of the impeachment were carried off by him; although the concluding argument of John A. Bingham was perhaps that which displayed the most oratorical ability. Butler opened the case for the House on March 30th, and the trial continued almost daily until May 6th, 1868, when the whole case was submitted to the Senate. A few days were occupied in the settlement of the form of the question and the practice upon the judgment, and there was a short adjournment on account of the illness of one of the senators. At the Senate conference it appeared that two at least of those who were in favor of a conviction were unwilling to sustain the article which charged a violation of the Tenure of Office Act, since they believed that Stanton's case was excepted by its proviso.41 For the test vote, accordingly, they selected the concluding article, which included several charges, a belief in the sufficiency of any one of which might be sufficient to satisfy the conscience of a senator who voted "guilty," to the whole.42 On May 16th that vote was taken and the respondent was acquitted by the votes of nineteen senators "not guilty," against thirty-five, "guilty"; the majority lacking only one of the requisite two-thirds. The President of the Senate, Benjamin F. Wade of Ohio, who would have succeeded Johnson upon a conviction, voted guilty. An adjournment was taken until the 26th; and meanwhile great pressure was brought upon the recalcitrant Republicans, one of whom, Senator Ross of Kansas, it was believed, had been won over to the side of conviction.43 But the votes were taken upon the second and third articles with precisely the same re hand shook so while he was examining way I know how to conduct a case.' Finding me incorrigible, they left me to my devices." (Butler's Book, pp. 929-930.) 41 Political Leaders of the Reconstruction Period, by E. G. Ross, The Forum, vol. xx, pp. 218, 225; Opinion of Senator Sherman, Johnson's Trial, vol. iii, p. 1; Opinion of Senator Howe, ibid., p. 58. 42 Johnson's Impeachment Trial, vol. ii, p. 484. McPherson, History of the Reconstruction, p. 282. 43 Blaine, Twenty Years in Congress, vol. ii, p. 375. An attempt to sult. The court then adjourned without a day, and the Chief Justice entered a judgment of acquittal upon these three articles. Twenty-nine senators afterwards filed opinions in justification of their votes. The minority included eight Democrats and four Republican supporters of the administration whose votes for an acquittal were in accordance with their political position. The scale was turned, however, by seven Republicans who had, hitherto, opposed the policy of the President; and who by this action sacrificed their hopes of a political future. For most of them disobeyed the instructions of their State legislatures or of the leaders of the State organizations of their party; and in consequence lost all chances of a re-election. The reputation of one or two may lend color to the suspicion that they were influenced by improper con siderations. But the character and position of the rest, who thus in obedience to their oaths cast away the objects of their ambition, put the integrity of their motives beyond all question. Their judgment was given because their consciences would not permit judicial action in opposition to their convictions. And history has already pronounced her verdict that they saved the country from a precedent big with danger and vindicated the wisdom of those who made the Senate a court for the trial of impeachments.45 expel him on the charge of having sold his vote was afterwards projected, but abandoned. Political Leaders of the Reconstruction Period, by E. G. Ross, The Forum, vol. xx, p. 227. 44 William Pitt Fessenden of Maine, Joseph S. Fowler of Tennessee, James W. Grimes of Iowa, John B. Henderson of Missouri, Edward G. Ross of Kansas, Lyman Trumbull of Illinois and Peter G. Van Wynkle of West Virginia. 45 Blaine, who voted for the impeachment when in the House, eight years later pronounced his judgment that the proceedings were not justified and the acquittal proper (Blaine, Twenty Years in Congress, vol. ii, pp. 375-383). Mr. Justice Miller was of the same opinion (Lectures on the Constitution, p. 172). S. S. Cox in his Three Decades of Federal Legislation, pp. 582-593, gives an interesting account of an interview between the President and Senator Grimes of Iowa at the rooms of Reverdy Johnson, during the trial, when Andrew Johnson expressed his views of his political duty in such a manner as to convince the senator that his continuance in office would not be injurious to the country. Cox also claims to have influenced Henderson's vote. The official report is Trial of Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, before the Senate of the United States, on Impeachment for High Crimes and Misdemeanors. Published by Order of the Senate. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1868. Three volumes. Vol. i, pp. 741; vol. ii, pp. 498; vol. iii, pp. 401. The next impeachment trial before the Senate of the United States would seem like an anti-climax, were it not for the disgraceful nature of the charge, the important constitutional question which it raised, and the wonderful ability which the counsel on both sides displayed. In 1876, in the course of an investigation by a committee of the House of Representatives, it appeared that the Secretary of War, William W. Belknap, had for several years been receiving between $6,000 and $12,000 annually out of the proceeds of a posttradership, the incumbent of which had been appointed by him. Belknap, as soon as the fact had been discovered, resigned, and his resignation was accepted by President Grant. Upon the same day, but a few hours later than the acceptance of the resignation, he was impeached. He was tried during the spring and summer of that year between April 5th and August 1st, when judgment was pronounced. The managers on the part of the House were Scott Lord of New York, J. Proctor Knott of Kentucky, W. T. Lynde of Wisconsin, John A. McMahon of Ohio, Elbridge G. Lapham of New York, and George Frisbie Hoar of Massachusetts. His counsel were Matthew H. Carpenter, formerly senator of the United States, Jeremiah S. Black, formerly attorney-general of the United States and justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, and Montgomery H. Blair. Five articles of impeachment were presented, each of which charged the transaction in different form, but in substance as the acceptance of bribes. A plea was filed to the jurisdiction upon the ground that, at the time of the impeachment, Belknap was not an officer of the United States. The plea was overruled by the vote of a majority of less than two-thirds. The counsel for the respondent refused to plead further, but the case continued under the Senate rules as if a plea of not guilty had been filed, the witnesses were examined and cross-examined, and arguments made upon the whole case by counsel for both sides. Upon the final vote, nearly all the senators who had voted in support of the plea, voted "not guilty" upon the ground that they had no jurisdiction, and consequently Belknap was acquitted, since the majority vote of guilty was less than two-thirds. All but one of the senators 46 who voted for an acquittal were members of the 46 William W. Eaton of Connecticut. His successor was a Republican. Republican party, to which Belknap belonged. A number of Republican senators, however, voted with the other Democrats in the Senate in favor of his conviction. The report of the trial is interesting, and the arguments of Hoar for the prosecution, and Carpenter and Black for the defense, are masterpieces of forensic eloquence.47 § 91. Persons Subject to Impeachment. The Constitution says: "The President, Vice-President, and all civil officers of the United States shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for and Conviction of Treason, Bribery or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."1 Upon Blount's impeachment it was claimed by the managers from the House of Representatives that these words were not restrictive of the power of impeachment conferred in the preceding article; and that private citizens or even State officers might be impeached 2 as in England, where 47 Proceedings of the Senate sitting for the trial of William W. Belknap, Late Secretary of War, on the Articles of Impeachment exhibited by the House of Representatives, 44th Congress, 1st Session. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1876, pp. 1166. The questions of law are discussed infra, §§ 91-92. § 91. 1 Article II, Section 4. 2 The Constitution has said who shall have the power to impeach and who of trying impeachments. It has also limited the extent of the punishment. But it has not described the persons who shall be the objects of impeachment, nor defined the cases to which the remedy shall be confined. We cannot do otherwise, therefore, than presume, that upon these points we are designedly left to the regulations of the common law. Sir, in the very threshold, has not this law given us the foundation upon which we stand? Where have we looked for the form of the pleadings, which has brought the present question before the Court? And if, sir, a question of evidence should arise, as happened upon a former occasion, should we hesitate as to the law which ought to determine its competency? If we were asked, whether a greater looseness in pleadings on impeachment were not allowed, than in suits at law, we should answer in the affirmative; and if it were inquired, whether the rules of evidence were more lax, we should answer in the negative; and in such opinions, I trust, we should not be contradicted by the learned counsel of the party impeached, and yet, sir, the opinions could alone be collected from the rules of the common law. It is, perhaps, worthy of observation, that even as it regards those persons who are clearly liable to impeachment, there is no direct provision, which subjects them to it. Thus in the 4th section of the 2d article, which has the closest connection with the point, it has not said that the President, Vice-President, and civil officers, shall be liable to impeachment; but taking it for granted that they were liable at com the only limitation is that a commoner cannot be impeached for a mon law, has introduced an imperative provision as to their removal upon conviction of certain crimes. The question, therefore, is, what persons, for what offences, are liable to be impeached at common law? And I am confident, as to this point, the learning and liberality of the counsel will save me the trouble of argument, or the citation of authorities, to establish the position, that the question of impeachability is a question of discretion only, with the Commons and Lords. Not that I mean to insist, that the Lords have legal cognizance of a charge of a capital crime against a commoner, but simply that all the King's subjects are liable to be impeached by the Commons, and tried by the Lords, upon charges of high crimes and misdemeanors. And this, sir, goes to the extent of the articles exhibited against William Blount. And for my part, I do not conceive it would have been sound policy to have laid any restriction as to person upon the power of impeaching. It is not difficult to imagine a case in which the punishment it imposes would be the most suitable which could be inflicted. Let us suppose, that a citizen not in office, but possessed of extensive influence, arising from popular arts, from wealth or connections, actuated by strong ambition and aspiring to the first place in the Government, should conspire with the disaffected of our own country, or with foreign intriguers, by illegal artifice, corruption or force, to place himself in the Presidential Chair. I would ask in such a case, what punishment would be more likely to quell a spirit of that description, than absolute and perpetual disqualification for any office of trust, honour or profit under the Government; and what punishment could be better calculated to secure the peace and safety of the State from the repetition of the same offence?" (Manager Bayard in Blount's Impeachment, Wharton's State Trials, pp. 265, 266.) "Nor can I conceive how the universal extent of the power of impeachment, contended for by my honorable colleague, is contrary to the spirit, the objects, or the policy, either of the law of impeachment, or of the Federal Constitution. The use of the law of impeachment is to punish and thereby prevent offences which are of such a nature as to endanger the safety, or injure the interests of the United States: and the object of the Federal Constitution was to provide for that safety, and to protect those interests. Such offences may be committed, as well by persons out of office, as by persons in office; and although the punishment can go no further than removal and disqualification, which restriction was, perhaps, wisely introduced in order to prevent those abuses of the power of impeachment which had taken place in another country, yet it may often be extremely important to prevent such offenders from getting into office, as well as to remove them when they are in; and it is, therefore, as consistent with the policy of impeachments, and the principles of the Federal compact, to punish them in the one case as in the other. This doctrine, it is further said, would enable Congress to interfere with the State governments, by impeaching their offi |