The following description of the Baker H. Micument and Square is from Mr. Frottingham's Estary of the Sege of Boston, pp. 50 SA two hundred feet west of the mortment. trees • The obelisk is thirty feet in Eameter at the base, about fineen feet at the wo of the tru *Monument Scuare is four hundred and cated part, and was desired to be two hundred seventeen feet from serta to seath, and four and twenty feet high: but the morrar and the hundred feet from east to west, and contains seams between the stones make the precise Dearly I acres. It embraces the whole site of height two hundred and twenty-ne feet. Withthe redrone, and a part of the site of the breast in the shaft is a bouew cene, with a spiral stain Work Acmed us to the most accurate plan of way winding round it to its suman with the town and the barble Page's, the mecamest enters a circular chamber at the tro There are stands where the motivert izle of the red sabe ninety courses of stone in the shaft. — six of was, and the whole of the redoubt was between them below the greand, and eighty-four above the monument and the street that bounds it on the ground. The capstone, or apex. 3 a single the west. The small mound in the northeast stone four feet square at the base, and three feet corner of the square is supposed to be the re-six inches in height, weighing two and a half mains of the breastwork. Warren fell about toms." OUR RELATIONS TO THE SOUTH AMERICAN REPUBLICS. EXTFACTS FROM THE SPEECH ON THE PANAMA MISSION," DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES, ON THE 14TH OF APRIL, 1826. our own interests. Our neutrality is not a predetermined abstinence, either from remonstrances, or from force. Our neu trality, that defends neutrality, that takes up arms, if need be, for neutrality. When it is said, therefore, that this measure departs from our neutral policy, either that policy, or the measure itself, is misunderstood. It implies either that the object or the tendency of the measure is to involve us in the war of other states, which I think cannot be shown, or that the assertion of our own sentiments, on points affecting deeply our own interests, may place us in a hostile attitude toward other states, and that therefore we depart from neutrality; whereas the truth is, that the decisive assertion and the firm support of these sentiments may be most essential to the maintenance of neutrality. IT has been affirmed, that this measare, and the sentiments expressed by the Executive relative to its objects, are an acknowledged departure from the neutral policy is a policy that protects neutral policy of the United States. Sir, I deny that there is an acknowledged departure, or any departure at all, from the neutral policy of the country. What do we mean by our neutral policy? Not, I suppose, a blind and stupid indifference to whatever is passing around us; not a total disregard to approaching events, or approaching evils, till they meet us full in the face. Nor do we mean, by our neutral policy, that we intend never to assert our rights by force. No, Sir. We mean by our policy of neutrality, that the great objects of national pursuit with us are connected with peace. We covet no provinces; we desire no conquests; we entertain no ambitious projects of aggrandizement by war. This is our policy. But it does not follow from this, that we rely less than other nations on our own power to vindicate our own rights. We know that the last logic of kings is also our last logic; that our own interests must be defended and maintained by our own arm; and that peace or war may not always be of our own choosing. Our neutral policy, therefore, not only justifies, but requires, our anxious attention to the political events which take place in the world, a skilful perception of their relation to our own concerns, and an early anticipation of their consequences, and firm and timely assertion of what we hold to be our own rights and An honorable member from Pennsylvania thinks this congress will bring a dark day over the United States. Doubtless, Sir, it is an interesting moment in our history; but I see no great proofs of thick-coming darkness. But the object of the remark seemed to be to show that the President himself saw difficulties on all sides, and, making a choice of evils, preferred rather to send ministers to this congress, than to run the risk of exciting the hostility of the states by refusing to send. In other words, the gentleman wished to prove that the President intended an alliance; although such intention is expressly disclaimed. Much commentary has been bestowed on the letters of invitation from the ministers. I shall not go through with verbal criticisms on these letters. Their general import is plain enough. I shall not gather together small and minute quotations, taking a sentence here, a word there, and a syllable in a third place, dovetailing them into the course of remark, till the printed discourse bristles in every line with inverted commas. I look to the general tenor of the invitations, and I find that we are asked to take part only in such things as concern ourselves. I look still more carefully to the answers, and I see every proper caution and proper guard. I look to the message, and I see that nothing is there contemplated likely to involve us in other men's quarrels, or that may justly give offence to any foreign state. With this I am satisfied. I must now ask the indulgence of the committee to an important point in the discussion, I mean the declaration of the President in 1823. Not only as a member of the House, but as a citizen of the country, I have an anxious desire that this part of our public history should stand in its proper light. The country has, in my judgment, a very high honor connected with that occurrence, which we may maintain, or which we may sacrifice. I look upon it as a part of its treasures of reputation; and, for one, I intend to guard it. Sir, let us recur to the important political events which led to that declaration, or accompanied it. In the fall of 1822, the allied sovereigns held their congress at Verona. The great subject of consideration was the condition of Spain, that country then being under the government of the Cortes. The ques tion was, whether Ferdinand should be reinstated in all his authority, by the intervention of foreign force. Russia, Prussia, France, and Austria were inclined to that measure; England dissented and protested; but the course was agreed on, and France, with the consent of these other Continental powers, took the conduct of the operation into her own hands. In the spring of 1823, a French army was sent into Spain. Its success was complete. The popular government was overthrown, and Ferdinand re-established in all his power. This invasion, Sir, was determined on, and undertaken, precisely on the doctrines which the allied monarchs had proclaimed the year before, at Laybach; that is, that they had a right to interfere in the concerns of another state, and reform its government, in order to prevent the effects of its bad example; this bad example, be it remembered, always being the example of free government. Now, Sir, acting on this principle of supposed dangerous example, and having put down the example of the Cortes in Spain, it was natural to inquire with 1 In the message of President Monroe to ened citizens, and under which we have en Congress at the commencement of the session joyed such unexampled felicity, this whole of 1823-24, the following passage occurs: - nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to "In the wars of the European powers, in mat- candor, and to the amicable relations existing ters relating to themselves, we have never between the United States and those powers, to taken any part, nor does it comport with our declare that we should consider any attempt on policy so to do. It is only when our rights their part to extend their system to any portion are invaded, or seriously menaced, that we re- of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace sent injuries or make preparations for defence. and safety. With the existing colonies or deWith the movements in this hemisphere we are pendencies of any European power, we have of necessity more immediately connected, and not interfered, and shall not interfere. But by causes which must be obvious to all enwith the governments who have declared their lightened and impartial observers. The politi- independence and maintained it, and whose incal system of the Allied Powers is essentially dependence we have on great consideration and different, in this respect, from that of America. on just principles acknowledged, we could not This difference proceeds from that which exists view any interposition for the purpose of opin their respective governments. And to the pressing them, or controlling in any other mandefence of our own, which has been achieved ner their destiny, in any other light than as the by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and manifestation of an unfriendly disposition to matured by the wisdom of their most enlight-ward the United States." what eyes they would look on the colo- | taken a decided course; for as early as nies of Spain, that were following still worse examples. Would King Ferdinand and his allies be content with what had been done in Spain itself, or would he solicit their aid, and was it likely they would grant it, to subdue his rebellious American provinces? Sir, it was in this posture of affairs, on an occasion which has already been alluded to, that I ventured to say, early in the session of December, 1823, that these allied monarchs might possibly turn their attention to America; that America came within their avowed doctrine, and that her examples might very possibly attract their notice. The doctrines of Laybach were not limited to any continent. Spain had colonies in America, and having reformed Spain herself to the true standard, it was not impossible that they might see fit to complete the work by reconciling, in their way, the colonies to the mother country. Now, Sir, it did so happen, that, as soon as the Spanish king was completely re-established, he invited the co-operation of his allies in regard to South America. In the same month of December, of 1823, a formal invitation was addressed by Spain to the courts of St. Petersburg, Vienna, Berlin, and Paris, proposing to establish a conference at Paris, in order that the plenipotentiaries there assembled might aid Spain in adjusting the affairs of her revolted provinces. These affairs were proposed to be adjusted in such manner as should retain the sovereignty of Spain over them; and though the co-operation of the allies by force of arms was not directly solicited, such was evidently the object aimed at. The king of Spain, in making this request to the members of the Holy Alliance, argued as it has been seen he might argue. He quoted their own doctrines of Laybach; he pointed out the pernicious example of America; and he reminded them that their success in Spain itself had paved the way for successful operations against the spirit of liberty on this side of the Atlantic. The proposed meeting, however, did not take place. England had already October, Mr. Canning, in a conference with the French minister in London, informed him distinctly and expressly, that England would consider any foreign interference, by force or by menace, in the dispute between Spain and the colonies, as a motive for recognizing the latter without delay. It is probable this determination of the English government was known here at the commencement of the session of Congress; and it was under these circumstances, it was in this crisis, that Mr. Monroe's declaration was made. It was not then ascertained whether a meeting of the Allies would or would not take place, to concert with Spain the means of re-establishing her power; but it was plain enough they would be pressed by Spain to aid her operations; and it was plain enough, also, that they had no particular liking to what was taking place on this side of the Atlantic, nor any great disinclination to interfere. This was the posture of affairs; and, Sir, I concur entirely in the sentiment expressed in the resolu tion of a gentleman from Pennsylvania,1 that this declaration of Mr. Monroe was wise, seasonable, and patriotic. Our It has been said, in the course of this debate, to have been a loose and vague declaration. It was, I believe, sufficiently studied. I have understood, from good authority, that it was considered, weighed, and distinctly and decidedly approved, by every one of the President's advisers at that time. government could not adopt on that occasion precisely the course which England had taken. England threatened the immediate recognition of the provinces, if the Allies should take part with Spain against them. We had already recognized them. It remained, therefore, only for our government to say how we should consider a combination of the Allied Powers, to effect objects in America, as affecting ourselves; and the message was intended to say, what it does say, that we should regard such combination as dangerous to us. Sir, I agree with those who maintain the 1 Mr. Markley. |