the unintentional instrument of preventing the passage of wha. might be thought essential laws. He would like exceedingly to contrast the objections urged against the reception of the Venezuelean minister, with the more forcible and stronger personal ones that lay to the present Spanish minister. But deep as the interest which he heretofore had felt and still felt, in the success of that great struggle to the south, he must, for the reasons assigned, forbear to press any proposition upon the house, at present. Should it be necessary at another session, and should he have the honor of a seat on this floor then, he pledged himself to bring up the subject, unless adverse causes should render it highly inexpedient.

ON THE SPANISH TREATY.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, APRIL 3, 1820.

[A PERUSAL of this speech will be always gratifying and instructive, to all who would wish to be well informed in the political history of the United States. While it shows, in a striking manner, the foresight and sagacity of Mr. Clay, as an American statesman, it contains facts of much importance with regard to the settlement of the southern boundaries of the United States and the acquisition of Florida. It will be seen, that Mr. Clay disapproved of the treaty between this country and Spain, made in 1819, by the administration of Mr. Munroe, for reasons stated in this speech, which was made before the treaty was ratified by Spain. His principal objection to the treaty appears to have been, that it relinquished our claim to Texas, which territory Mr. Clay considered of much greater value to us than Florida. The settlement of these questions, by the subsequent ratification of the treaty, in October, 1820, by which we relinquished Texas and acquired Florida, does not diminish the value of this record of Mr. Clay's views on a subject, which has increased in importance since the independence of both Mexico and Texas has been established.]

THE house having resolved itself into a committee of the whole, on the state of the union, and the following resolutions, submitted some days ago by Mr. Clay (the speaker) being under consider

ation:

First, resolved, that the constitution of the United States vests in congress the power to dispose of the territory belonging to them; and that no treaty, purporting to alienate any portion thereof, is valid without the concurrence of congress:

Second, resolved, that the equivalent proposed to be given by Spain to the United States in the treaty concluded between them, on the twenty-second of February, 1819, for that part of Louisiana lying west of the Sabine, was inadequate; and that it would be inexpedient to make a transfer thereof to any foreign power, or to renew the aforesaid treaty:

Mr. Clay said, that, whilst he felt very grateful to the house for the prompt and respectful manner in which they had allowed him to enter upon the discussion of the resolutions which he had the honor of submitting to their notice, he must at the same time frankly say, that he thought their character and consideration, in the councils of this country, were concerned in not letting the present session pass off without deliberating upon our affairs with

Spain. In coming to the present session of congress, it had been his anxious wish to be able to concur with the executive branch of the government in the measures which it might conceive itself called upon to recommend on that subject, for two reasons, of which the first, relating personally to himself, he would not trouble the committee with further noticing. The other was, that it appeared to him to be always desirable, in respect to the foreign action of this government, that there should be a perfect coincidence in opinion between its several coördinate branches. In time of peace, however, it might be allowable, to those who are charged with the public interests, to entertain and express their respective views, although there might be some discordance between them. In a season of war there should be no division in the public councils; but a united and vigorous exertion to bring the war to an honorable conclusion. For his part, whenever that calamity may befall his country, he would entertain but one wish, and that is, that success might crown our struggle, and the war be honorably and gloriously terminated. He would never refuse to share in the joys incident to the victory of our arms, nor to participate in the griefs of defeat and discomfiture. He conceded entirely in the sentiment once expressed by that illustrious hero, whose recent melancholy fall we all so sincerely deplore, that fortune may attend our country in whatever war it may be involved.

There are two systems of policy, he said, of which our government had had the choice. The first was, by appealing to the justice and affections of Spain, to employ all those persuasives which could arise out of our abstinence from any direct countenance to the cause of South America, and the observance of a strict neutrality. The other was, by appealing to her justice also, and to her fears, to prevail upon her to redress the injuries of which we complain-her fears by a recognition of the independent governments of South America, and leaving her in a state of uncertainty as to the further step we might take in respect to those governments. The unratified treaty was the result of the first system. It could not be positively affirmed, what effect the other system would have produced; but he verily believed that, whilst it rendered justice to those governments, and would have better comported with that magnanimous policy which ought to have characterized our own, it would have more successfully tended to an amicable and satisfactory arrangement of our differences with Spain.

The first system has so far failed. At the commencement of the session, the president recommended an enforcement of the provisions of the treaty. After three months' deliberation, the committee of foreign affairs, not being able to concur with him, has made us a report, recommending the seizure of Florida in the nature of a reprisal. Now the president recommends our postponement of the subject until the next session. It had been his intention, whenever

the committee of foreign affairs should engage the house to act upon their bill, to offer, as a substitute for it, the system which he thought it became this country to adopt, of which the occupation of Texas, as our own, would have been a part, and the recognition of the independent governments of South America another. If he did not now bring forward this system, it was because the committee proposed to withdraw their bill, and because he knew too much of the temper of the house and of the executive, to think that it was advisable to bring it forward. He hoped that some suitable opportunity might occur during the session, for considering the propriety of recognising the independent governments of South America.

Whatever he might think of the discretion which was evinced in recommending the postponement of the bill of the committee of foreign relations, he could not think that the reasons, assigned by the president for that recommendation, were entitled to the weight which he had given them. He thought the house was called upon, by a high sense of duty, seriously to animadvert upon some of those reasons. He believed it was the first example, in the annals of the country, in which a course of policy, respecting one foreign power, which we must suppose had been deliberately considered, has been recommended to be abandoned, in a domestic communication from one to another coördinate branch of the government, upon the avowed ground of the interposition of foreign powers. And what is the nature of this interposition? It is evinced by a cargo of scraps, gathered up from this chargé d'affaires, and that; of loose conversations held with this foreign minister, and that perhaps mere levee conversations, without a commitment in writing, in a solitary instance, of any of the foreign parties concerned, except only in the case of his imperial majesty; and what was the character of his commitment we shall presently see. But, he must enter his solemn protest against this and every other species of foreign interference in our matters with Spain. What have they to do with them? Would they not repel as officious and insulting intrusion, any interference on our part in their concerns with foreign states? Would his imperial majesty have listened with complacency, to our remonstrances against the vast acquisiuous which he has recently made? He has lately crammed his enormous maw with Finland, and with the spoils of Poland, and, whilst the difficult process of digestion is going on, he throws himself upon a couch, and cries out, don't, don't disturb my

repose.

He charges his minister here to plead the cause of peace and concord! The American government is too enlightened' (ah' sir, how sweet this unction is, which is poured down our backs,) to take hasty steps. And his imperial majesty's minister here is required to engage (Mr. Clay said, he hoped the original expression

was less strong, but he believed the French word engager bore the same meaning,) 'the American government,' &c. Nevertheless, the emperor does not interpose in this discussion. No! not he. He makes above all no pretension to exercise influence in the councils of a foreign power. Not the slightest. And yet, at the very instant when he is protesting against the imputation of this influence, his interposition is proving effectual! His imperial majesty has at least manifested so far, in this particular, his capacity to govern his empire, by the selection of a sagacious minister. For if count Nesselrode had never written another paragraph, the extract from his despatch to Mr. Poletica, which has been transmitted to this house, will demonstrate that he merited the confidence of his master. It is quite refreshing to read such state papers, after perusing those (he was sorry to say it, he wished there was a veil broad and thick enough to conceal them for ever,) which this treaty had produced on the part of our government.

Conversations between my lord Castlereagh and our minister at London had also been communicated to this house. Nothing from the hand of his lordship is produced; no! he does not commit himself in that way. The sense in which our minister understood him, and the purport of certain parts of despatches from the British government to its minister at Madrid, which he deigned to read to our minister, are alone communicated to us. Now we know very well how diplomatists, when it is their pleasure to do so, can wrap themselves up in mystery. No man more than my lord Castlereagh, who is also an able minister, possessing much greater talents than are allowed to him generally in this country, can successfully express himself in ambiguous language, when he chooses to employ it. He recollected himself once to have witnessed this facility, on the part of his lordship. The case was this. When Bonaparte made his escape from Elba, and invaded France, a great part of Europe believed it was with the connivance of the British ministry. The opposition charged them, in parliament, with it, and they were interrogated, to know what measures of precaution they had taken against such an event. Lord Castlereagh replied by stating, that there was an understanding with a certain naval officer of high rank, commanding in the adjacent seas, that he was to act on certain contingences. Now, Mr. Chairman, if you can make any thing intelligible out of this reply, you will have much more success than the English opposi tion had.

The allowance of interference by foreign powers in the affairs of our government, not pertaining to themselves, is against the councils of all our wisest politicians-those of Washington, Jefferson, and he would also add those of the present chief magistrate; for, pending this very Spanish negotiation, the offer ot the mediation of foreign states was declined, upon the true ground,