I conceive, then, sir, that we were not empowered by the constitution, nor bound by any practice under it, to renew the charter of this bank, and I might here rest the argument. But as there are strong objections to the renewal on the score of expediency, and as the distresses which will attend the dissolution of the bank have been greatly exaggerated, I will ask for your indulgence for a few moments longer. That some temporary inconvenience will arise, I shall not deny; but most groundlessly have the recent failures in New York been attributed to the discontinuance of this bank. As well might you ascribe to that cause the failures of Amsterdam and Hamburg, of London and Liverpool. embarrassments of commerce, the sequestrations in France, the Danish captures; in fine, the belligerent edicts are the obvious sources of these failures. Their immediate cause is the return of bills upon London, drawn upon the faith of unproductive or unprofitable shipments. Yes, sir, the protests of the notaries of London, not those of New York, have occasioned these bankruptcies.

The

The power of a nation is said to consist in the sword and the purse. Perhaps, at last, all power is resolvable into that of the purse, for with it you may command almost every thing else. The specie circulation of the United States is estimated by some calculators at ten millions of dollars, and if it be no more, one moiety is in the vaults of this bank. May not the time arrive, when the concentration of such a vast portion of the circulating medium of the country in the hands of any corporation, will be dangerous to our liberties? By whom is this immense power wielded? By a body, that, in derogation of the great principle of all our institutions, responsibility to the people, is amenable only to a few stockholders, and they chiefly foreigners. Suppose an attempt to subvert this government; would not the traitor first aim, by force or corruption, to acquire the treasure of this company? Look at it in another aspect. Seven tenths of its capital are in the hands of foreigners, and these foreigners chiefly English subjects. We are possibly on the eve of a rupture with that nation. Should such an event occur, do you apprehend that the English premier would experience any difficulty in obtaining the entire control of this institution? Republics, above all other governments, ought most seriously to guard against foreign influence. All history proves, that the internal dissensions excited by foreign intrigue have produced the downfall of almost every free government that has hitherto existed; and yet, gentlemen contend that we are benefited by the possession of this foreign capital! If we could have its use, without its attending abuse, I should be gratified also. But it is in vain to expect the one without the other. Wealth is power, and, under whatsoever form it exists, its proprietor, whether he lives on this or the other side of the Atlantic.

will have a proportionate influence. It is argued, that our possession of this English capital gives us a great influence over the British government. If this reasoning be sound, we had better revoke the interdiction as to aliens holding land, and invite foreigners to engross the whole property, real and personal, of the country. We had better, at once, exchange the condition of independent proprietors for that of stewards. We should then be able to govern foreign nations, according to the reasoning of the gentlemen on the other side. But let us put aside this theory and appeal to the decisions of experience. Go to the other side of the Atlantic and see what has been achieved for us there, by Englishmen holding seven tenths of the capital of this bank. Has it released from galling and ignominious bondage one solitary American seaman, bleeding under British oppression? Did it prevent the unmanly attack upon the Chesapeake? Did it arrest the promulgation, or has it abrogated the orders in council-those orders which have given birth to a new era in commerce? In spite of all its boasted effect, are not the two nations brought to the very brink of war? Are we quite sure, that, on this side of the water, it has had no effect favorable to British interests. It has often been stated, and although I do not know that it is susceptible of strict proof, I believe it to be a fact, that this bank exercised its influence in support of Jay's treaty; and may it not have contributed to blunt the public sentiment, or paralyse the efforts of this nation against British aggression.

The duke of Northumberland is said to be the most considerable stockholder in the bank of the United States. A late lord chancellor of England, besides other noblemen, was a large stockholder. Suppose the prince of Essling, the duke of Cadore, and other French dignitaries, owned seven eighths of the capital of this bank, should we witness the same exertions (I allude not to any made in the senate) to recharter it? So far from it, would not the danger of French influence be resounded throughout the nation?

I shall, therefore, give my most hearty assent to the motion for striking out the first section of the bill.

ON THE AUGMENTATION OF MILITARY FORCE.

IN THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
DECEMBER 31, 1811.

[In our biographical sketch, we have mentioned, that Mr. Clay, having left the senate of the United States in 1811, was the same year elected to the house of representatives, where he took his seat, and was chosen speaker of that body on the opening of the session. This took place at an eventful period in our national history. The numerous and aggravated wrongs which the nation had sustained and endured for years, both from France and England, but more especially from the latter, had aroused the attention of the whole country. The celebrated orders in council, the impressment of our seamen, and the right of searching our vessels, claimed and exercised by Great Britain, had prepared the people to expect that some decisive steps would be taken by their representatives in congress. In accordance with public sentiment, president Madison transmitted, November fourth, 1811, a message to congress, recommending appropriate measures for the vindication of our national honor, and the redress of our violated rights. The political parties, however, into which the people were divided, differed widely as to the course to be pursued in our foreign relations. The opposition to the administration numbered many eminent men, among whom the most talented and troublesome was John Randolph, of Virginia; his intellectual powers at this juncture being in full force and vigor. The committee on foreign relations proposed an immediate increase of the military force, and accordingly a bill passed, to raise thirteen additional regiments for the public service. It was the consideration of this measure, which induced Mr. Clay to address the house, when in committee of the whole, as follows.]

Mr. Clay (the speaker) said, that when the subject of this bill was before the house in the abstract form of a resolution, proposed by the committee of foreign relations, it was the pleasure of the house to discuss it whilst he was in the chair. He did not complain of this course of proceeding; for he did not at any time wish the house, from considerations personal to him, to depart from that mode of transacting the public business which they thought best. He merely adverted to the circumstance as an apology for the trouble he was about to give the committee. He was at all times disposed to take his share of responsibility, and under this impression, he felt that he owed it to his constituents and to himself, before the committee rose, to submit to their attention a few observations.

He saw with regret a diversity of opinion amongst those who had the happiness generally to act together, in relation to the quantum of force proposed to be raised. For his part, he thought it was too great for peace, and he feared too small for war. He

had been in favor of the number recommended by the senate, and he would ask gentlemen, who had preferred fifteen thousand, to take a candid and dispassionate view of the subject. It was admitted, on all hands, that it was a force to be raised for the purposes of war, and to be kept up and used only in the event of war. It was further conceded, that its principal destination would be the provinces of our enemy. By the bill which had been passed, to complete the peace establishment, we had authorized the collection of a force of about six thousand men, exclusive of those now in service, which, with the twenty-five thousand provided for by this bill, will give an aggregate of new troops of thirty-one thousand men. Experience in military affairs, has shown, that when any given number of men is authorized to be raised, you must, in counting upon the effective men which it will produce, deduct one fourth or one third for desertion, sickness, and other incidents to which raw troops are peculiarly exposed. In measures relating to war, it is wisest, if you err at all, to err on the side of the largest force, and you will consequently put down your thirty-one thousand men at not more than an effective force in the field of about twentyone thousand. This, with the four thousand now in service, will amount to twenty-five thousand effective men. The secretary of war has stated, in his report, that, for the single purpose of manning your forts and garrisons on the sea-board, twelve thousand and six hundred men are necessary. Although the whole of that number will not be taken from the twenty-five thousand, a portion of it, probably, will be. We are told, that in Canada, there are between seven and eight thousand regular troops. If it is invaded, the whole of that force will be concentrated in Quebec, and would you attempt that almost impregnable fortress, with less than double the force of the besieged? Gentlemen who calculate upon volunteers as a substitute for regulars, ought not to deceive themselves. No man appreciated higher than he did the spirit of the country. But, although volunteers were admirably adapted to the first operations of the war, to the making of a first impression, he doubted their fitness for a regular siege, or for the manning and garrisoning of forts. He understood it was a rule in military affairs, never to leave in the rear a place of any strength undefended. Canada is invaded; the upper part falls, and you proceed to Quebec. It is true there would be no European army behind to be apprehended: but the people of the country might rise; and he warned gentlemen who imagined that the affections of the, Canadians were with us, against trusting too confidently on such a calculation, the basis of which was treason. He concluded, therefore, that a portion of the invading army would be distributed in the upper country, after its conquest, amongst the places susceptible of military strength and defence. The army, considerably reduced, sets itself down before Quebec. Suppose it falls. Here again will be required a

number of men to hold and defend it. And if the war be prosecuted still further, and the lower country and Halifax be assailed, he conceived it obvious, that the whole force of twentyfive thousand men would not be too great.

The difference between those who were for fifteen thousand, and those who were for twenty-five thousand men, appeared to him to resolve itself into the question, merely, of a short or protracted war; a war of vigor, or a war of languor and imbecility. If a competent force be raised in the first instance, the war on the continent will be speedily terminated. He was aware that it might still rage on the ocean. But where the nation could act with unquestionable success, he was in favor of the display of an energy correspondent to the feelings and spirit of the country. Suppose one third of the force he had mentioned (twenty-five thousand men) could reduce the country, say in three years, and that the whole could accomplish the same object in one year; taking into view the greater hazard of the repulsion and defeat of the small force, and every other consideration, do not wisdom and true economy equally decide in favor of the larger force, and thus prevent failure in consequence of inadequate means? He begged gentlemen to recollect the immense extent of the United States; our vast maritime frontier, vulnerable in almost all its parts to predatory incursions, and he was persuaded, they would see that a regular force, of twenty-five thousand men, was not much too great during a period of war, if all designs of invading the provinces of the enemy were abandoned.

Mr. Clay proceeded next to examine the nature of the force contemplated by the bill. It was a regular army, enlisted for a limited time, raised for the sole purpose of war, and to be disbanded on the return of peace. Against this army, all our republican jealousies and apprehensions are attempted to be excited. He was not the advocate of standing armies; but the standing armies which excite most his fears, are those which are kept up in time of peace. He confessed, he did not perceive any real source of danger in a military force of twenty-five thousand men in the United States, provided only for a state of war, even supposing it to be corrupted, and its arms turned, by the ambition of its leaders, against the freedom of the country. He saw abundant security against the success of any such treasonable attempt. The diffusion of political information amongst the great body of the people, constituted a powerful safeguard. The American character has been much abused by Europeans, whose tourists, whether on horse or foot, in verse and prose, have united in depreciating it. It is true, that we do not exhibit as many signal instances of scientific acquirement in this country as are furnished in the old world; but he believed it undeniable, that the great mass of the people possessed more intelligence than any other people on the globe. Such a people, consisting of upwards of seven millions, affording