tions into which they were also divided, the free and the slave States. The first conflict was settled then, and it is to be hoped. forever. The latter was smothered for a while; but the embers smouldered for nearly three-quarters of a century, until they broke into a flame which was not quenched till it had destroyed the kindling. The larger States wished the political power to be based on numbers. The smaller insisted that they should have an equal right of suffrage, as under the Confederation.1 The North desired that the basis of representation, if related to numbers, should be confined to free men. The South demanded that property in slaves should also be represented. The Continental Congress and the Congress under the Confederation each consisted of a single chamber in which the delegates voted by States.2 Before the opening of the Convention some of the delegates from Pennsylvania were disposed to abolish this injustice at the outset by insisting that votes in that body should be proportioned to population; but the moderation of Virginia checked their rashness, which would have brought the proceedings to an early and fruitless termination.3 The earliest division arose upon the question as to the character of the new government. There was little opposition to the determination that if it were to be national the legislature should consist of two houses. The only hostile vote was that of Pennsylvania, which was thus cast as a compliment to Franklin.5 Upon the day after the introduction by Randolph of the resolution proposed by the delegation of Virginia, the consideration of the first was postponed, and instead thereof the Convention, in the committee of the whole, adopted, by a vote of six States to one, New York being divided, the following resolution: "That a National government ought to be established, consisting of a supreme legislative, executive, and judiciary." In the course of the debate, "Mr. Gouverneur Morris explained the distinction between a federal § 48. 1 Supra, § 4, over note 17; § 9, note 3. 2 Articles of Confederation, V. 3 Supra, § 9, note 3. 4 Supra, § 17. 5 Madison Papers, Elliot's Debates, 2d ed., vol. v, p. 135; infra, § 75. and a national supreme government; the former being a mere compact resting on the good faith of the parties." When referred to the Committee of Detail, the first resolution was: "That the government of the United States ought to consist of a supreme legislature, judiciary and executive."6 The small States, however, refused to concede that their defeat on the question of the character of the new government should carry with it the control of the national legislature by the majority. They were aided by the support of some delegates from the larger States, who feared lest the consolidation should eventually cause a destruction of the State governments and a complete centralization that would result in the destruction of liberty. They rallied in support of the Connecticut compromise, first proposed by Roger Sherman, which allowed the lower house to be filled by popular election and its membership proportioned to population; but preserved the equality of the States in the upper house, which was to be chosen by their legislatures.8 A debate ensued of the utmost bitterness, in which the small States threatened to dissolve the Union and seek the support of some foreign power, while the large replied that disruption would be prevented by an appeal to arms.9 The convention came to a deadlock upon the question, and Franklin was driven to the expedient of suggesting the aid of prayer to promote conciliation.10 At last the subject was referred to a committee of one member from each State, who recommended the measure finally adopted, except that they proposed to give the lower house exclusive power to inaugurate appropriation bills and bills fixing salaries, without power in the Senate to alter or amend them.12 & Madison Papers, Elliot's Debates, 2d ed., vol. v, pp. 133, 375. 7 Ibid., p. 240, note. 8 Ibid., pp. 138 and 178. See, however, the remarks of Dickinson, ibid., pp. 148-149; and of Spaight, ibid., p. 137. Sherman had suggested an analogous scheme in the Continental Congress, Aug. 1, 1776. John Adams' Works, vol. ii, p. 499. The concession in the commit 9 See the speeches of Gunning Bedford of New Jersey (ibid., p. 268), of Gouverneur Morris (ibid., p. 276), and of Gorham of Massachusetts (ibid., p. 255). 10 His suggestion was not adopted. Ibid., pp. 253-255. 11 Ibid., p. 273. 12 Ibid., p. 274. See infra, § 64, over note 26. tee was obtained by the influence of Franklin, 13 who represented Pennsylvania, the second State in population. It was carried against the vote of Pennsylvania in the Convention by five States to four, Massachusetts being divided; New York, New Hampshire and Rhode Island, who would have voted with the majority, being absent; and North Carolina, which had formerly acted with the larger States, with one dissentient delegate, giving the casting vote.14 A motion for a reconsideration, made by Gouverneur Morris in the Convention immediately after this conference, was not even seconded.15 Thus the structure of Congress was finally determined by the votes of less than a majority of the States present in the Convention, and of less than one-third of the represented population.16 18 Ibid., p. 274, note. 14 Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina (Mr. Spaight, no), ay, 5. Pennsylvania, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, no, 4. Massachusetts, divided: Mr. Gerry, Mr. Strong, ay; Mr. King, 15 Ibid., p. 319. 16 Towle, History and Analysis of the Constitution, 3d ed., p. 69. CHAPTER V. TERM OF MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. § 49. Term of Members of the House of Representatives. THE Constitution provides that "The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year." The history of the English Parliament and of the extension of its term from two to seven years by the Septennial Act under George I, in order to defeat the will of the people,2 had taught the framers of the Constitution the importance of limiting the duration of the term of members of Congress. The necessity of the adjudication that a statute was void which extended a legislative term beyond the limits of the Constitution, seemed to the men of that time the strongest argument in support of the power of the courts to declare an act of the legislature unconstitutional.3 Their caution was proved wise by the action of the French National Convention in continuing the greater part of themselves in the legislative assembly which they established in their constitution of 1795. Had no such safeguard been inserted in the Constitution of the United States, there can be little doubt but that at least the Federal Congress at the close of the administration of Adams, and perhaps later ones would have continued themselves in office, under the conviction that this was indispensable to the public welfare. The terms of the colonial assemblies were fixed by law, and varied from six months to seven years. When the first State constitutions were adopted, Rhode Island and Connec § 49. 1 Constitution, Article I, Section 2. 2 A. D. 1717, Hallam's Constitutional History, Widdleton's American Ed., vol. iii, p. 228. 3 Den d. Bayard and wife v. Singleton, 1 Martin (N. C.), 42. 4 The Federalist, No. li. ticut continued under their old charters and former practice of semi-annual elections. The other States, except South Carolina, where they were biennial, had annual elections.5 Delegates to the Congress under the Confederation were annually appointed as the State legislature directed, subject to recall at any time, and ineligible for more than three years out of six. The term of two years was chosen by the Federal Convention as a compromise between the advocates of annual elections and those who wished the old English practice of a triennial term.7 This feature of the Constitution was perhaps that most attacked when it was before the people for ratification. The Federalist found it necessary to devote an entire number to the consideration of the phrase of the day, "that where annual elections end, tyranny begins.' The dangers feared from a long term were ignorance of the wants of the constituents, and attempts at a perpetuation of power. The advantages anticipated were the wisdom to be derived from experience, and the opportunity to mature measures which might require a considerable period of time for their perfection. In practice, the term has been found to be subject to more criticism for its brevity than its length; and the pres 5 The Federalist, No. lii. The first vote was in favor of a triennial term. New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, and Georgia, 7; Massachusetts (Mr. King, ay, Mr. Gorham wavering); Connecticut, North Carolina, and South Carolina, no, 4. Mr. Madison seconded the motion for three years. "Instability is one of the great vices of our Republic to be remedied. Three years will be necessary in a government so extensive, for members to form any knowledge of the various interests of the States to which they do not belong, and of which they can know but little from the situation and affairs of their own. One year will be almost consumed in preparing for, and travelling to and from, the seat of national office." Mr. Gerry: "The people of New England He will never give up the point of annual elections. They know of the transition made in England from triennial to septennial elections, and will consider such an innovation here as the prelude to a like usurpation. considered annual elections as the only defense of the people against tyranny. He was as much against a triennial house as against an hereditary executive." (Madison Papers, Elliot's Debates, 2d ed., pp. 183-184.) Nine days later the term of three years was stricken out. Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, ay, 7; New York, Delaware, Maryland, no, 3; New Jersey, divided. The term of two years was then inserted, nem. con. (Ibid., pp. 224-226. 8 No. liii. |