delaying their march.

The rebel advance under Longstreet offered such a determined resistance to the Union left wing, that the night fell on a drawn battle on that portion of the field, the National arms having been decidedly triumphant on the right. During all this time the corps of Fitz-John Porter, which Pope had repeatedly ordered to assail the rebel right, had remained inactive at Manassas Junction, within sight and sound of the battle. During the whole afternoon Porter had seen the troops of Longstreet hurrying forward to the assistance of Jackson's hard-pressed army, and yet made no effort to check their movement. His excuse, that he encountered the enemy in flank in the direction of Gainesville and was compelled to fall back towards Manassas, was declared by Pope to be groundless. "I believed then, as I am very sure now," says the latter general in his official report, "that it was easily practicable for him to have turned the right flank of Jackson, and to have fallen upon his rear; that if he had done so, we should have gained a decided victory over the army under Jackson before he could have been joined by any of the forces of Longstreet, and that the army of General Lee would have been so crippled and checked by the destruction of this large force, as to have been no longer in condition to prosecute further operations of an aggressive character."

Notwithstanding the failure of Porter to overwhelm Jackson's right wing, and the successful junction of Longstreet with the latter general, the advantage of the day's battle, fought on the old Bull Run fields; was so clearly with the National forces, that after the cessation of firing Pope sent the following dispatch to Washington :

"HEAD-QUARTERS, FIELD OF Battle,

"GROVETON, NEAR GAINESVILLE, August 30, 1862.

"To Major-General HALLECK, General-in-Chief, Washington, D. C.:

"We fought a terrific battle here yesterday with the combined forces of the enemy, which lasted with continuous fury from daylight until after dark, by which time the enemy was driven from the field, which we now occupy.

"Our troops are too much exhausted to push matters, but shall do so in the course of the morning, as soon as Fitz-John Porter's Corps come up from Manassas, "The enemy is still in our front, but badly used up.

"We have lost not less than eight thousand men, killed and wounded, and from the appearance of the field the enemy have lost at least two to our one. He stood strictly on the defensive, and every assault was made by ourselves.

Our troops have behaved splendidly.

"The battle was fought on the identical battle-field of Bull Run, which greatly increased the enthusiasm of our men.

"The news just reaches me from the front that the enemy is retreating towards the mountains. I go forward at once to see.

"We have made great captures, but I am not able yet to form an idea of their extent.

"JOIN POPE, Major-General Commanding."

The Union losses in the battle of the 29th were not less than six to eight thousand, and those of the enemy probably considerably exceeded those numbers. In fact, so greatly were the latter shattered by the severe fighting, that during the night of the 29th, and up to ten o'clock on the morning of the 30th, every indication seemed to point to their retreat from the front. Their left wing receded in the

night along the Warrenton turnpike in the direction of Gainesville, to meet the remainder of the supports under Lee, which continued during the morning to pour through Thoroughfare Gap in great numbers. Every hour added immensely to the strength of the rebels, while Pope's army had been not only greatly reduced by the incessant labors of the previous ten days, but had received no further re-enforcements from the Army of the Potomac since the arrival of Porter's Corps, notwithstanding repeated assurances that Franklin's and Sumner's Corps should be hurried forward without delay. On the morning of the 30th, Pope estimated his available force on the field. at only forty thousand men, to whom were opposed an army of more than double that strength. In addition to their paucity of numbers, these troops were actually suffering for subsistence, and artillery and cavalry horses had been continuously in harness or saddled for ten days, and for two days had been without forage. As hour after hour passed on, and no succor arrived to the exhausted Army of Virginia, Pope repeatedly telegraphed for rations, forage, and ammunition. The following dispatch, received at daylight of the 30th, showed him how little prospect there was that his request would be complied with:

"To Commanding Officer at Centreville:

แ

August 29, 1862–8 P. M.

"I have been instructed by General McClellan to inform you that he will have all the available wagons at Alexandria loaded with rations for your troops, and all of the cars, also, as soon as you will send in a cavalry escort to Alexandria as a guard to the train.

"Respectfully,

"Such a letter," says General Pope, "when we were fighting the enemy, and Alexandria was swarming with troops, needs no comment. Bad as was the condition of our cavalry, I was in no situation to spare troops from the front, nor could they have gone to Alexandria and returned within the time by which we must have had provisions, or have fallen back in the direction of Washington. Nor do I yet see what service cavalry could have rendered in guarding railroad trains."

Though discouraged by this message, and convinced that he could look for no kind of assistance from McClellan, Pope set resolutely to work to make the best fight he could with the means at his disposal. It was his object to cripple Lee, if possible, before the whole rebel army could arrive on the field; and he therefore advanced to the attack on the 30th, as rapidly as he could bring his forces into action. Between twelve and two o'clock, both wings of the Union army were pushed forward; but it becoming evident that Lee was messing his troops as fast as they arrived on the field for an assault on the Federal left, Pope hastened to strengthen that part of his line. At about four P. M. the battle became general, and immense masses of troops were precipitated against the Union left, held by McDowell, Porter, and Sigel, who, in spite of fatigue and overwhelming numbers, of fered a stubborn resistance. At the same time, the enemy were in such force in front of Heintzelman and Reno, on the centre and right,

that no re-enforcements could be sent to the left until late in the afternoon, when Reno's Corps was thrown into action in that direction. By this time, the left, succumbing to the press of numbers, had fallen back more than half a mile, though still retaining its formation, and darkness fell upon the Union army, worsted in a most unequal encounter, but not routed or even broken. The right had not lost one inch of ground during the day. Before the close of the battle, Pope received intelligence that Franklin's Corps, which, against the express orders of General Halleck, had been detained several days at Alexandria on various frivolous pretexts, was in the neighborhood of Centreville, followed at an interval of four miles by the corps of Sumner; but as his troops who had engaged in the battle of the 30th, were too exhausted to immediately renew the action, he decided to waive the advantage which this fresh accession of strength would give him, and fall back across Bull Run to the heights of Centreville, the defensive works of which were readily available for a stand against the enemy, and would enable him to cover Washington. Accordingly, between eight o'clock and midnight, the Union army retired leisurely and in good order to its new position, the enemy making no effort to pursue his advantage; and, on the morning of the 31st, was concentrated in and around Centreville, with outlying bodies to Chantilly, and on the road to Fairfax Court-House. During the 31st the army rested, and some supplies and ammunition were received. On September 1st, the strength of the united Armies of Virginia-and the Potomac, including the corps of Franklin and Sumner, and that of Banks, which had just arrived from Bristow Station, where it had been guarding the trains, was reported by the commanding officers at less than sixty thousand men. As this force seemed to General Pope too small for offensive purposes under the peculiar circumstances in which he was placed, he determined to remain for the present in a defensive attitude, and await the further movements of the enemy. What the circumstances alluded to consisted of may be determined from the following dispatch, sent on September 1st to General Halleck:

"Major-General Halleck, General-in-Chief:

"CENTREVILLE, September 1-8.50 A. M.

"All was quiet yesterday, and so far this morning. My men all resting. They need it much. Forage for our horses is being brought up. Our cavalry is completely broken down, so that there are not five horses to a company that can raise a trot. The consequence is, that I am forced to keep considerable infantry along the roads in my rear to make them secure, and even then it is difficult to keep the enemy's cavalry off the roads. I shall attack again to-morrow if I can; the next day certainly.

"I think it my duty to call your attention to the unsoldierly and dangerous conduct of many brigade and some division commanders of the forces sent here from the Peninsula. Every word and act and intention is discouraging, and calculated to break down the spirits of the men, and to produce disaster. One commander of a corps, who was ordered to march from Manassas Junction to join me near Groveton, although he was only five miles distant, failed to get up at all, and, worse still, fell back to Manassas without a fight, and in plain hearing, at less than three miles distance, of a furious battle, which raged all day. It was only in consequence of peremptory orders that he joined me next day. One of his brigades, the brigadier-general of which professed to be looking for his division, absolutely remained all day at Centreville, in plain view of the battle, and made no attempt to join. What renders the

whole matter worse, these are both officers of the regular army, who do not hold back from ignorance or fear. Their constant talk, indulged in publicly and in promiscuous company, is, that the Army of the Potomac will not fight,' that they are demoralized by withdrawal from the Peninsula, &c. When such example is set by officers of high rank, the influence is very bad among those in subordinate stations.

"You have hardly an idea of the demoralization among officers of high rank in the Potomac Army, arising in all instances from personal feeling in relation to changes of commander-in-chief and others. These men are mere tools or parasites, but their example is producing, and must necessarily produce, very disastrous results. You should know these things, as you alone can stop it. Its source is beyond my reach, though its effects are very perceptible and very dangerous. I am endeavoring to do all I can, and will most assuredly put them where they shall fight or run away. My advice to you (I give it with freedom, as I know you will not misunderstand it) is, that in view of any satisfactory results, you draw back this army to the intrenchments in front of Washington, and set to work in that secure place to reorganize and rearrange it. You may avoid great disaster by doing so. I do not consider the matter except in a purely military light, and it is bad enough and great enough to make some action very necessary. Where there is no heart in their leaders, and every disposition to hang back, much cannot be expected from the men.

Please hurry forward cavalry horses to me under strong escort. I need them badly; worse than I can tell you. "JOHN POPE, Major-General.

"A true copy:

(Signed)

"T. C. H. SMITH,

"Lieut.-Colonel and A. D. C."

As the enemy showed a disposition to work round to the north, as if for the purpose of turning the Union right, Pope fell slowly back towards Fairfax Court-House, keeping a strong force under Hooker, Reno, and McDowell, at Chantilly, which lies west of the former place. At sunset on the 1st, the rebels made a sudden attack at Chantilly, and a severe engagement, uninterrupted by a terrific thunder-storm, was maintained until dark, when the enemy was repulsed at all points, and left the field in the possession of the Federal troops. The latter, however, paid dearly for this success by the loss of Major-General Kearny and Brigadier-General Stevens, two of the most loyal and accomplished officers in the army. On the morning of the 2d, Pope's whole command was massed behind Difficult Creek, between Flint Hill and the Alexandria turnpike, whence, at noon, in accordance with orders from Halleck, they marched for Washington, within the defensive works of which they arrived in good order and without further loss, on the evening of the 3d. Immediately afterwards, Pope, at his own request, was relieved of his command. He at the same time preferred charges of insubordination and negligence against General Porter, on which the latter was subsequently tried, and, having been convicted, was cash

iered.

When General McClellan had fallen back before the enemy, on the first of July, and collected his broken columns under cover of the gunboats on James River, he believed himself to be in a very perilous position. To retreat down the Peninsula, he thought, in face of a powerful enemy, was a hazardous proceeding. To embark the army, even if there had been sufficient transports, while the enemy commanded the opposite shore, was not a promising operation. The army of General Pope was not yet ready to threaten Richmond from the north, and all