The attention of congress has been invited to this subject by the president, in his message, delivered at the opening of the session. Indeed, had it been wholly neglected by the chief magistrate, from the critical situation of the country, and the nature of the rights proposed to be vindicated, it must have pressed itself upon our attention. But, said Mr. Clay, the president, in his message, observes: 'your attention will, of course, be drawn to such provisions on the subject of our naval force, as may be required for the service to which it is best adapted. I submit to congress the seasonableness, also, of an authority to augment the stock of such materials as are imperishable in their nature, or may not, at once, be attainable?' The president, by this recommendation, clearly intimates an opinion, that the naval force of this country is capable of producing effect; and the propriety of laying up imperishable materials, was no doubt suggested for the purpose of making additions to the navy, as convenience and exigences might direct.

It appeared to Mr. Clay a little extraordinary, that so much, as it seemed to him, unreasonable jealousy, should exist against the naval establishment. If, said he, we look back to the period of the formation of the constitution, it will be found that no such jealousy was then excited. In placing the physical force of the nation at the disposal of congress, the convention manifested much greater apprehension of abuse in the power given to raise armies, than in that to provide a navy. In reference to the navy, congress is put under no restrictions; but with respect to the army, that description of force which has been so often employed to subvert the liberties of mankind, they are subjected to limitations designed to prevent the abuse of this dangerous power. But it was not his intention to detain the committee, by a discussion on the comparative utility and safety of these two kinds of force. He would, however, be indulged in saying, that he thought gentlemen had wholly failed in maintaining the position they had assumed, that the fall of maritime powers was attributable to their navies. They have told you, indeed, that Carthage, Genoa, Venice, and other nations, had navies, and, notwithstanding, were finally destroyed. But have they shown, by a train of argument, that their overthrow was, in any degree, attributable to their maritime greatness? Have they attempted, even, to show that there exists in the nature of this power a necessary tendency to destroy the nation using it? Assertion is substituted for argument; inferences not authorized by historical facts are arbitrarily drawn; things wholly unconnected with each other are associated together; a very logical mode of reasoning, it must be admitted! In the same way he could demonstrate how idle and absurd our attachments are to freedom itself. He might say, for example, that Greece and Rome had forms of free government, and that they no longer exist; and,

deducing their fall from their devotion to liberty, the conclusion, in favor of despotism, would very satisfactorily follow! He demanded what there is in the nature and construction of maritime power, to excite the fears that have been indulged? Do gentlemen really apprehend, that a body of seamen will abandon their proper element, and, placing themselves under an aspiring chief, will erect a throne to his ambition? Will they deign to listen to the voice of history, and learn how chimerical are their apprehensions?

But the source of alarm is in ourselves. Gentlemen fear, that if we provide a marine, it will produce collisions with foreign nations; plunge us into war, and ultimately overturn the constitution of the country. Sir, if you wish to avoid foreign collision, you had better abandon the ocean; surrender all your commerce; give up all your prosperity. It is the thing protected, not the instrument of protection, that involves you in war. Commerce engenders collision, collision war, and war, the argument supposes, leads to despotism. Would the counsels of that statesman be deemed wise, who would recommend that the nation should be unarmed; that the art of war, the martial spirit, and martial exercises, should be prohibited; who should declare, in the language of Othello, that the nation must bid farewell to the neighing steed, and the shrill trump, the spirit-stirring drum, the ear-piercing fife, and all the pride, pomp, and circumstance of glorious war; and that the great body of the people should be taught, that national happiness was to be found in perpetual peace alone? No, sir. And yet, every argument in favor of a power of protection on land, applies, in some degree, to a power of protection on the sea. Undoubtedly a commerce void of naval protection is more exposed to rapacity than a guarded commerce; and if we wish to invite the continuance of the old, or the enactment of new edicts, let us refrain from all exertion upon that element where we must operate, and where, in the end, they must be resisted.

For his part (Mr. Clay said) he did not allow himself to be alarmed by those apprehensions of maritime power, which appeared to agitate other gentlemen. In the nature of our government he beheld abundant security against abuse. He would be unwilling to tax the land to support the rights of the sea, and was for drawing from the sea itself, the resources with which its violated freedom should at all times be vindicated. Whilst this principle is adhered to, there will be no danger of running into the folly and extravagance which so much alarms gentlemen; and whenever it is abandoned - whenever congress shall lay burdensome taxes, to augment the navy beyond what may be authorized by the increased wealth, and demanded by the exigences, of the country, the people will interpose, and, removing their unworthy representatives, apply the appropriate corrective. Mr. Clay, then, could

not see any just ground of dread in the nature of naval power. It was, on the contrary, free from the evils attendant upon standing armies. And the genius of our institutions-the great representative principle, in the practical enjoyment of which we are so eminently distinguished-afforded the best guarantee against the ambition and wasteful extravagance of government. What maritime strength is it expedient to provide for the United States? In considering this subject, three different degrees of naval power present themselves. In the first place, such a force as would be capable of contending with that which any other nation is able to bring on the ocean—a force that, boldly scouring every sea, would challenge to combat the fleets of other powers, however great. He admitted it was impossible at this time, perhaps it never would be desirable, for this country to establish so extensive a navy. Indeed, he should consider it as madness in the extreme in this government to attempt to provide a navy able to cope with the fleets of Great Britain, wherever they might be met.

The next species of naval power to which he would advert, is that which, without adventuring into distant seas, and keeping generally in our own harbors, and on our coasts, would be competent to beat off any squadron which might be attempted to be permanently stationed in our waters. His friends from South Carolina (Messrs. Cheves and Lowndes) had satisfactorily shown, that, to effect this object, a force equivalent only to one third of that which the maintenance of such a squadron must require, would be sufficient; that if, for example, England should determine to station permanently upon our coast a squadron of twelve ships of the line, it would require for this service thirty-six ships of the line; one third in port, repairing, one third on the passage, and one third on the station. But that is a force which it has been shown that even England, with her boasted navy, could not spare for the American service, whilst she is engaged in the present contest. Mr. Clay said, that he was desirous of seeing such a force as he had described; that is, twelve ships of the line and fifteen or twenty frigates, provided for the United States; but he admitted that it was unattainable in the present situation of the finances of the country. He contended, however, that it was such as congress ought to set about providing; and he hoped, in less than ten years, to see it actually established. He was far from surveying the vast maritime power of Great Britain, with the desponding eye with which other gentlemen beheld it. He could not allow himself to be discouraged at a prospect of even her thousand ships. This country only required resolution, and a proper exertion of its immense resources, to command respect, and to vindicate every essential right. When we consider our remoteness from Europe, the expense, difficulty, and perils, to which any squadron would be exposed, while stationed off our coasts, he entertained no doubt

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that the force to which he referred, would insure the command of our own seas. Such a force would avail itself of our extensive sea-board and numerous harbors, every where affording asylums to which it could safely retire from a superior fleet, or from which it could issue, for the purpose of annoyance. To the opinion of his colleague (Mr. M'Kee), who appeared to think that it was in vain for us to make any struggle on the ocean, he would oppose the sentiments of his distinguished connection, the heroic Daviess, who fell in the battle of Tippecanoe. [Here Mr. Clay read certain parts of a work, written by colonel Daviess, in which the author attempts to show, that, as the aggressions upon our commerce were not committed by fleets, but by single vessels, they could, in the same manner, be best retaliated; that the force of about twenty or thirty frigates, would be capable of inflicting great injury on English commerce, by picking up stragglers, cutting off convoys, and seizing upon every moment of supineness; and that such a force, with our seaports and harbors well fortified, and aided by privateers, would be really formidable, and would annoy the British navy and commerce, just as the French army was assailed in Egypt, the Persian army in Scythia, and the Roman army in Parthia.]

The third description of force, worthy of consideration, is, that which would be able to prevent any single vessel, of whatever metal, from endangering our whole coasting trade, blocking up our harbors, and laying under contribution our cities-a force competent to punish the insolence of the commander of any single ship, and to preserve in our own jurisdiction, the inviolability of our peace and our laws. A force of this kind is entirely within the compass of our means, at this time. Is there a reflecting man in the nation, who would not charge congress with a culpable neglect of its duty, if, for the want of such a force, a single ship were to bombard one of our cities! Would not every honorable member of the committee inflict on himself the bitterest reproaches, if, by failing to make an inconsiderable addition to our little gallant navy, a single British vessel should place New York under contribution! Yes, sir, when the city is in flames, its wretched inhabitants begin to repent of their neglect, in not providing engines and water-buckets. If, said Mr. Clay, we are not able to meet the wolves of the forest, shall we put up with the barking impudence of every petty cur that trips across our way? Because we cannot guard against every possible danger, shall we provide against none? He hoped not. He had hardly expected that the instructing but humiliating lesson, was so soon to be forgotten, which was taught us in the murder of Pierce, the attack on the Chesapeake, and the insult offered in the very harbor of Charleston, which the brave old fellow who commanded the fort in vain endeavored to chastise. It was a rule with Mr. Clay, when acting

either in a public or private character, to attempt nothing more than what there existed a prospect of accomplishing. He was therefore not in favor of entering into any mad projects on this subject, but for deliberately and resolutely pursuing what he believed to be within the power of government. Gentlemen refer to the period of 1798, and we are reminded of the principles maintained by the opposition at that time. He had no doubt of the correctness of that opposition. The naval schemes of that day were premature, not warranted by the resources of the country, and were contemplated for an unnecessary war, into which the nation was about to be plunged. He always admired and approved the zeal and ability with which that opposition was conducted, by the distinguished gentleman now at the head of the treasury. But the state of things is totally altered. What was folly in 1798, may be wisdom now. At that time, we had a revenue only of about six millions. Our revenue now, upon a supposition that commerce is restored, is about sixteen millions. The population of the country, too, is greatly increased, nearly doubled, and the wealth of the nation is perhaps tripled. Whilst our ability to construct a navy is thus enhanced, the necessary maritime protection is proportionably augmented. Independent of the extension of our commerce, since the year 1798, we have had an addition of more than five hundred miles to our coast, from the bay of Perdido to the mouth of the Sabine-a weak and defenceless accession, requiring, more than any other part of our maritime frontier, the protecting arm of government.

The groundless imputation, that those who were friendly to a navy, were espousing a principle inimical to freedom, should not terrify him. He was not ashamed when in such company as the illustrious author of the notes on Virginia, whose opinion on the subject of a navy, contained in that work, contributed to the forma tion of his own. But the principle of a navy, Mr. Clay contended, was no longer open to controversy. It was decided when Mr. Jefferson came into power. With all the prejudices against a navy, which are alleged by some to have been then brought into the administration, with many honest prejudices, he admitted, the rash attempt was not made to destroy the establishment. It was reduced to only what was supposed to be within the financial capacity of the country. If, ten years ago, when all those prejudices were to be combatted, even in time of peace, it was deemed proper, by the then administration, to retain in service ten frigates, he put it to the candor of gentlemen to say, if now, when we are on the eve of a war, and taking into view the actual growth of the country, and the acquisition of our coast on the Gulf of Mexico, we ought not to add to the establishment.

Mr. Clay said, he had hitherto alluded more particularly to the exposed situation of certain parts of the Atlantic, frontier Whilst