RELIGIOUS FREEDOM. 237 The amendment had two disagreeable aspects, to him: "the one, to render a man popular with his constituents; the other, to render the place ineligible to his competitor." But the amendment passed.1 2 The language of the first part of the proposed fourth amendment was not satisfactory to many. Vining wished its two statements transposed. "It would read better," said Gerry, "if it stated that no religious doctrine shall be established by law." Inasmuch as Congress had no authority whatever delegated to it by the Constitution to make religious establishments, Sherman thought the amendment unnecessary, and wished it struck out. Daniel Carroll, a kinsman of a distinguished Roman Catholic family, of Maryland, and a member of the late Federal Convention, was highly in favor of adopting the words, believing that the amendment would tend more towards conciliating the minds of the people to the government than almost any other he had heard proposed.3 "I apprehend the meaning of the words to be," said Madison, "that Congress shall not establish a religion and enforce the legal observance of it by law, or compel men to worship God in any manner contrary to their conscience." Whether the words were necessary or not, several of the late conventions had urged the adoption of some such provision, for they feared that the power given by the Constitution to make all laws necessary and proper to carry it into execution, enabled Congress to make laws that might infringe the rights of conscience. Huntington, of Connecticut, feared that the words might be so literally construed as to be "extremely hurtful to the cause of religion." All might not understand the amendment as 1 Annals, 756. 2 August 15, 1789. 3 Annals, 758. Madison had expounded it. It might be convenient to put upon it an entirely different construction. In New England, the ministers of the congregations1 were sustained by the contributions of the members of their society, and the expense of building meeting-houses was met in the same way. These matters were regulated by by-laws. If an action were to be brought in a Federal Court, on any of these cases, the person who had neglected to pay his subscription might appeal to this amendment, on the ground that he was not compelled to support a religious establishment. Rhode Island had always enjoyed freedom in religious matters. The rights of conscience ought to be secured, but the amendment should be worded so as "not to patronize those who professed no religion at all." Madison at once suggested that if the word, national, was inserted before religion, "it would point the amendment directly to the object it was intended to prevent," but his suggestion stirred old memories and revived old antagonisms. Gerry promptly declared his aversion to the word, which reminded him of some observations that had taken place in the ratifying conventions. "It had been insisted, by those who were called Anti-Federalists, that this form of government consolidated the Union." "Those who were called Anti-Federalists at that time complained that they had injustice done them by the title, because they were in favor of a federal government, and the others were in favor of a national one; the Federalists were for ratifying the Constitution as it stood, and the others, not until amendments were made. Their names ought not to have been Federalists and Anti-Federalists, but Rats and Anti-Rats." Gerry then fired a shot at Madison, saying that the latter's motion about the word, 1 i. e., the Congregational Church. RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE. 239 national, showed that he considered the word implied a consolidated government.1 Madison quickly withdrew his motion, observing that the words "no national religion shall be established by law" did not imply that the government was a national one. At this Livermore's amendment of the phraseology was adopted, that "Congress shall make no laws touching religion, or infringing the rights of conscience."2 And thus the perils of a prolonged discussion,-whether the government was national or federal,-were avoided. The provisions, common to the State constitutions, securing freedom of the press, the right of petition, and, in a few States, freedom of speech, had schooled most of the members into familiarity with the next clause, embodying the provisions and now proposed as part of the third amendment.3 Sedgwick promptly criticised it as descending too much into minutia and thus making the House appear trifling to its constituents. Tucker fell back on the request of Virginia and North Carolina that the amendment be made. Gerry cited the State constitutions, though the abuse of rights in Massachusetts persuaded some against the clause. Sedgwick thought the word "consult" superfluous and moved that it be struck out. Tucker wished to insert the words, "to instruct their Representatives." A long debate followed on the question of instruction, Page asserting that instruction and representation went together in a republic. But Clymer declared the idea dangerous and utterly destructive of all thought of an independent and deliberative body, and Sherman agreed with him. "When the people 1 Annals, 759. 2 Annals, 759. 3 For the clause see p. 204. 4 Annals, 761-766. 240 INSTRUCTION OF REPRESENTATIVES. have chosen a representative," said Sherman, "it is his duty to meet others from the different parts of the Union and consult and agree with them to such acts as are for the general benefit of the whole community. If they were to be guided by instructions, there would be no use in deliberation; all that a man would have to do would be to produce his instructions, lay them on the table and let them speak for him. From hence I think it may be fairly inferred that the right of the people to consult for the common good can go no further than to petition the legislature, or apply for a redress of grievances. It is the duty of a good representative to inquire what measures are most likely to promote the general welfare, and after he has discovered them, to give them his support. Should his instructions therefore coincide with his ideas on any measure, they would be unnecessary; if they were contrary to the conviction of his own mind, he must be bound by every principle of justice to disregard them.' Jackson, pursuing the argument further, affirmed that, if the doctrine of instruction was established, it would necessarily drive the House into a number of factions, as there might be different instructions from every State. "To say that sovereignty vests in the people, and that they have not a right to instruct and control their representatives," said Gerry, "is absurd to the last degree.' But he understood the amendment only as recognizing the right of instruction, not as compelling the representative to be bound by his instructions. With this last opinion, Madison agreed, for the people might instruct their representative to violate the Constitution, in which case he could not be expected to obey. Smith, of South Carolina, opposed the provision because it put the more distant States to a disadvantage, as the nearer ones could more easily communicate their instructions to their members. INSTRUCTION OF REPRESENTATIVES. 241 The southern States would thus be seriously injured. Stone remarked that the only precedent was that of the Swiss cantons, where the people instructed their representatives, and also voted directly on the laws; but no such form of government had been advocated for America. Vining touched the great issue of the times by asking, what the members would do were their constituents to instruct them to make paper money; surely, such directions, contrary to the Constitutions, would be disobeyed. Livermore thought that instructions voted by State Legislature would have much force, though he did not believe them binding. Sedgwick wishing to set Livermore right, replied, that members of the House stood, not as representatives of the State Legislatures, as under the old Congress, but as representatives of the great body of the people. "The sovereignty, the independence and the rights of the States are intended to be guarded by the Senate." If the House was to be viewed in any other light, "the greatest security the people have for their rights and privileges is destroyed." Page feared that unless the amendment was adopted, many constituencies would be alarmed, as they had asked for it. Lawrence, with a comprehension rare even among the Fathers, remarked that he objected to the amendment, "because every member ought to consider himself the representative of the whole Union, and not of the particular district which had chosen him," but lest the prevalence of this national spirit be over-estimated, by the readers of to-day, it is well to consider the concluding words of Lawrence: "The decisions of Congress," said he, "were to bind every individual of the confederated States, and it was wrong to be guided by the voice of a single district whose interests might happen to clash with those of the general good." The phrase "confederated States" was the usual |