MADISON'S REPORT. 347 New England States defended the alien and sedition laws, though Rhode Island did not consider itself authorized to decide on their constitutionality. Delaware pronounced the Virginia resolutions an unjustifiable interference with the powers of the general government, and Vermont and Massachusetts asserted that it was not within the right of any State legislature to usurp the powers of the federal government. Not one State replied in approval of the Kentucky and Virginia resolutions. The replies received were hardly those expected, but the Virginia House of Burgesses referred them all to a special committee, of which Madison was chairman. He undertook, in an elaborate report,1 to prove that the Virginia resolutions were in harmony with the express provisions of the Constitution. Though not holding the doctrine of nullification, he defined the federal government to be the result of a compact between the States, and argued that its powers were derivative, not original. The idea of national sovereignty, he thought, was disproved by the history of the country. The States were the final arbiter, for they had created the general government as their agent. Madison did not show just at what time a State might pronounce a federal act to be a palpable violation of State rights; he left the matter open. If nullification was to be the final conclusion of the Doctrine of '98, by which name Madison's interpretation has long since been known, he at least left it to be worked out in the practical administration of the government. There can be little doubt that the majority of the voters at the time of the adoption of the Kentucky and Virginia resolutions supported, whether or not they understood, the doctrine of '98. The jealousy of the States for their sov 1 Elliot, IV, 546. 348 REPORT OF THE ACTS. ereignty, of which Randolph had spoken in the Federal Convention, had become a fixed part of the political creed of most of the American people. This is evident in the result of the presidential election in 1800, which put the Democratic party in possession of the executive and legislative branches of the general government and extended the party's authority among the States. The campaign which Jefferson and his friends had begun while the alien and sedition laws were under discussion in Congress had widened into a national movement and had united a ma jority of the voters in the country into a great political party, which, on the seventeenth of February, 1801, was able, through its representatives in the House, to elect Jefferson, President of the United States. The repeal of the alien and sedition acts soon followed.2 If the doctrine of these resolutions was true then the court of last resort in all cases in which the constitutionality of an act of Congress was in doubt, was the State legislatures. But the Federalists stoutly held to the contrary, and the Supreme Court being dominated by men of their political faith, they succeeded in sustaining their theory of the function and jurisdiction of the federal judiciary; ChiefJustice Marshall, in no uncertain language laying down the principle of national sovereignty.3 An opportunity to apply the doctrine of the Kentucky and Virginia resolutions presented itself soon after the inauguration of Jefferson, in the matter of the constitutionality of the purchase of the Louisiana country. The navigation of the Mississippi had been the subject of diplomacy before the adoption of the Constitution, and 1 See Vol. I, ante, p. 307. 2 April 14, 1802. 3 United States vs. Peters, (1809) 5 Cranch, 115; Gibbons vs. Ogden, (1824) 9 Wheaton, 1; Story's Commentaries, 1637. ACQUISITION OF LOUISIANA. 349 as we have seen, the Virginia convention had stood resolutely against ratification till the Kentucky members were convinced that, if the new Constitution was adopted, the general government would not surrender the control of the great river to Spain.1 The same understanding quieted much opposition in North and South Carolina, which States at that time extended to the Mississippi. The Spanish cession of Louisiana to France by secret treaty, in 1800, increased rather than diminished the danger to American interests, for France was a greater power than Spain and could maintain a more active control of the navigation of the river. Recognizing the public danger, Jefferson, in a private letter2 recorded his conviction that whatever foreign power possessed New Orleans it must be the natural and habitual enemy of the United States, and he instructed Livingston, our minister to Paris, to enter into negotiations for the acquisition of the island of Orleans and the two Floridas. At this time Napoleon was contemplating the execution of a mighty colonial policy. New France should again take its place on the map of America, and the decision secured half a century before on the Heights of Abraham, should be reversed. In consequence of this imperial dream, Livingston at first received scant attention, but disaster soon overtaking the Emperor compelled him to abandon his colonial scheme, and Livingston was informed that France would sell Louisiana to the United States. Though not an unexpected opportunity, it was one that could never occur again. The transaction was speedily carried through. On the thirtieth of April, 1803, the United States, by a treaty signed at Paris, acquired the entire Louisiana 1 See pp. 101-104. 2 April 18, 1802; Works, IV, 431. 350 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PURCHASE. country for fifteen million dollars.1 The inhabitants were incorporated into the Union, and were to be admitted to all the rights of citizens of the United States as soon as possible. They were guaranteed the protection of their liberty, property and religion.2 By a reciprocity clause the port of New Orleans was made free for twelve years to the manufactures and commerce of France, Spain and their colonies, but no other nation was favored in like manner. The Federalists quickly assailed the constitutionality of the purchase, though they acknowledged its immeasurable importance to the Union. But the most famed man of the party, Hamilton, took a broader view, and though he seldom agreed with Jefferson on constitutional questions, he now supported him, urging, with his customary foresight and precision, that the unity and best interests of the United States demanded the annexation of all the territory west of the Mississippi.3 There was no American precedent for the purchase, and Livingston and Monroe, who carried the negotiation through, confessed that they had exceeded their instructions; but they well knew that they were carrying out Jefferson's wishes. The politic, indeed the only thing for the President to do, was to have the treaty approved as speedily as possible and without debate, for there were constitutional difficulties in the way. Jefferson's pro gram was carried out to the letter, its execution being an easy matter with a Republican majority in both Houses. On the nineteenth of October, the Senate ratified the treaty, with ten votes to spare, and the House, with equal 1 The total cost of the purchase to June 30, 1880, was $27,267,621.98; Donaldson's Public Domain, 105. 2 Article III, Treaties and Conventions, 332. 3 Hamilton's Works, VI, 541. FEDERALIST STRICT CONSTRUCTION. 351 promptness and zeal, voted the necessary appropriations to carry it into effect, no member hinting at any right of the House to do otherwise. A territorial government for Louisiana was authorized, but, strange to say, on a monarchical plan. The President was empowered to take possession of the territory and to govern it at his discretion till a government in due form could be established by Congress.1 This unique law can hardly be said to have conformed to Jefferson's principle of strict construction, yet he approved it without delay and promptly carried it into effect. But it gave the Federalists an opportunity to turn strict constructionists, to retaliate on Jefferson and to accuse him of holding monarchical views. John Randolph, the ingenious but eccentric Democratic leader in the House, even attempted to prove that the acquisition complied strictly with the Constitution; but even those who inclined to judge him insane most of the time, believed that he knew better. When a strict constructionist so doctrinaire as Randolph could take such a position, it was a sign that political parties were losing the ground under their feet. Men of both parties knew that not one word in the Constitution authorized the purchase, and a few members who had belonged to the Federal Convention knew more than this, namely, that not one word spoken in that Convention had intimated that the Louisiana country would sometime be annexed to the United States. The acquisition was an innovation. Even the so-called sovereign bodies, the States, had not been consulted in the matter. Indeed, for a brief time our statesmen were bewildered over the issues of the acquisition, and the people knowing less about it, could neither pronounce it wise 1 October 31, 1803; Statutes at Large, II, 245. |