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MASON, HENRY AND MADISON.

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lishing a standing army.1 Madison's reply was complete; that the most effectual way to guard against a standing army, which he thought one of the greatest mischiefs that could possibly happen to a country, was to render it unnecessary, which could be effected by giving the general government full power to call forth the militia and to exert the whole natural strength of the Union when needed. He did not believe that a government "of a federal nature consisting of many co-equal sovereignties,” and, particularly, having one branch chosen from the people, would drag the militia, without a cause, to an immense distance.2 Such an abuse of power would incite public indignation and defeat its purpose. Moreover, the power over the militia was concurrent, not exclusive."

But Mason and Henry persisted in representing the British system as superior, at every point, though Madison showed that the restrictions in that system, of which the Anti-Federalists made so much, were all directed against the power of the executive; whereas, in the proposed system, all the powers of government were limited and guarded, and the representatives would be more responsible to the people than were the members of the House of Commons. Henry insisted that the incentives to constitutional action, which distinguished the King of Great Britain, would not be found in the Constitution. The President's interests would be transient. The sword and the purse were not united in the same hands

1 This objection is fully answered by Hamilton in the Federalist, Nos. XXIV and XXV.

2 Elliot, III, 381.

* Id., 382. Compare Hamilton's argument on this point in the Federalists, No. XXIX, which appeared originally in the Daily Advertiser, January 10, 1788. In some editions of the Federalist, this number is incorrectly given as No. XXXV; it is No. XXIX in the first edition.

4 Elliot, III, 383.

THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CONSTITUTION.

108 under the British system as they would be in the one now proposed. The security of the people demanded their separation.1 Madison replied that the objection was totally inapplicable to the plan. Henry could not mean that the sword and purse ought not to be trusted in the hands of the same government; for there never was, nor would there ever be, an efficient government in which both were not vested. The only rational meaning must be, therefore, that they were not to be given to the same member, which, in the case of the British government, meant that the sword was in the hands of the Crown; the purse in the hands of Parliament. As far as any analogy could exist between the two Constitutions, it would be so in America. Here the purse was to be in the hands of the representatives of the people; they appropriated all moneys, regulated the land and naval forces and called forth the militia. The President was to be in command, and, in conjunction with the Senate, to appoint the officers. The means ought to be commensurate to the end, and the end was the common protection, which could not be effected without a general power to use the strength of the Union. The Constitution, he said, was based on republican principles of government; power must be lodged somewhere.

The practical question was, in what part of the government to place it, and not whether any other political body, independent of the government, should have it or not. In Virginia and in other States in the Union, the relaxed operation of government had been sufficient to alarm the friends of good order. Population was increasing rapidly in every State, and additional checks on dissipation and licentiousness were needed. A change was absolutely necessary, and the friends of republican

1 Id., 388.

MADISON'S ANALYSIS OF THE PLAN.

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government were called upon to endeavor to establish an adequate system. Madison could see no danger in submitting to practices and experiments, which, in theory, seemed to be founded on the best principles. But he was specific in his reply to Henry and Grayson, who claimed that the Constitution proposed did not compare with the British system, in fixing responsibility. If the number of members of Parliament elected by the influence of the Crown was deducted from the total membership of the House of Commons, the remaining members would not bear a greater proportion to the population of England than the number of representatives in Congress, as fixed by the Constitution, would bear to the United States. Even if this were not true, there would be a still greater responsibility in the proposed plan. Members of the House of Representatives were to be chosen for two years; members of Parliament were chosen for seven. Any citizen might be elected to Congress, but, in Great Britain, no one could be chosen to represent a county unless he had an estate of the value of six hundred pounds sterling a year, nor could he represent a corporation without having an annual estate of three hundred pounds.1 His conclusion, therefore, was a just one: that if confidence was due to the government in England, it was due tenfold in America.2

But even this exact analysis wrought no conviction in Henry's mind. He saw in it only a confession that the government to be formed was national and without a single federal feature. Its friends had alleged that it was national or federal as might best suit their argu

1 For the property qualifications of Senators and Representatives in the State governments at this time see my Constitutional History of the American People, 1776-1850, I, 68-71, 77-79. 2 Elliot, III, 395.

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POWERS OF CONGRESS.

ments, but now all doubt was past. The State governments would form no part of the new plan. The most essential objects of government were to be administered by Congress. If the government was to be republican, it was to be consolidated not confederated, and Henry saw no safety for the country in such a plan.1 Lee, of Westmoreland, very properly complained that the opponents of the plan paid no regard to the necessity of the Union, which was the great object before the country.

Some of the Anti-Federalists declared that, under the power in the Constitution to regulate their compensation, the wages of members of Congress would be so low that the rich alone could serve, while another objector asserted that they would be so high as to ruin the country. The concession of the Federalists that the objects of the government were general and equally affected the interests of the people of every State, did not warrant Henry's conclusion that the plan was to establish a national government. Henry's proof, he said, consisted in ascribing infinitude to powers clearly limited and defined for certain designated purposes.2 But Henry repeated his objections to a standing army, which, he said, the power of Congress over the militia would make possible. Corbin replied that all confederate governments had the care of the national defense, and that Congress ought to have it. As the United States explicitly guaranteed to every State in the Union a republican form of government, and was under obligation to protect each from invasion and domestic violence, he thought there was ample power in the States to use their own militia and to call on Congress for the militia of other States. Moreover, as representa

1 Id., 395-399.

2 Id., 405-406.

8 Compare Madison's argument on the same point in the Federalist, No. LXIII. It appeared in the Independent Journal January 22 (?) 1788.

FUGITIVE SLAVES.

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tives were chosen every second year, it would be practically impossible to make laws which would destroy the States. John Marshall pointed out that Congress was empowered to call forth the militia only for continental purposes, but the Constitution did not say that the power given to the States by the people was taken away. He thought it unquestionable that the State governments could call forth the militia under the Constitution in the same manner as they could have done under the Articles.2 But this interpretation was rejected by the Anti-Federalists.

Mason argued that the exclusive power of Congress over the Federal district would be exceedingly dangerous, as the power might be extended without limitation, and the district under Congress become the sanctuary of the blackest crimes. As the Federal courts were to sit there, the danger was the greater.3 Madison's reply was sufficient, that it would seem to be the last thing to enter into the mind of any man to grant exclusive advantages, within a very circumscribed district, to the prejudice of the community at large. But Grayson saw in the proposed Federal District a rendezvous for fugitive slaves, who, until the District was made a State, would not be given up; for the executive of a State "could not apply to the ten mile square" for their rendition. It is doubtful whether such far-fetched objections as this influenced even the most wavering members.*

It was now the fourteenth of June, and the debate had continued long enough to establish a general conviction that defects in the Constitution might be remedied by amendments. Henry announced that the necessity of a

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