HARVARD COLLEGE LIBRARY FROM THE LITRY OF IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, March 2, 1863. Resolved, by the Senate of the United States, (the House of Representatives concurring,) That in order to enable the "Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War" to complete their investigations of certain important matters now before them, and which they have not been able to complete, by reason of inability to obtain important witnesses, be authorized to continue their sessions for thirty days after the close of the present Congress, and to place their testimony and reports in the hands of the Secretary of the Senate. Resolved, further, That the Secretary of the Senate is hereby directed to cause to be printed, of the reports and accompanying testimony of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, 5,000 copies for the use of the Senate, and 10,000 copies for the use of the House of Representatives. Attest: J. W. FORNEY, Secretary. IN THE HOUSE of RepresentaTIVES, March 2, 1863. Resolved, That the House concur in the foregoing resolutions of the Senate to continue the sessions of the "Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War" for thirty days, and to direct the Secretary of the Senate to cause the printing of the reports, &c., with the following amendment : insert at the end the words: "of the present Congress." Attest: EM. ETHERIDGE, Clerk. IN THE SENATE of the United STATES, March 2, 1863. Resolved, That the Senate concur in the foregoing amendment of the House of Representatives to said resolution. Attest: J. W. FORNEY, Secretary. APRIL 6, 1863. Mr. WADE, from the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, in accordance with the preceding resolution, placed in the hands of the Secretary of the Senate the following report in three parts. PART 1.-ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. PART 2.-BULL RUN-BALL'S BLUFF. PART 3.-WESTERN DEPARTMENT, OR MISSOURI-MISCELLANEOUS. REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR. PART II.-BULL RUN-BALL'S BLUFF. BULL RUN. The joint committee on the conduct of the war submit the following report, with accompanying testimony, in relation to the battle of Bull Run, in July, 1861: So long a time has elapsed, and so many important events have occurred in the progress of the war, since the campaign which ended with the battle of Bull Run, in July, 1861, that your committee do not deem it necessary to go very much into detail in their report. The testimony they submit herewith is very voluminous, and fully covers all the points of interest connected with that campaign. They therefore submit a brief report, confining their attention principally to the causes which led to the defeat of our army in that battle. That which now appears to have been the great error of that campaign was the failure to occupy Centreville and Manassas at the time Alexandria was occupied, in May. The position at Manassas controlled the railroad communication in all that section of country. The forces which were opposed to us at the battle of Bull Run were mostly collected and brought to Manassas during the months of June and July. The three months' men could have made the place easily defensible against any force the enemy could have brought against it; and it is not at all probable that the rebel forces would have advanced beyond the line of the Rappahannock had Manassas been occupied by our troops. The next cause of disaster was the delay in proceeding against the enemy until the time of the three months' men was so nearly expired. In that respect the movement was made too late rather than too soon, and the enemy were allowed time to collect their forces at Manassas and to strengthen the position by defensive works. The reason why the movement was so long delayed is shown, to some extent, by the testimony, to which your committee would direct the attention of those who desire to examine that point. And when the movement was finally determined upon, much was needed to render the troops efficient. There had been but little time devoted to disciplining the troops and instructing them, even as regiments; hardly any instruction had been given them in reference to brigade movements, and none at all as divisions. When General McDowell reviewed eight regiments together-the only instance previous to the battle, so far as the evidence shows, that even that number of troops were manoeuvred in one body—he was charged with desiring to make a show. General McDowell was instructed, verbally, by General Scott, to prepare and submit a plan of operations against the enemy at Manassas. This plan was considered in cabinet meeting, and agreed to; and the 9th of July was fixed upon by General Scott as the day when the army should move. The plan of General McDowell was to move out in the direction of Centreville, and endeavor to turn the enemy's right with a portion of his force, and |