412

JACKSON ON THE SURPLUS.

pears when we reflect that Jackson always emphasized the equality of the States in their claims upon the general government. Jefferson, on one of the few occasions when there had been a surplus in the Treasury, asked for an amendment to empower Congress to expend it in public education or in internal improvements; Jackson followed the simpler and the more direct method prescribed by the State sovereignty theory of dividing the surplus pro rata among the States, and allowing each to expend it as it saw fit.1 Jackson's notions of the meaning of the Constitution were a factor which had to be reckoned with at a critical time in our history. In their broad outlines they agreed perfectly with the doctrine of residuary sovereignty in the State advocated by Hamilton and Marshall and sustained by the Supreme Court in later times.2 But he differed from his predecessors and from most of his successors in the quantity of residuary sovereignty imputed to it. The purpose of his administration may be said to have been to preserve that nice adjustment of sovereignty in the nation and residuary sovereignty in the States which the fathers had attempted in the Constitution.3

Jackson's successor, Van Buren, took occasion in his inaugural to comment on this nice balance of federal and State sovereignty, and to announce that its preservation would be the chief object of his administration. His opinions of the Constitution were an echo of Jackson's and he said officially, that he asked no more than that his own administration might continue Jackson's policy. One positive declaration rose above the commonplace of his in

1 See the note p. 514, post, of the distribution in Maine.

2 As in Texas vs. White, 7 Wallace, 700, (1868.)

8 Inaugural, March 4, 1829; Richardson, II, 439: Id., March 4, 1833; Id., III, 3.

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RIGHT OF PETITION.

413

augural: his inflexible and uncompromising determination to oppose the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia against the wishes of the slave-holding States, and to prevent the slightest interference with slavery in States where it existed.1 The slavocrats promptly seized on this declaration as a solemn promise on the part of Van Buren, to withstand every attempt of the abolitionists to petition Congress for the limitation or overthrow of slavery. His administration, therefore, is chiefly of interest as a period and almost the beginning of the struggle over the right of petition, when exercised for the abolition or restriction of slavery.

Calhoun boldly announced such petitions a violation of the federal compact,2 and throughout VanBuren's administration the pro-slavery party attempted, and practically succeeded in administering the government in accordance with Calhoun's theory of constitutional interpretation. The right of petition was too ancient and well settled to be long subjected to unlawful restraints, and

1 March 4, 1837; Richardson, III, 318; "Yet Van Buren was charged of being an abolitionist. I hope you will try and vindicate Mr. Martin Van Buren's character from the infamous charges of the white Whigs as they call themselves, on the subject of abolition," writes a North Carolina correspondent to Blair and Rives, in 1836: "They charge him with being an abolitionist, yet it is well known that friends of the abolitionists are not the friends of Martin Van Buren." "I suggest the propriety of your furnishing the Globe with a well written article which will show how many abolitionists there are in Congress and how many there are of them opposed to our Republican candidates, (Van Buren and Johnson) and also whom they support and whom the Federalists of the old school, the nullifiers and abolitionists and bank pensioners are trying to elevate to the Presidency." MS. letter, George W. Hufham, Rokfish, Duplin County, North Carolina, June 11, 1836.

2 See his resolutions of February 27, 1837, Benton's Debates, XIII, 567.

its denial in the manner proposed by Calhoun, precipitated a debate which continued almost without interruption through Van Buren's term. The question at issue in so far as it was a parliamentary matter was one of expediency rather than of constitutionality. But the proslavery party was under full control of the government and whatever may be said of its leaders its rank and file inclined to confuse constitutionality with expediency. Pro-slavery sentiments ruled Congress and the right of petition received a serious blow by the enactment of the notorious gag rule by the House in 1836, by which debate could be cut off at will.1 For seven years this mere rule of procedure was an excuse for violating the Constitution,2 but nearly all evils have their compensation, and it may be said that from the hour of its adoption dates the national movement against slavery.

Jackson and Calhoun had been hailed as leaders of reform in 1828, but the Nation grew tired of Democratic reforms and in 1840 the Whigs fancied that they had reformed the reformers by the election of Harrison and Tyler. Whig principles were supposed to be broad and liberal. But the death of Harrison, a month after his inauguration, struck down the hopes of the party. Tyler had never espoused Whig principles or sympathized with the Whig party, of which fact his veto messages speedily gave proof. He surpassed Monroe in zeal, though not in the prolixity of his river and harbor vetoes. did Jackson in his hostility to a bank. hardly equaled him in hostility to a tariff bill possessing any quality of protection. No other American President

1 May 26, 1836, renewed January 13, 1837.

2 The rule was repealed December 4, 1844.

3 June 11, 1844; Richardson, IV, 330 and passim.

He outAnd Calhoun

4 August 16, 1841; Id., 63; September 9, 1841; Id., 68.

June 29, 1842; Id., 180; August 9, 1842; Id., 183.

STATE RESOLUTIONS ON TEXAS.

415

has taken so narrow a view of the Constitution as John Tyler. But his policy illustrated a not uncommon political paradox, of a strict construction President pursuing an almost unparalleled liberal construction policy, as was shown in his whole treatment of the Texas question, and especially in his recommendation to Congress to annex that republic to the United States by a joint resolution.1 This mode of acquiring territory was novel. Tyler was anxious to have his name go down to posterity associated with a bold stroke of national expansion. His was an ambition to which some of our later Presidents have also fallen a victim. If Louisiana could be acquired by purchase, could not Texas be acquired by a joint resolution of Congress? Jefferson would have said something about a constitutional amendment, that the States be first consulted and their consent secured, but Tyler, whatever may be said of his loyalty to the party, thoroughly understood the tone of public sentiment in the country. He believed that the American people desired Texas, and he needed no proof that the Southern States demanded its annexation. As early as 1837, the Alabama legislature had led off boldly with a demand for its annexation, and was speedily followed by the legislatures of other Southern States.2

Tyler was like Jefferson in one respect, that he bravely abandoned strict construction when it seemed the politic thing to do. Congress promptly followed his advice with a joint resolution on annexation. And the Texas convention composed almost entirely of American adven

1 December 3, 1844; Richardson, IV, 345.

2 Alabama's Joint Resolution, December 25, 1837; January 1, 1842; for a summary of the Resolutions of State legislatures on the Texas question, see my Constitutional History of the American People, 1776-1850, I, 337-340.

8 March 1, 1845.

turers, re-echoed its approval. The joint resolution for annexation was no less novel than the admission of the new State into the Union without being required to submit a constitution of government republic in form and not conflicting with the Constitution of the United States; conditions emphasized so loudly at the time of the admission of Missouri.

The Democrats approved Tyler's policy, though repudiating Tyler, and nominated Polk and Dallas in 1844, on an expansion platform, the substance of which was that Texas should be "re-annexed" to the United States at the earliest practicable period. The Whigs were ominously silent on the whole question. Pro-slavery men among them demanded Texas as fresh slave soil; and the few anti-slavery men who had hitherto acted with the Whigs now joined the Free-Soil party. Whigs and Democrats stood toward the issues growing out of the Texan question much as the Federalists and Democratic-Republicans had stood toward the question of the acquisition of Louisiana. In both cases each party for the time being ignored its so-called principles. The immediate effect of the acquisition of Texas was war with Mexico, but it would be difficult to harmonize the policy of conquest pursued throughout Polk's administration, and which resulted in the acquisition of the California country, with the strict construction doctrines which Polk and his party before him had professed.2

If our conclusions relative to the meaning of the Constitution were to be drawn wholly from its interpre

1 July 4, 1845; see its Journal, July 4 to August 28, 1845, Austin, 1845; and its Debates reported by W. F. Weeks, Houston, 1846.

2 See his message on the war, May 11, 1846; Richardson, IV,