the indirect and direct Intervention of subjects of a neutral State in a war. During the recent civil war in the United States of North America, in which England observed a strict neutrality, the principles of International Law, which England had for a long period of time upholden and enforced when belligerent, were put to a severe trial. Several grave questions of International Law were raised and discussed during this great civil war. Among them were thefollowing :-(1.) The RECOGNITION of revolted States as de facto Governments by a neutral Power. All the neutral States recognized the Southern Confederacy as a de facto Government, so far as belligerent rights and neutral obligations were concerned. But they did not accredit diplomatic agents to this de facto Government. It would have been perfectly competent to them to have done so without any breach of neutral duty (e), and indeed if any precedent for such a step had been wanting, it would have been found in the conduct of the United States, who had always exercised their right, both of recognizing without delay as de facto Governments the Colonies in America which had revolted from European kingdoms, and of sending diplomatic representatives to them. President Grant, in his mes (e) More especially as the greatest conflict of opinion prevailed amongst the highest American authorities on the vital point of the liberty of a State to separate herself from the Union. 1860. President Buchanan asserts that Congress has no power to coerce a State which wishes to withdraw from the Union.-Ann. Reg. p. 283. 1865. President Johnson: "It is not one of the rights of any State Government to renounce its own place in the Union."-Ann. Reg. p. 293. 1867. President Johnson: "Candour compels me to declare, there is no Union as our fathers understood the term."-Ann. Reg. p. 291. แ sage to Congress, 1869, said: "The people and Go"vernment of the United States entertain the same 66 warm feelings and sympathies for the people of "Cuba, in their pending struggle, that they mani"fested throughout the previous struggles between Spain and her former colonies in behalf of the "latter. But the contest has at no time assumed "the conditions which amount to a war in the sense "of International Law, or which would show the "existence of a de facto political organization of "the insurgents, sufficient to justify a recognition of belligerency. "The principle is maintained, however, that this "nation is its own judge when to accord the rights "of belligerency, either to a people struggling to "free themselves from a Government they believe to "be oppressive, or to independent nations at war "with each other" (ƒ). ENVOY on board a (2.) The INVIOLABILITY OF AN neutral ship on the high seas (g). which, whatever doubt might once have existed respecting it, must now be considered as settled in the affirmative by the consent of all civilized nations. (3.) As to BLOCKADE and CONTRABAND, the rights of the belligerent and the obligations of a neutral with respect to them were fully enforced, though the blockade was on a most gigantic scale, pressed most severely upon neutral commerce, and inflicted especial distress upon the manufacturing population of England. X. (4.) There remains one question of the (f) Ann. Reg. 1869, pp. 305, 306. (g) See vol. ii. pt. vi. ch. ii. as to Ambassadors generally. gravest importance, namely, the RESPONSIBILITY OF A STATE FOR (h) THE ACTS OF HER CITIZENS, involving the duty of a neutral to prevent armaments and ships of war issuing from her shores for the service of a belligerent, though such armaments were furnished and ships were equipped, built, and sent without the knowledge, and contrary to the orders, of her Government. The question to what extent the State is responsible for the private acts of its subjects (civitasne deliquerit an cives?) is one of the most important and interesting parts of the law which governs the relations of independent States. The subject is discussed in these volumes, but the following proposi tions may be recapitulated here. It is a maxim of general law, that so far as foreign States are concerned, the will of the subject must be considered as bound up in that of his Sovereign. It is also a maxim that each State has a right to expect from another the observance of international obligations, without regard to what may be the municipal means which it possesses for enforcing this ob servance. The act of an individual citizen, or of a small number of citizens, is not to be imputed without clear proof to the Government of which they are subjects. A Government may by knowledge and sufferance, as well as by direct permission, become responsible for the acts of subjects whom it does not prevent from the commission of an injury to a foreign State. A Government is presumed to be able to restrain the subject within its territory from contravening (h) Pt. iv. ch. i. of this volume. the obligations of neutrality to which the State is bound. The principal matters which have at various times and in various forms given rise to complaints on the part of belligerents with respect to the conduct of the neutral States are (I pass over, in this brief notice, the question as to loans of money): (1.) The furnishing from a neutral territory arms, ammunition, and the various articles which are, according to the circumstances, to be considered as contraband. (2.) The enlistment of soldiers or sailors in a neutral territory to be employed in the service of a belligerent. (3.) The furnishing ships of war to a belligerent. It is important to remember, in the consideration of these matters, not only what the reason of the thing might suggest, but what the usage of States has sanctioned. Having regard to the reason of the thing, it may seem very difficult to draw any distinction between the duty of a neutral Government with respect to the enlistment within the territory of military forces on behalf of a belligerent, and the permission to supply within the territory munitions of war to a belligerent. To furnish cannon may be often as great an assistance as to furnish men to the belligerent. "Verum "est dictum," says Grotius, " in hostium esse partibus qui ad bellum necessaria hosti administrat;" and in the Mémoire justificatif (i) it will be seen that (i) Mémoire justificatif pour servir de réponse à l'exposé des motifs de la conduite du roi de France relativement à l'Angleterre (Miscellaneous Works of Edward Gibbon, ed. 1854, vol. v. p. 1), written by Gibbon, by desire of England then considered that the permission accorded by the French Government for the export of munitions of war from French ports to the revolted American colonies (la licence effrénée d'un commerce illégitime) was alleged as one justifying cause of the war which England had then declared against France. France and some other States have provided (j), by their municipal or constitutional law, that no munitions of war shall be fabricated without the "autori"sation" of the Minister of War, and that their exportation may be forbidden generally, or for a particular period or destination. But with respect to the established modern usage of nations, undoubtedly a clear and decided practical distinction between these things is very generally, though not universally, made, and thus while foreign enlistment is strenuously prohibited as inconsistent with neutrality by the United States, the sale of contraband goods at home, and the carriage of them subject to the liability of seizure, are as strenuously insisted upon as being consistent with neutrality. "There is nothing" (says the high authority of Mr. Justice Story), "in our laws, or in the laws of "nations, that forbids our citizens from sending "armed vessels, as well as munitions of war, to foreign ports for sale. It is a commercial adven"ture which no nation is bound to prohibit, and "which only exposes the persons engaged in it to "the penalty of confiscation" (k). England, how Lord Chancellor Thurlow, and Lord Weymouth, Secretary of State in 1778. Ib. vol. i. p. 234. () See pt. iv. ch. i. of this volume. (k) The Santissima Trinidad, Wheaton's Rep. vii. p. 340. |