legislatures, but this was defeated by the votes of seven States to three. In the debate upon the question whether the lower house should be elected by the State legislatures, — "Mr. Dickinson considered it essential that one branch of the legislature should be drawn immediately from the people, and expedient that the other should be chosen by the legislatures of the States. This combination of the State governments with the national government was as politic as it was unavoidable. In the formation of the Senate, we ought to carry it through such a refining process as will assimilate it, as nearly as may be, to the House of Lords in England." 4 After the defeat of the motion for an election of the lower house by the State legislatures, in which he voted with the majority, he moved," "that the members of the second branch ought to be chosen by the individual legislatures." "Mr. Dickinson had two reasons for his motion,- first, because the sense of the States would be more easily collected through their governments than from the people at large; secondly, because he wished the Senate to consist of the most distinguished characters, distinguished for their rank in life and their weight of property, and bearing as strong a likeness to the British House of Lords as possible; and he thought such characters more likely to be selected by the State legislatures than in any other mode." Roger Sherman seconded the motion that, it seems not unlikely, was an entering wedge for the compromise that he subsequently suggested. The only strong opposition was from Wilson, who proposed instead, "an election by the people, in large districts, which would be most likely to obtain men of intelligence and uprightness; subdividing the districts only for the accommodation of voters." " "Mr. Gerry insisted that the commercial and moneyed interest would be more secure in the hands of the State legislatures than of the people at large." " 10 All the States but Pennsylvania, however, voted against the postponement of Dickinson's motion to take up that of Wilson; and the former was then unanimously adopted."1 Upon a subsequent vote it was again carried by nine States against two, Pennsylvania and Virginia being in the minority.12 6 "Mr. Read proposed, that the Senate should be appointed by the executive magistrate, out of a proper number of persons to be nominated by the individual legislatures.' His proposition was not seconded, nor supported." 18 The length of the term of the Senate was designed to give an opportunity for deliberation in legislation to protect the people against themselves.14 Some of the State senates sat for two, others 11 Ibid., p. 170. 12 Ibid., p. 240. 13 Ibid., p. 167. Gouverneur Morris also wished to have the senators appointed by the executive. Ibid., p. 272. 14 Mr. Madison. In order to judge of the form to be given to this institution, it will be proper to take a view of the ends to be served by it. These were first, to protect the people against their rulers; secondly, to protect the people against the transient impressions into which they themselves might be led. A people deliberating in a temperate moment, and with the experience of other nations before them, on the plan of government likely to secure their happiness, would first be aware, that those charged with the public happiness might betray their trust. An obvious precaution against this danger would be, to divide the trust between different bodies of men, who might watch and check each other. In this they would be governed by the same prudence which has prevailed in organizing the subordinate departments of government, where all business liable to abuses is made to pass through separate hands, the one being a check on the other. It would next occur to such a people, that they themselves were liable to temporary errors, through want of information as to their true interests; and that men chosen for a short term, and employed but a small portion of that in public affairs, might err from the same cause. This reflection would naturally suggest, that the government be so constituted as that one of its branches might have an opportunity of acquir ing a competent knowledge of the public interests. Another reflection equally becoming a people on such an occasion, would be, that they themselves, as well as a numerous body of representatives, were liable to err, also, from fickleness and passion. A necessary fence against this danger would be, to select a portion of enlightened citizens, whose limited number, and firmness, might seasonably interpose against impetuous counsels. It ought, finally, to occur to a people deliberating on a government for themselves, that, as different interests necessarily result from the liberty meant to be secured, the major interest might, under sudden impulses, be tempted to commit injustice on the minority. In all civilized countries the people fall into different classes, having a real or supposed difference of interests. There will be for three, others again four, and that of Maryland for five years.15 The last had the right to fill vacancies in its own body.16 The term of six years was chosen as a compromise between nine and four. There was a tie vote upon the question to agree to five. Four members, one of whom was Alexander Hamilton, proposed that the senators should hold their offices for life, unless removed by impeachment.18 There creditors and debtors; farmers, merchants, and manufacturers. will be, particularly, the distinction of rich and poor. It was true, as had been observed (by Mr. Pinckney), we had not among us those hereditary distinctions of rank which were a great source of the contests in the ancient governments, as well as the modern states, of Europe; nor those extremes of wealth or poverty which characterize the latter. We cannot, however, be regarded, even at this time, as one homogeneous mass, in which everything that affects a part will affect in the same manner the whole. In framing a system which we wish to last for ages, we should not lose sight of the changes which age will produce. An increase of population will of necessity increase the proportion of those who will labor under all the hardships of life, and secretly sigh for a more equal distribution of its blessings. These may in time outnumber those who are placed above the feelings of indigence. According to the equal laws of suffrage, the power will slide into the hands of the former. No agrarian attempts have yet been made in this country; but symptoms of a levelling spirit, as we have understood, have sufficiently appeared, in a certain quarter, to give notice of the future danger. How is this danger to be guarded against, on the republican principles; how is the danger, in all cases of interested coalitions, to oppress the minority, to be guarded against? Among other means, by the establishment of a body, in the govern ment, sufficiently respectable for its wisdom and virtue to aid, on such emergencies, the preponderance of justice, by throwing its weight into that scale. Such being the objects of the second branch in the proposed government, he thought a considerable duration ought to be given to it. He did not conceive that the term of nine years could threaten any real danger; but, in pursuing his particular ideas on the subject, he should require that the long term allowed to the second branch should not commence till such a period of life as would render a perpetual disqualification to the re-elected, little inconvenient, either in public or private view. He observed, that, as it was more than probable we were now digesting a plan which, in its operation, would decide forever the fate of republican government, we ought, not only to provide every guard to liberty that its preservation could require, but be equally careful to supply the defects which our own experience had particularly pointed out." (Madison Papers, Elliot's Debates, 2d ed., vol. v, pp. 242-243.) See supra, § 75. 15 The Federalist, numbers xxxix, lxiii. 16 Ibid. 17 Madison Papers, Elliot's Debates, 2d ed., vol. v, pp. 241–245. 18 The others were Read, Robert Morris, and Gouverneur Morris (ibid., pp. 241, 271, 585). The provision for the election of members by rotation was adopted unanimously at the suggestion of Gorham and Randolph.19 Penn's Frame of Government for Pennsylvania had provided that in the Councii one-third of the members should be elected every year, and at the time of the Convention the upper houses of New York, Virginia and Delaware as well as of the first named State were filled in a similar manner.20 The idea is said to have been borrowed from the senates of the cities in the Netherlands,21 who had taken it from Venice. The grant to each State of an equal right of suffrage in the Senate was the result of the controversy between the large and small States, which nearly disrupted the Convention and finally resulted in the Connecticut compromise, suggested by Roger Sherman, as previously described.22 Luther Martin of Maryland wished that the Senate should vote by States, and Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania that the number from each State should be three; but neither was able to carry more than the members of his own delegation in favor of his views.23 The provision for the temporary supply of vacancies in the Senate by the State executives was inserted by the Committee of Detail in the following form: "Vacancies may be supplied by the executive until the next meeting of the legislature." 24 Upon the consideration of their report, — "Mr. Madison, in order to prevent doubts whether resignations could be made by senators, or whether they could refuse to accept, moved to strike out the words after 'vacancies,' and insert the words happening by refusals to accept, resignations, or otherwise, may be supplied by the legislature of the State in the representation of which such vacancies shall happen, or by the executive thereof until the next meeting of the legislature.' Mr. Gouverneur Morris. This is absolutely necessary; otherwise, as members chosen into the Senate are disqualified from be19 Ibid., p. 241. 20 Poore's Charters and Constitutions, vol. ii, pp. 1520, 1334, 1910; vol. i, p. 274; Stevens, Sources of the Constitution, p. 78; supra, § 49, note 9. 21 Campbell, The Puritan in Holland, England and America, vol. ii, p. 423; Stevens, Sources of the Constitution, p. 78. 22 Supra, §§ 48, 64. 23 Madison Papers, Elliot's Debates, 2d ed., vol. v, pp. 356-357. 24 Ibid., p. 377. ing appointed to any office, by Section 9, of this article, it will be in the power of the legislature, by appointing a man a Senator against his consent, to deprive the United States of his services. "The motion of Mr. Madison was agreed to nem. con." 25 The other words of this clause seem to have been inserted by the Committee of Style without discussion. The Convention considered and disapproved suggestions that senators must have a property qualification,26 that like members of the House of Lords they should have the right to enter their dissents, in all cases, upon the journal,27 that they should choose the President in case of a failure of a choice by the electors, 28 that their consent should be required to pardons,29 and that they should have the power to declare war 30 and decide controversies between the States.31 The proceedings as to the presidency of the Senate, impeachments, and the power of that body to concur in treaties and approve appointments will be described later.32 The latter were suggested by the powers of the colonial councils.33 § 77. Senatorial Elections. The Constitution simply directs that the senators from each State shall be chosen by the Legislature thereof," 1 without prescribing the manner of the choice. A subsequent provision is that "The Times, Places, and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators." 2 For nearly one hundred years after the adoption of the Constitution Congress left the matter to the regulation of the several States. It was settled by uniform acquiescence that the governor of a State, although by the Constitution his assent was necessary |