152 SATISFACTION FOR SIN. forms to attract towards it more of deliberate attention, I fear we have been too much accustomed to rest satisfied with dark and indefinite replies. I am quite free to confess that, within the whole compass of my theological reading, I have not met with any thing which throws all the light upon it which I humbly think it is capable of receiving. The statements of Staper, an admirable compendium of which is given by a beloved brother, whose praise is in all the churches,* approach the most nearly to what would seem to be needed. Still the definition of satisfaction which is laid down in that work is too much generalized to prove of great practical benefit ; and, with deference to our honoured friend, Dr. Smith, I would suggest that the phrase, "a compensation for the injury perpetrated" against a moral governor, does not much less need explanation than the term satisfaction itself. The questions still recur, "What is a compensation to a being in his public character, (for compensation to a private individual involves no difficulty,) or how is it to be made?" On this important subject, then, I solicit the kind and candid attention of the reader to the following remarks. To make satisfaction for sin is, then, I would suggest, to do that which shall preserve to the moral government of God that powerful control over its subjects which the entrance of sin endangered, and which its unconditional forgiveness would have entirely destroyed. In explanation of this statement, let it be observed, that the government which God exercises over rational, and, therefore, accountable creatures, is moral in its nature; it is the government of motives, addressed to the understanding, the conscience, and the heart. The law which he has given to us constitutes one of the main instruments of this government. It addresses itself to two of the most powerful principles of our nature;-to our hopes, by promising an illustrious reward if we render obedience;— to our fears, by threatening to inflict a signal punishment if we venture upon rebellion. The tendency of this law to prevent disobedience is its moral power; and that power must * Vide Dr. P. Smith on the Sacrifice of Christ, p. 287-8. obviously be proportioned to the confidence which the subjects of the government repose on its promises and threatenings. If the former are viewed with distrust, they will not excite to obedience; if the latter are considered doubtful in regard to their execution, they will not deter from rebellion. Now consider for a moment what was the posture of affairs after rebellion had actually broken out under the Divine government. The transgressors had exposed themselves to the vengeance of the law; and the Legislator was put upon his trial, so to speak, whether the awful threatenings denounced by him against rebellion were mere idle, harmless threats or not. If, in these circumstances, the rebels had been permitted to remain unpunished, what would have been the consequence? Is it not manifest that the law would have lost its moral power; and, the instrument of the Divine government becoming utterly impotent, that anarchy would have ensued in every part of his dominions? It was, therefore, imperative upon the moral Governor to demand satisfaction; i. e., (for such appears to me to be the precise idea which we should attach to the term,) to require that to be done which should preserve to his law all the power to preserve order and tranquillity in his government which had been originally possessed by it. This object might have been secured, or satisfaction might have been obtained, by the infliction of the threatened punishment upon his rebel subjects. To have resorted to this measure would, however, have involved the utter destruction of the offenders themselves, and preserved the authority and moral power of the Divine government, merely that a bloody sceptre might be wielded over myriads of intelligent beings, crushed by the rod of the Divine indignation. To have preserved the authority of the law at this dreadful expense, would have brought no glory to the Divine Being, unless no other method of sustaining its influence could have been devised. An expedient was, therefore, sought and resorted tothe expedient revealed in the gospel. The Second Person of the adorable Trinity, in harmony with his own volition, having authority to lay down his life, was substituted in the place of the guilty, and by his perfect obedience unto death, made 154 SATISFACTION FOR SIN satisfaction for their sins; i. e., he preserved to the law and government of God, that moral power to prevent the inroads of rebellion which the entrance of sin had enfeebled, and threatened finally to destroy. This all-important result, viz., the preservation of the efficacy of the system of moral government of God, in connexion with the non-execution of the threatenings denounced against the transgressor, is secured by the surpassing honour which the obedience and death of Christ reflected upon the Divine law; and the powerful and decided proof it exhibited, that sin could never be permitted to pass unpunished. Who does not hear a voice from Calvary, "If they do these things in a green tree, what shall be done in the dry?" It is true, doubtless, that it was only the human nature of our Lord that suffered; yet, in consequence of the ineffable and mysterious union of that nature with the Divine, it is impossible to look upon his sufferings in the same light with those of a mere man. Their moral influence upon the subjects of the Divine government is prodigiously greater than if they had been endured by Paul, or even Gabriel himself. When we recollect that he who died for us was a being in whom "dwelt all the fulness of the Godhead bodily,"-that the law was honoured in its precepts by the obedience, and in its penalty by the death, of a being so exalted and glorious as the Son of God, it is utterly impossible to escape the conclusion, that the law must be perfectly holy, just, and good;that the violation of its precepts must be pregnant with incalculable guilt, and cannot fail to be followed by the most tremendous consequences. It is thus that the atonement of Christ removes the anger of God, and reconciles the world to him. It effects no change in the state of his feelings in his private character; it does not abate his personal disapprobation either of sin, or of sinners; but it reconciles Him to us, or, in the language of Scripture, it reconciles us to Him, in his public character. It removes the necessary opposition of his government to us. It renders it competent to him to remit the punishment due to our sins, and even to raise us, for the sake of his Son, to distinguished honour and happiness, without destroying or impairing the moral power of his law the instrument by which the government of the world is carried on. Yea, more than all this it accomplishes. It reflects more honour upon the law than could have been seen encircling it, if man had continued obedient; or, if man had suffered its penalty, becoming disobedient; i. e., it has made a full and perfect satisfaction for sin. The general conclusion, then, at which we have arrived, and which appears to me so important in its bearings upon the subject, is, that justice, in the case of a moral governor is satisfied, or, more correctly, that the moral governor is satisfied, when, as the consequence of transgression, an amount of suffering is endured which will restore to the violated and paralyzed law its original power to prevent the inroads of rebellion. It may not be impossible, perhaps, though I do not regard it as necessary, to pursue this subject a little further; and to ascertain the principles which regulate this amount, both in the case of the transgressor, and in that of a substitute. I submit with much diffidence the following remarks to the candid consideration of the reader. That justice is satisfied-or that the efficiency of the law is preserved when a measure of suffering is laid upon the transgressor proportioned to his desert, is a position the truth of which will be admitted by all. Yet the statement is indefinite, and must remain so, till we know the amount of this desert; or, rather, till we ascertain the measure by which its amount is decided. That measure, then, it is further stated, is the law of God. The transgressor deserves to endure the precise amount of punishment which the Divine law attaches to his crime. This statement, also, will be admitted. Yet there is another question to which it does not appear to me that sufficient attention has been given; it is the following: "What is it that guides the Great Eternal in the decisions which he pronounces? By what rule does he walk, in attaching the amount of punishment to transgression of which we are now speaking?" This is not a matter of accident; the sanctions of the law are not arbitrary. When the moral governor declares, in his law, that the transgressor shall suffer a certain amount of punishment--which is to us the measure of his 156 THE CLAIMS OF JUSTICE ON THE SINNER guilt, or desert-he acts under the guidance of certain fixed principles. What are they? What does a subject of moral government-of the moral government of God, for instance,deserve to suffer? Can any other answer be returned than that he deserves to endure that precise amount of punishment which is adapted to answer the ends of moral governmentto array the law in those terrors which are calculated to prevent, and which, if they were rightly considered, would prevent, the inroad of sin? To attach to transgression any amount short of this, would be folly; and, therefore, useless cruelty. To attach an amount beyond this would be unnecessary; and, therefore, malevolence, and injustice. The fact is, that guilt, i. e., desert of punishment, can only exist in connexion with a moral system. This is true, also, of its opposite, to which we may give the name of moral merit. Both guilt and moral merit necessarily suppose the pre-existence of moral government; for they are, in fact, the claim upon the head of that government which the conduct of its subjects gives them to its punishment, or its rewards. There is a difference in this point of view between guilt and merit, and virtue and vice. The two latter do not seem necessarily to suppose the existence of moral government. Hence, though Jehovah is a perfectly holy Being, and perfectly happy on that account, we never say that he deserves to be so, because he is not a subject of moral government. In the case of a transgressor, then, justice is satisfied when that measure of punishment is inflicted upon him, which will restore to the law its original power and efficiency. So far every thing seems to be tolerably plain. It is only when we approach a case of substitution that much difficulty is experienced. Granting, that moral government will at all admit the principle of substitution, (and that it will do this is manifest from the fact that it has done it; nor do I see any difficulty in the case, where the individual presenting himself in the place of the transgressor has a right to do it-and where the acceptance of him would equally answer the ends of moral government,) the question is, " With what measure of suffering in the substitute will justice be satisfied? Must |