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The only theories of political economy with which their debates show familiarity1 were a few exploded maxims of Hume,2 quoted in the Convention, and perhaps a single reference to the classification of taxes made by the French physiocrats.3

Their study of ancient history seems to have gone little beyond the Lives of Plutarch and a few compilations made during the eighteenth century. With modern English history most had

§ 6. 1 Adam Smith's great work on The Wealth of Nations was published in 1776; and an American edition in 1789, which speaks of the great demand for the book in the United States; but there is no reference to it in the reports of the debates, even in the discussion of taxes on exports. There is a tradition that Hamilton read and made a commentary on it in 1783. (See History of the Republic of the United States as traced in the Writings of Alexander Hamilton and his Contemporaries, vol. ii, p. 514.) Prof. W. G. Sumner, than whom no one seems better qualified to pass judgment on such a point, was satisfied from the internal evidence of Hamilton's writings, that he never read Adam Smith (Sumner's Life of Hamilton, pp. 108, 180). According to Sumner, Law and Hume are the only writers on political economy whom Hamilton quotes to any extent (Hamilton's Works, Lodge's ed., vol. i, pp. 70, 78, 256; vol. vii, pp. 86, 390; vol. vii, p. 245). Henry C. Adams, on the other hand, in his History of Taxation in the United States, p. 20, expresses the opinion that Hamilton's Report on Manufactures was inspired by Adam Smith. Prof. Ugo Rabbeno, in Protezionismo Americano, and E. G. Bourne, in Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. viii, p. 328, have collected a series of parallel passages, which seem to prove that Hamilton consulted The Wealth of Nations when preparing this report.

2 Hamilton, in the Convention, referred with approval to the fact "that

one of the ablest politicians (Mr. Hume) had pronounced all that influence on the side of the crown which went under the name of corruption, an essential part of the weight which maintained the equilibrium of the Constitution." (Madison Papers, Elliot's Debates, 2d ed., vol. v, p. 229.) This was one of his favorite themes (See Jefferson's Ana, books 1 and 2, vol. ix, p. 96; Jefferson to William Short, Jan. 8, 1825, ibid., vol. vii, p. 389). He also quoted with approval the paradox that a national debt is a national blessing (Hamilton to Robert Morris, Hamilton's Works, 2d ed., vol. iv, p. 124).

3 It seems that the term "direct taxes" in Article I, section 2, which was moved by Gouverneur Morris, was borrowed from the writings of the French physiocrats, Turgot, Quesnay, and Dupont de Nemours, with whom he and Franklin at least were familiar. See Franklin's Works, vol. viii, p. 245; Dunbar on The Direct Tax of 1861, 3 Quarterly Journal of Economics, p. 436; and the discussion of Direct Taxes, infra.

4 "It is clear that Hamilton and Madison knew hardly anything more of Grecian history than what they had picked up from the observations of the Abbé Mably" (Freeman's History of Federal Government from the Foundation of the Achæan League to the Disruption of the United States, p. 319). Freeman refers to Mably's Observations sur l'Histoire de Grèce, which, as he shows, displays ignorance

such knowledge as is contained between the covers of Hume and Catharine Macaulay, together with the traditions of the conflict between the Crown and Parliament in the previous century, and a full acquaintance with contemporary events on the continent of Europe as well as Great Britain. A few had read with care the Parliamentary History, besides Locke and some writers on political science in the eighteenth century, and Wyse and Paine, if not Rousseau, had made all familiar with the theory of the social contract. But no references to these works are to be found in the reports of the debates, which abound in illustrations from colonial history. One only of them had any claim to the title of civilian, and his reading in that direction seems to have gone little beyond the works of Kames, although perhaps the most important phrase in the Constitution is said to have been taken by him from the civil law.5 The common law had been the subject of their deepest study,

of the structure of that famous league. A number of the members of the Convention were graduates of American colleges; but at that time the curriculum of such a college went little beyond what is now required for admission to the freshman class. Two had studied in the Scotch universities, and one for a short time at Oxford; but the parades of classical learning in the debates show little knowledge which was not derived from Montesquieu. See Maine, Popular Government, p.204.

5 Judge Wilson, who is said to have suggested the words, "impair the obligation of contracts." Holmes' Argument in Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheaton, 122, 151.

6 In no country, perhaps, in the world, is the law so general a study. The profession itself is numerous and powerful, and in most provinces it takes the lead. The greater number of the deputies sent to the Congress were lawyers. But all who read, and most do read, endeavor to obtain some smattering in that science. I have been told by an eminent bookseller, that in no branch of his busi

The

ness, after tracts of popular devotion, were so many books as those on the law exported to the plantations. colonists have now fallen into the way of printing them for their own use. I hear that they have sold nearly as many of Blackstone's Commentaries in America as in England. General Gage marks out this disposition very particularly in a letter now on your table. He states that all the people in his government are lawyers or smatterers in law-and that in Boston they have been enabled, by successful chicane, wholly to evade many parts of one of your capital constitutions."

"This study renders men acute, inquisitive, dexterous, prompt in attack, ready in defence, full of recourses. In other countries the people, more simple and of a less mercurial cast, judge of an ill principle in government only by an actual grievance; here they anticipate the evil, and judge of the pressure of the grievance by the badness of the principle. They augur misgovernment at a distance, and snuff the approach of

but even in that their books were few. According to John Adams, at the outbreak of the revolution there was but one copy of the State Trials and Selden's Tract of the Judicature of Parliament in the United States.7

8

With two great writers of their own time they were thoroughly familiar. The lectures of Sir William Blackstone were then recognized as an authority in America as well as England; and the writings of Montesquieu were not only cited constantly with respect, but studied before the Convention as a preparation for its great work.9

From the former, they had learned those compacts between the Crown and Commons which had proved indispensable to British freedom. By the latter, they had been taught the causes of the decay of other nations; and especially the theory that each government which is permanent must be divided into three distinct and independent departments, the legislative, the judiciary and the executive.10 The truth of this had been deeply impressed

tyranny in every tainted breeze." (Burke's Speech on Conciliation with America, March 22, 1775, Burke's Works, Am. ed., vol. ii, pp. 124, 125.)

7 Those were in Boston. John Adams' Works, vol. x, pp. 238-239. In 1790 there was a copy of an English impeachment trial at Worcester, Massachusetts, but none in New Hampshire. For Jeremiah Smith was obliged to drive there from the latter State in order to find a form from which to draw the impeachment of Judge Woodbury Langdon. (Life of Jeremiah Smith, p. 38.) John Dickinson at least was well read in the Parliamentary History.

8 According to Burke there were almost as many English copies of Blackstone sold in the United States as in England (supra, note 6). An American edition was published in Philadelphia in 1771. A copy bought by Roger Sherman in the same year is now in the library of the New York City Bar Association.

The Spirit of the Laws was cited

constantly in the debates at Philadelphia and the State Conventions, as well as in The Federalist. Washington, when preparing for the Convention, studied and copied with his own hand an abstract made for him by Madison. (Bancroft's Formation of the Constitution, p. 211.)

10In every form of government (TоTεía) there are three departments (ópia), and in every form the wise law-giver must consider, what, in respect to each of these, is for its interest. If all is well with these, all must needs be well with it, and the differences between forms of government are differences in respect to these. Of these three, one is the part which deliberates (τὸ βουλευόμενον) about public affairs; the second is that which has to do with the offices...; and the third is the judicial part (rò dikúšov)."— Aristotle, Politics, book VI, c. xiv.

"Il y a dans chaque État trois sortes de pouvoirs : la puissance législative, la puissance exécutrice des

upon them by the imbecility of Congress under the Articles of Confederation.

They had been well disciplined by that severe school-mistress, experience. In the army, some had been tried by the weakness of the central power and the need of dancing attendance on local legislatures blinded to the common welfare by local interests and prejudices. As judges, others had observed the injustice and impairment of public credit from the obstructions cast by State legislatures in the way of foreign and domestic creditors. In

choses qui dépendent du droit des gens, et la puissance exécutrice de celles qui dépendent du droit civil.

"Par la première, le prince ou le magistrat fait des lois... et corrige ou abroge celles qui sont faites. Par la seconde, il fait la paix ou la guerre, envoie ou reçoit des ambassades, établie la sûreté, previent les invasions. Par la troisième, il punit les crimes, ou juge les différences des particuliers. On appellera cette dernière la puissance de juger, et l'autre simplement la puissance exécutrice de l'Etat...

"Lorsque dans la même personne ou dans le même corps de magistrature, la puissance législative est réunie à la puissance exécutrice, il n'y a point de liberté; parce qu'on peut craindre que le même monarque ou le même sénat ne fasse des lois tyranniques pour les exécuter tyranniquement.

"Il n'y a point encore de liberté si la puissance de juger n'est pas séparée de la puissance législative et de l'exécutrice. Si elle étoit jointe à la puissance législative, le pouvoir sur la vie et la liberté des citoyens seroit arbitraire: car le juge seroit legislateur. Si elle étoit jointe à la puissance exécutrice, le juge pourroit avoir la force d'un oppresseur.

"Tout seroit perdu si le même homme, ou le même corps des principaux, ou des nobles, ou du peuple,

exerçoient des trois pouvoirs: celui de faire des lois, celui d'exécuter les résolutions publiques, et celui de juger les crimes ou les différends des particuliers."- Montesquieu, L'Esprit des Lois, livre xi, ch. vi (1748).

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It may be confidently laid down, that neither the institution of a Supreme Court, nor the entire structure of the Constitution of the United States were the least likely to occur to anybody's mind before the publicaiton of the Esprit des Lois.' We have already observed that the Federalist' regards the opinions of Montesquieu as of paramount authority, and no opinion had more weight with its writers than that which affirmed the essential separation of the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial powers. The distinction is so familiar to us, that we find it hard to believe that even the different nature of the Executive and Legislative powers was not recognized till the fourteenth century; it occurs in the Defensor Pacis of the great Ghibelline jurist, Marsilio da Padova (1327), with many other curious anticipations of modern political ideas, but it was not till the eighteenth that the Esprit des Lois' made the analysis of the various powers of the State part of the accepted political doctrine of the civilized world."-Maine, Popular Government, p. 218, cited from Thayer's Constitutional Cases, pp. 1, 2.

these legislatures again, many had seen the strength and weakness of their organization, and the necessity of some breakwaters against sudden floods of popular passion.

In Congress, they had felt the need of unity in the executive, and the powers of taxation and the regulation of commerce in the national legislature. Many had assisted in framing the constitutions of their respective States, and had tested the strength and weakness of the work they had thus accomplished. All these things were ever before them in their conclave. And if they builded better than they knew, they worked with intelligent foresight.

§ 7. Prototypes of the Federal Constitution.

The Constitution of the United States is not the first written constitution of a nation, although it is the first that has had a prolonged and successful duration. Articles of confederation in peace and war between different states were the natural outgrowth of treaties of alliance between small powers under constant dangers from an enemy too strong for any one of them alone. Such was the Achaian League, which lasted in Greece one hundred and thirty-four years, from the reign of Pyrrhus to the proconsulate of Mummius.1 At the outbreak of the Revolution, such confederations dragged out an impotent existence in Switzerland and the Netherlands. From the latter form of league were copied many of the defects in the instrument which the Constitution displaced.2 Such confederacies, however, were, with the exception of

§ 7. 1 See Freeman's History of Federal Goverment, passim, especially pp. 245, 704, for a history of the rise and fall and an account of the structure of the Achaian League.

2 In their first formative effort they missed the plain road of English and American experience. They had rightly been jealous of extending the supremacy of England, because it was a government outside of themselves; they now applied that jealousy to one another, forgetting that the general power would be in their own hands. Joseph Hawley of Massachusetts had, in November, 1775, advised

annual parliaments of two houses; the committee for framing the confederation, misled partly by the noted distrust for which the motive had ceased and partly by erudition which studied Hellenic councils and leagues as well as later confederacies, took for its pattern the Constitution of the United Provinces, with one house and no central power of final decision. These evils were nearly fatal to the United Provinces themselves, although every one of them could be reached by a messenger within a day's journey; and here was a continent of States which could not be consulted

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