tled, and holding that he was not authorized to sign one after- June Term, 1860. wards. Without determining whether this is proper practice or not, we think the judgment must be affirmed; for the In re CAMPonly error relied on is the refusal to grant a new trial, and the judge's affidavit does not show that any exception was taken. The counsel for the plaintiff in error seeks to supply this defect by his own affidavit, showing that he did except. But certainly we shall not adopt the practice of trying the record upon affidavits of parties or counsel, while the judge before whom the trial was had, is living. If the affidavit of the judge can be received in place of a bill of exceptions at all, it must show that the necessary exceptions were taken. The judgment is affirmed, with costs. BELL. In the matter of the appeal of HUGH CAMPBELL, adm'r, &c. When an administrator does not render an account of his administration to the probate court within one year from his appointment, nor apply to the court to extend the time for doing so, the court may cite him to render such account upon its own motion, and without the application of any one interested in the estate. APPEAL from the Circuit Court for La Fayette County. M. Hollister, contra. By the Court, COLE, J. In this case the judge of the county court of La Fayette county, acting as judge of probate, made an order, citing the appellant, who was the administrator of the estate of Patrick Norris, deceased, to appear before him and render an account of his acts and doings as administrator, more than one year having elapsed since his appointment as administrator of such estate. From the order citing him to appear, &c., the administrator appealed to the circuit court, where the order of the probate court was affirmed. An appeal was then taken to this court. VOL. XII-24 July 30. June Term, 1860. BELL. The simple question presented on the appeal, is, whether the probate court had authority, upon its own motion-no peIn re CAMP- tition or application being presented therefor by some one interested in the estate-to make an order citing the administrator to render an account of his administration, after the expiration of a year from the time such administrator was appointed. It is contended on the part of the appellant, that the probate court can only make such an order upon the application of some one interested in the settlement of the estate. Under the Revised Statutes of this state, courts of probate have a very extensive jurisdiction over the estates of deceased persons, and experience daily demonstrates that this jurisdiction must be extensive in order to secure a prompt and faithful settlement of such estates by those having them in charge. Our statute is founded upon the notion that the estates of deceased persons can ordinarily be settled within a year, and hence it is made one of the conditions of the bond to be given by an executor or administrator, that he "render a true and just account of his administration to the county court within one year, and at any other time when required by such court." If the condition of an estate is such that it cannot be settled within the year, then the executor or administrator should apply to the probate court for an extension of time, to enable him to execute his trust. When the administrator does not ask to have the time extended for the settlement of an estate, we think the probate court has the power, after the expiration of the year, to cite the adminis trator to render his account, even upon its own motion, and we can conceive of no valid objection to such an exercise of power on the part of that court. It is suggested upon the brief of counsel for the appellant, that various causes might exist which would render it impossible for an administrator to properly settle an estate within a year; but when this is the case, an extension of time would undoubtedly be granted on application therefor. It is a notorious fact that great, and not unfrequently, unnecessary delay intervenes in the settlement of estates, and there is but little danger that the power which was exercised in this case, will be abused. 1860. SMITH What reason the probate court had for citing the adminis- June Term, trator to render his account in this case, we do not know. It is fair to assume that that court acted upon good and sufficient grounds in citing the administrator to render his ac- PACKARD et al. count, and that ample time had been given for the settlement of the estate. The probate court may have known that the administrator was acting improvidently, and that it was improper that he should be allowed longer to remain in the exercise of his functions. There may have been infant heirs who had no guardian, or some other reason may have existed which rendered it expedient and necessary for that court to act as it did in the premises. As we think the probate court had the power, under our statute, to make the order citing the administrator to account, it follows that the order of the circuit court must be af firmed. SMITH VS. PACKARD and others. A judgment was rendered on the 14th of January, 1857, at which time the period of limitation of writs of error was four years from the date of the judgment. By an act approved April 24, 1858, the period of limitation was reduced to two years from the date of the judgment: Held, that a writ of error to reverse the above mentioned judgment, sued out on the 28th of October, 1959, was barred, a reasonable time for suing out the writ having elapsed after the passage of the last mentioned act, before the period of limitation prescribed therein expired. ERROR to the Circuit Court for Jackson County. The writ of error in this case was issued on the 28th day of October, 1859, to reverse a judgment rendered in the Jackson circuit court, on the 14th of January, 1857. A motion was made to quash the writ of error, upon the ground that it was barred by the statute of limitations. Knapp, Widvey & Booth, for plaintiff in error. J. J. Cole and W. H. Tucker, for defendants in error: The statute of limitations in force at the time a suit is instituted, governs and limits the right of action. No vested right is interfered with by a change in the law in this re SMITH V. June Term, spect before the commencement of the suit. Patterson vs. 1860. Gaines, 6 How. (U. S.), 550; Winston vs. McCormick, 1 Ind., 56; 4 Cow., 392; 2 Paige, 284; Story on the Con., § 1379; PACKARD et al. Butler vs. Palmer, 1 Hill, 324; People vs. Livingston, 6 Wend., 526; 2 Ind., 486; 7 id., 91; 2 Shep., 344; 28 Miss., 361; 7 Met., 435; Gilman vs. Cutts, 3 Foster (N. H.), 382; Willard vs. Harvey, 4 id., 344; Grover vs. Coon, 1 Coms., 536; 7 Barb., 445. July 30. By the Court, PAINE, J. At the time of the argument of this case, a motion to quash the writ of error was also argued, and the conclusion to which we have come upon that, renders it unnecessary to decide upon the merits of the case. The motion is made for the reason that the writ was barred by the statute of limitations. The judgment was entered on the 14th day of January, 1857. The statute in force at that time allowed a writ of error to be brought at any time within four years after the judgment. But chapter 61 of the General Laws of 1858, which was approved April 24th of that year, contains the following provision: "The time within which a writ of error may be issued in any case, is hereby limited to two years from the date of the judgment rendered in the case in which the writ is taken." This writ of error was issued on the 28th day of October, 1859, more than two years after the date of entering the judgment. If the statute applies, it is clear, therefore, that the writ was barred. The authorities seems fully to establish the rule that where mere inchoate rights are concerned, depending for their original existence on the law itself, they are subject to be abridged or modified by law, and that statutes of this character apply to such rights existing at the time of their passage, provided a reasonable time is left after the passage of the act, and before it would operate as a bar, for the party to exercise the right. De Cordova vs. City of Galveston, 4 Tex., 470; Winston vs. McCormick, 1 Carter (Ind.), 56; Gilman vs. Cutts, 3 Foster (N. II.), 376; Willard vs. Harvey, 4 id., 344; Smith vs. Morrison, 22 Pick., 430; Butler vs. Pal- June Term, mer, 1 Hill, 324. In this case, about nine months remained after the passage of the act, and before the 1860. DUNBAR V. ER. expiration of the two years from HARNESBERGthe date of the judgment. There can be no doubt that this must be considered as a reasonable time within which the writ of error might have been sued out, and that the statute therefore operated as a bar to its being issued afterwards. We think the constitutional provision that the writ of error shall never be prohibited, has no application to the question. The object of that provision was to prevent parties from being deprived entirely of the right to this writ; not to prevent any limitation from ever being established upon the exercise of the right. The motion to quash is granted, with costs. DUNBAR VS. HARNESBERGER. The assignee of a note which was over-due and had been paid, cannot maintain an action upon it against the maker, although he took the assignment without notice of such payment. Where a sheriff has an execution in his hands against the owner and holder of a note, the maker may pay to such sheriff the amount of the note, or so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy the execution, and such payment is as valid, under Sec. 90, Chap. 134 of R. S. 1858, as if made directly to the holder of the note. APPEAL from the Circuit Court for Pierce County. Action by Dunbar against Harnesberger, before a police justice of the city of Prescott, on a promissory note, dated June 12th, 1858, due the last day of January, 1859, for fiftyfive dollars, with twelve per cent. interest from date, executed by the defendant to Henry Sorns, and alleged to have been endorsed by said Sorns, and delivered to the plaintiff. Answer, 1. A general denial. 2. Payment of the note after due, to L. H. Merrick, who was at that time the holder thereof. 3. Payment of the note to the sheriff of Pierce county, upon an execution in his hands issued out of the |