ture of the Union-and that the right of the State or district to name and select whomsoever it choose was one of the rights retained by the States when they entered the Union, and Articles IX and X of the Constitution were cited, to wit:

ART. IX. Rights retained by the people. The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

ART. X. The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people.

Article X was construed in the case of Collector v. Day (11 Wall. 124) in which the court said:

This clause does not contain a new grant of power to the States or people, but is simply declaratory of a preexisting condition.

Judge Story, in his memorable work On the Constitution, volume 1, section 627, says:

The truth is that the States can exercise no powers whatsoever, which exclusively spring out of the existence of the National Government, which the Constitution does not delegate to them. They have just as much right, and no more, to prescribe new qualifications for a Representative as they have for a President. Each is an officer of the Union, deriving his powers and qualifications from the Constitution, and neither created by, dependent upon, nor controllable by the States. It is no original prerogative of States power to appoint a Representative, a Senator, or President for the Union.

These officers owe their existence and functions to the united voice of the whole, not a portion, of the people. Before a State can assert the right it must show that the Constitution has delegated and recognized it. No State can say that it has reserved what it never possessed.

The title of Mr. Beck's book, The Vanishing Rights of the States, is thus seen to be a misnomer. No right of a State can "vanish" that never existed.

X. CONCLUSION. THE CONSTITUTION EXPRESSLY CONFERS THE POWER WITHOUT LIMITATION UPON THE SENATE; THE INTENT OF THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION IS PLAIN; HISTORY SUPPORTS THE POWER, THE PRACTICE OF COLONIES, STATES, AND CONGRESS UPHOLDS THE POWER, AND THE BEST GOVERNMENTAL POLICY DEMANDS THAT THE SENATE EXERCISE THE POWER

We have seen that the Constitution expressly confers the power to "judge qualifications of its own members" without limitation; that the debates in the Constitutional Convention show that such was the plain intent of the framers of the Constitution; that the authors of the plans submitted to the Constitutional Convention all agreed that such powers should be conferred without limitation; that Georgia first conferred this unlimited power upon its senate in 1777; that the house of delegates of the State of Virginia in 1780 exercised this power without any constitutional provision and assumed that it was an inherent legislative power; that the Colony of Virginia in 1742 recognized and exercised this right as an inherent legislative power; that the House of Commons and the House of Lords recognized and exercised this right twenty-five times in the Wilkes case, and that such power was the growth of hundreds of years; that since the adoption of our Federal Constitution Congress has repeatedly exercised such power; that the profoundest students

and authorities upon constitutional law declare that the power is absolute.

If there were no precedents to guide this Government, if there was no constitutional provision upon the subject, if the matter were to arise now for the first time, what would be the best governmental policy? Would the delegation of such a power to the Senate be fraught with danger to the Republic? It must be remembered that Senators are officials of the United States Government and not of the States. They legislate not for the States alone but for all the people of the Union. The vote of a Senator affects every State of the Union as much as it does the one from which he is elected. His vote may mean peace or war for the Union. Should not the Union have the right to protect itself against corruption in one of its parts? Should the whole suffer from the dereliction of a part? If it be said that one political party may corruptly and wrongfully decline to seat a Senator elect of another party, it must be admitted that such a contingency might arise, but it would not destroy the right of the State to representation; another could be elected in his place. Other possibilities readily suggest themselves. For instance, the President might be a Republican and the Senate Republican and the House Democratic, and the House might refuse to pass any appropriation legislation in order to embarrass the administration. This is a contingency that might arise, but what sensible American believes it probable?

Exaggerated illustrations mean nothing; they are futile. As Senator David Reed, of Pennsylvania, in discussing this question in the Senate last spring, said:

Illustrations can be drawn that make both sides of this question seem silly. We must be guided by reason and not by fancy.

Under our Constitution momentous questions are submitted to the decision of nine Supreme Court judges appointed by the President and not elected by the people. Generally speaking, these judges come from one class those identified with large interests-and not from the masses; yet the people recognize that ours is a constitutional Government and that such procedure is in accordance with law. There is no real danger in submitting to 95 Senators elected by the people the question whether a particular Senator elect possesses sufficient moral or intellectual qualifications to sit in the greatest deliberative body in the world. We submit to the decision of the Supreme Court when it decides some vital matter by a vote of 5 to 4. May we not intrust the decision of the qualifications of a Senator elect to the judgment of a majority of 95 Senators elected by the people and responsible to them for their acts? Never in the past has a Senator or Congressman been denied a seat unjustly. History has proven the wisdom of the Constitution in conferring this power upon the Senate.

SALE OF CONDEMNED PROPERTY

LETTER FROM THE SERGEANT AT ARMS OF THE SENATE TRANSMITTING, IN COMPLIANCE WITH A RESOLUTION OF THE COMMITTEE TO AUDIT AND CONTROL THE CONTINGENT EXPENSES OF THE SENATE, A STATEMENT OF THE SALE OF CERTAIN CONBEMNED PROPERTY OF THE SENATE AND THE DISPOSITION OF THE PROCEEDS

DECEMBER 6 (calendar day, DECEMBER 9), 1927.-Ordered to be printed and to lie on the table

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,

Washington, D. C., December 5, 1927. SIR: I have the honor to report that in compliance with the following resolution adopted by the Committee to Audit and Control the Contingent Expenses of the Senate, viz

Resolved, That the upholsterer and cabinetmaker of the Senate be, and he hereby is, authorized to sell at public or private sale, under the direction of the Secretary and the Sergeant at Arms of the Senate, the condemned property of the United States in their charge which has been condemned in accordance with the statute and turn over the proceeds of such sales to the financial clerk of the Senate to be disposed of by him in accordance with the law—

there has been sold since December 6, 1926, the following property of the United States and the proceeds thereof turned over to the financial clerk of the Senate, for which I hold his receipts: