142

LANSING AND HAMILTON.

deed, if Clinton's argument was to be pursued to the end, Hamilton remarked, it would lead to the withdrawal of all confidence of the American people in any government.1

Lansing, making much of his knowledge of the proceedings in the Federal Convention, renewed the discussion pending when he had left it, on the danger which the small States would incur from the large in the extended representation; but Lansing having left before the basis of representation was agreed to, was ill qualified to explain the motives of the Convention. Hamilton remarking that Lansing and himself saw the facts substantially alike, observed that the "plan in all its parts was a plan of accommodation," a fact of great weight with thoughtful men and used to its full effect by the supporters of the Constitution in all the States. Even the most aggressive Anti-Federalist hesitated to set up his individual judgment against the consensus of opinion embodied in the plan. But Lansing could not understand how, if it was a system of accommodation, that the number as the basis of representation had been reduced from forty thousand to thirty thousand. This gave Hamilton an opportunity to make the effective reply that the change had not been made till the Convention was near rising and the business completed, when Washington, expressing the wish that the number should be reduced to thirty thousand, it had been agreed to without opposition.3

Smith did not see in the Articles of the Confederation the opportunities for corruption, incident to the required vote of nine States in important matters, of which Hamilton had made so much. He thought that the power of

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143

recalling the members of Congress and their annual election was an adequate check against corruption.1 It was in consonance with this idea that Gilbert Livingston, of Dutchess county, proposed, as an amendment, that a senator should not be eligible for more than six years in twelve, and that a State might recall him at any time and appoint another in his stead.2 Chancellor Livingston promptly pointed out that this would subordinate the Senate to factions in the States and prove a source of endless confusion. While the Senate was intended to represent the State governments, its members were also representatives of the United States, and were not to consult the interest of any one State, but that of the Union. This could never be done if there was a power to recall. It would open a wide door for bribery, factions and intrigue. But Livingston's proposition was defended with warmth by Lansing.*

This attack on the organization of the Senate called forth from Hamilton one of the most remarkable speeches of the times and the most complete exposition and defense of the Senate to be found in literature outside of the Federalist. He defended the provision in the Constitution, respecting the Senate, as being based on the principle of strength and stability in the organization of government and on the necessity for vigor in its operation.5 With equal effect, he met Smith's objections to the new plan by showing that it comported fully with the two great requisites in a government, the safety of the people

1 Id., 281.

2 Id., 289.

3 Id., 291.

4 Id., 293-296.

5 Id., 300-307; June 24, 1788. Compare the Federalist, Nos. LXII-LXV; for the authorship of this, see the introduction, by Lodge, to his edition of the Federalist.

144

NEWS FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE.

and the energy of the administration. In no other convention was there such persistent and prolonged objection made to the Senate, and chiefly, to its powers as too formidable.

The news of ratification by New Hampshire reached the convention on the twenty-fourth of June, which caused Chancellor Livingston to observe that it greatly altered the circumstances of the country and changed the ground of the debate. The Confederation was now dissolved and the question had become one of policy and expediency. Some might flatter themselves that there were southern States, referring to Virginia and North Carolina, that would form a league with New York, but such a confederation would expose the State to great dangers. Both Smith and Lansing claimed to take an entirely different view of the intelligence from New Hampshire. True nine States had ratified, but Lansing contended that it ought not to influence the deliberations of New York. If, said he, a disunion should unfortunately take place, New York was not in so bad a situation that it could not provide for its own safety independently of the other States. But he pronounced the assertion utterly false that he, or any opposed to the new plan, wished for a dissolution of the Union.2

Much objection was made to the clause giving Congress power to regulate elections, and Samuel Jones of Queens proposed as an amendment that this power should not be exercised unless a State refused to make the necessary laws, or should be incapable of making them, to which Melanchton Smith added that each State should be dis

1 Id., 316; June 25,

2 Id., 324-325. See Jay's letter to Washington and his reply, July 18, 1788; Sparks, IX, 393.

Id., 325.

ANTI-FEDERAL OBJECTIONS.

145

tricted in accordance with the number of its representatives and that each representative should be chosen by a majority of votes. He defended his amendment on the ground that as the Constitution stood, an entire State might be a single district and its representatives be chosen on a general ticket.1 Smith feared that otherwise a representative might be elected who had not received a majority of the votes cast.2 John Williams, of Washington county, though without knowledge of the amendments which had been proposed in South Carolina, now offered the substance of one of them, forbidding Congress to levy excises on domestic manufactures, or to lay direct taxes until the States should have paid their proportionate requisitions.3

Not one provision in the article on the powers of Congress pleased the anti-federal members, who construed them as trespassing on the rights and powers of the States. These, as Smith said, should make laws for local purposes; but the general government, only for national purposes. He interpreted the powers granted to Congress as transcending the scope and object of the general government. The whole tendency of this part of the plan, he said, was to abolish the State constitutions. Williams pronounced the terms, "common defense and general welfare," to be indefinable, and that against the encroachments which they made possible, the State governments would have no protection.5 The purpose of

4

1 It is not improbable that the precedent in Smith's mind was the provision in the Constitution of New York (1777, Article XII) by which the counties of the State were divided into four great districts for the purpose of electing senators.

2 Smith's amendment was revised and put in a modified form by Lansing; Elliot, II, 329.

8 Id., 331.

4 Id., 332; June 27, 1788.

5 Id., 338.

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REGULATION OF COMMERCE.

the amendment was to prevent the over taxation of our infant manufactures.

Livingston, objecting to the amendment, urged that it would prove only a temporary expedient, for at a future day an enlarged population would render us a manufacturing people. The impositions would then necessarily lessen, and the public wants would call for new sources of revenue. Articles of luxury would be among the first subjects of excise, because they would be very productive and a charge on them would be favorable to the morals of the citizens. It would not do to impose upon the Union all the burdens, and divest it of the principal resources, of government. The amendment would in time deprive the United States of a fruitful and indispensable branch of revenue. The country had had sufficient experience with the impolicy of requisitions to forbid establishing a general government on them as the basis of its supplies.1

Hamilton, going to the heart of the matter, observed that the leading objects of the federal government, in which revenue was concerned, were to maintain domestic peace and provide for the common defense. In these were comprehended the regulation of commerce, that is the whole system of foreign intercourse, the support of armies and navies, and of the civil administration. The Constitution, he said, could not set the bounds to a nation's wants, and "it ought not, therefore, to set bounds to its resources." The State governments would never become insignificant, so long as they retained the independent power of raising money. They could never lose their powers till the whole people of America were robbed of their liberties. "These must go together; they must sup