly on Williams's Division of Hooker's Corps, and a brigade of Hascall's Division of Schofield's army. The enemy was badly repulsed. This was the affair of "Kulp's house." It was now that Sherman, smarting under the imputation that he would not attack fortified lines, but depended upon overwhelming numbers to outflank, determined to risk an attack. Accordingly, on June 24th, he issued orders for an attack to take place June 27th. The general point selected was the left centre; because, if a strong column could be pushed through at that point boldly and rapidly two and one-half miles, it would reach the railroad below Marietta, cut off the enemy's right and centre from its line of retreat, and then either part could be overwhelmed and destroyed.

Accordingly at the appointed time the Seventeenth Corps (Blair's) circled the eastern point of the mountain and threatened the enemy's right. The Sixteenth Corps (Dodge's), next on the right, assaulted the heights on the northern slope of the mountain; the Fifteenth (Logan's) the western slope of the mountain. On the centre, Davis's Division of the Fourteenth Corps and Newton's of the Fourth constituted the assaulting column, supported on the right by Geary and Butterfield of Hooker's Corps. On the extreme right of our line was stationed Schofield, who moved forward his whole force, driving the enemy from a line of light works. The position to be attempted offered but a desperate chance of success. On the summit of the rugged mountain peak, covered with a dense growth of underbrush, the enemy had stationed a battery of twelve guns, from which they maintained a withering cross-fire on our troops engaged in forcing a passage up the steep sides of the mountain, and over the abatis and rifle-pits behind which the enemy lay sheltered. The utmost efforts of the men could not avoid a repulse. The Union loss, as reported by Logan, was three thousand five hundred and twenty-one. Generals Harker and McCook were among the slain.

General Sherman did not rest long under this failure, and Schofield was ordered to press strongly on the left, while, on July 1st, McPherson, being relieved by Garrard's Cavalry in front of Kenesaw, moved with his whole army by the right, threatening Nickajack Creek and Turner's Ferry on the Chattahoochee. Stoneman was sent to the river below Turner's. The result was the retreat of the enemy on the night of July 2d. At half-past eight A. M., July 3d, Sherman entered Marietta. Logan's Corps of General McPherson's army, which had not moved far, was ordered back into Marietta by the main road, and McPherson and Schofield were instructed to cross Nickajack and attack

the enemy in flank and rear, and, if possible, to catch him in the confusion of crossing the Chattahoochee; but Johnston had foreseen and provided against all this, and had covered his movement well. He had intrenched a strong tête de pont at the Chattahoochee, with an advanced intrenched line across the road at Smyrna camp-meeting ground, five miles from Marietta.

Here Thomas found him, his front covered by a good parapet, and his flank behind the Nickajack and Rottenwood Creeks. Ordering a garrison for Marietta, and Logan to join his own army near the mouth of Nickajack, Sherman overtook Thomas at Smyrna. On the 4th of July he pushed a strong skirmish line down the main road, capturing the entire line of the enemy's pits, and made strong demonstrations along Nickajack Creek and about Turner's Ferry. This had the desired effect, and the next morning the enemy was gone, and the army moved to the Chattahoochee, Thomas's left flank resting on it near Paice's Ferry, McPherson's right at the mouth of Nickajack, and Schofield in reserve. The enemy lay behind a line of unusual strength, covering the railroad and pontoon bridges, and beyond the Chattahoochee.

The operations of General Sherman had been greatly harassed by the movements of guerrillas, and on his arrival in the neighborhood of Marietta he issued the following letter to the people of Tennessee and Georgia, living within the limits of the Department of the Cumberland, for their information, as expressing the sentiments of the depart ment commander :

"HEAD-QUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE
"MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, BIG SHANTY,
"GEORGIA, June 21, 1864.

"General BURBRIDGE, Commanding Division of Kentucky:
"GENERAL:-The recent raid of Morgan, and the concurrent acts of men styling
themselves Confederate partisans or guerrillas, calls for determined action on our part.
"Even on the Southern State Rights' theory, Kentucky has not seceded. Her
people, by their vote and their actions, have adhered to their allegiance to the National
Government, and the South would now coerce her out of the Union and into theirs by
the very dogma of 'coercion' upon which so much stress was laid at the outset of
the war, and which carried into rebellion the people of the Middle or Border Slave
States.

"But politics aside, these acts of the so-called partisans or guerrillas are nothing but simple murder, horse-stealing, arson, and other well-defined crimes, which do not sound as well under their true names as more agreeable ones of warlike meaning.

"Now, before starting on this campaign, I foresaw it, and you remember, that this very case would arise, and I asked Governor Bramlette to at once organize in each county a small, trustworthy band, under the sheriff, and at one dash arrest every man in the community who was dangerous to it; and also every fellow hanging about the towns, villages, and cross-roads who had no honest calling, the material out of which guerrillas are made up; but this sweeping exhibition of power doubtless seemed to the Governor rather arbitrary.

"The fact is, in our country personal liberty has been so well secured that public safety is lost sight of in our laws and institutions, and the fact is, we are thrown back one hundred years in civilization, law, and every thing else, and will go right straight to anarchy and the devil, if somebody don't arrest our downward progress.

"We, the military, must do it. and we have right and law on our side. All governments and communities have a right to guard against real and even supposed danger. The whole people of Kentucky must not be kept in a state of suspense and real danger, lest a few innocent men should be wrongfully accused.