are doing pretty well under treatment of our surgeons. We get a little better rations, but not enough. LaterAll the wounded that were able, were taken out of prison and put in tents. Things are much more comfortable here.

October 13th. This morning the names of all those who are able to travel were taken. We start for Richmond to-morrow. We drew five days' rations to-night— ten crackers and half a pound of pork to a man.

October 14th.-At two A. M. we fell in, marched down to the depot, a distance of one mile; many of us had to go on crutches. There were over two hundred of us, and we were put into five box-cars. Only those who have experienced it know how we suffered on the train; for eight days we were jammed up in these cars. One of our number died, and we had to leave several at hospitals on the road. Our five days' rations lasted only two, and those who had no money had to share with the rest. Bread was a dollar a loaf, and pies sold as high as two dollars. The 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, and 20th were spent in the cars.

October 21st.-Arrived at Richmond, and were put in Libby. Although we found this a miserable hole, it was much better than the filthy, lousy cars. When we got to Libby we were as nearly starved as men can be, and navigate. We drew our rations here, and got our wounds dressed, although no surgeon was there.

October 22d.-To-day they have stopped our rations for punishment. Four men escaped from Castle Thunder last night. We got grub from our officers, who are confined above, but we have to be very sly, as they allow no communications to be held between us and them.

October 23d. They still keep our rations from us. The wounded are doing pretty well, but we are all so

dirty and filthy it is a wonder we don't catch some contagious disease; we can get no soap to wash with.

October 24th. This morning all the wounded were taken to the Alabama Hospital, and all those that were not wounded were sent to Belle Isle, to remain there until exchanged or starved to death, the latter the most probable.

October 25th.-We are much more comfortably situated than we were in Libby. We have a very good. room, yet we have no blankets, and have to sleep on the floor. There is no medicine even here.

October 26th.-Nothing of importance to-day.

October 27th.-To-day they took the names of one hundred and eighty-five of the worst wounded to exchange at nine P. M. We were put in a scow, and started for City Point.

October 28th.-We are now on the flag-of-truce boat New York. The stars and stripes float proudly above us, yet it is a sorrowful sight to see the poor boys look like skeletons. I venture not more than ten of our number will weigh one hundred pounds. I fear quite a number of the boys will die; they are beyond medical skill.

October 29th.-I feel like a white man, now, the first time since I was captured. We are now in St. John's College Hospital. Each one of us had to take a good scrub, and were put into a clean shirt, after which the most welcome of all things came—a beautiful roast. I trust our troubles are ended for a season.

THE FORT PILLOW MASSACRE.

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

MESSRS. WADE AND GOOCH, the sub-committee appointed by the Joint Committee on the Conduct and Expenditures of the War, with instructions to proceed to such points as they might deem necessary for the purpose. of taking testimony in regard to the massacre at Fort Pillow, submitted the following report to the joint committee, together with the accompanying testimony and papers.

In obedience to the instructions of this joint committee, adopted on the 18th ultimo, your committee left Washington on the morning of the 19th, taking with them the stenographer of this committee, and proceeded to Cairo and Mound City, Illinois, Columbus, Kentucky, and Fort Pillow and Memphis, Tennessee, at each of which places they proceeded to take testimony.

Although your committee were instructed to inquire only in reference to the attack, capture, and massacre of Fort Pillow, they have deemed it proper to take some testimony in reference to the operations of Forrest and his command, immediately preceding and subsequent to that horrible transaction. It will appear from the testimony thus taken, that the atrocities committed at Fort Pillow were not the result of passions excited by the heat of conflict, but were results of a policy deliberately decided upon, and unhesitatingly announced. Even if the uncertainty of the fate of those officers and men, belonging to colored regiments, who have heretofore been taken prisoners by the rebels, has failed to convince the authorities of our Government of this fact, the testi

mony herewith submitted must convince even the most sceptical that it is the intention of the rebel authorities not to recognise the officers and men of our colored regiments, as entitled to the treatment accorded by all civilized nations to prisoners of war. The declarations of Forrest and his officers, both before and after the capture of Fort Pillow, as testified to by such of our men as have escaped after being taken by him; the threats contained in the various demands for surrender made at Paducah, Columbus, and other places; the renewal of the massacre the morning after the capture of Fort Pillow; the statements made by the rebel officers to the officers of our gunboats, who received the few survivors at Fort Pillow-all this proves most conclusively the policy they have determined to adopt.

The first operation of any importance was the attack upon Union City, Tennessee, by a portion of Forrest's command. The attack was made on the 24th of March. The post was occupied by a force of about five hundred men, under Colonel Hawkins, of the Seventh Tennessee Union Cavalry. The attacking force was superior in numbers, but was repulsed several times by our own forces. For the particulars of the attack, and the circumstances attending the surrender, your committee would refer to the testimony submitted. They would state, however, that it would appear from the testimony that the surrender was opposed by nearly if not quite all the officers of Colonel Hawkins's command. Your committee think that the circumstances connected with the surrender are such that they demand the most searching investigation by the military authorities, as, at the time of the surrender, but one man on our side had been injured.

On the 25th of March, the enemy, under the rebel

Generals Forrest, Buford, Harris, and Thompson, estimated at over six thousand men, made an attack on Paducah, Kentucky, which post was occupied by Colonel S. G. Hicks, Fortieth Illinois Regiment, with six hundred and fifty-five men. Our forces retired into Fort Anderson, and there made their stand, assisted by some gunboats belonging to the command of Captain Shirk, of the navy, successfully repelling the attacks of the enemy. Failing to make any impression upon our forces, Forrest then demanded an unconditional surrender, closing his communication to Colonel Hicks in these words: "If you surrender you shall be treated as prisoners of war. But if I have to storm your works you may expect no quarter." This demand and threat was met by a refusal on the part of Colonel Hicks to surrender, he stating that he had been placed there by his Government to defend that post, and he should do so. The rebels made three other assaults that same day, but were repulsed with heavy loss each time; the rebel General Thompson being killed in the last assault. The enemy retired next day, having suffered a loss estimated at three hundred killed, and from one thousand to twelve hundred wounded. The loss on our side was fourteen killed and forty-six wounded.

The operations of the enemy at Paducah were characterized by the same bad faith and treachery that seems to have become the settled policy of Forrest and his command. The flag of truce was taken advantage of there, as elsewhere, to secure desirable positions which the rebels were unable to obtain by fair and honorable means; and also to afford opportunities for plundering private stores as well as Government property. At Paducah the rebels were guilty of acts more cowardly, if possible, than any they have practised elsewhere. When