might be chosen as the vehicle-and the dyestuffs bill itself may have barely escaped being made the choice. Secondly, a scheme of taxation so profoundly affecting governmental finance should receive greater consideration than it might be accorded if it were served up as a mere rider to a minor measure. Thirdly, legislation of such a character and so general application should originate in the House and not in the Senate. The House never takes kindly to any usurpation of its functions, and with respect to a matter of this kind it would stand on its constitutional right. It is interesting to note, however, that sales tax legislation is under serious consideration at the Capitol, and it is bound to bob up in some form. If Senator Watson of Indiana, who is filling admirably the shoes of Senator Penrose as acting chairman of Finance, succeeds in steering the tariff bills through without this menacing rider, he will have done well. GIVING POWER TO THE TARIFF

COMMISSION.

Should the dyestuffs bill become law in about its Senate form, it will be noteworthy as making the Tariff Commission a powerful administrative branch of the Government. It is a high compliment to the Commission that the Senate committee has been willing to entrust it with such powers as are contemplated in the Watson bill, as it may be called. Republicans feel more kindly toward the Commission, now that Dr. Taussig is off it; for while such a point of view may smack of injustice to the distinguished economist, much of whose work as a Tariff Commissioner has

been monumental, it must be admitted that many influential protectionists in Congress regarded him with distrust. Nevertheless, the Tariff Commission has rendered invaluable service to Congress through its researches and reports, and that body is now convinced that its members are prepared to administer the dyestuffs act in the spirit in which it has been formulated. This spirit is best illustrated in a section of the bill which in itself contains language unusual in a measure of this kind. Section 518 reads as follows: "That it is hereby expressly declared to be the intent of the Congress in enacting this act to build up, develop, and protect the dyestuffs manufacturing industry in the United States and its possessions, and that each and every of the foregoing sections shall be so construed as to effectuate such intent." While incidentally it may be remarked that these phrases commit every statesman voting for the bill to the principle of protection, the main purpose of this section is to direct the Tariff Commission, in cases of doubt or dispute, to decide them with reference to the welfare of the American chemical industry and not of the importer or the user of dyes. Thus the Tariff Commission in advance is given the backing of Congress in such decisions as it may render in conformity with the provivisions of the act.

TO ADMINISTER THE EMBARGO.

The Senate amendment provides that for three years after the enactment no (enumerated) dye or intermediate shall be admitted into the United States or any of its posses

sions unless the Tariff Commission shall determine that such article or a satisfactory substitute therefor is not obtainable in the United States or its possessions on reasonable terms as to quality, price and delivery; and, furthermore, that such article is required for use by an actual consumer. To be of reasonable quality it must be capable of giving in use results substantially equal to a corresponding article of foreign origin. A reasonable price is one which, in the judgment of the Tariff Commission, shall be sufficient to ensure the maintenance of production of the article. "by an efficient plant" on a commercial scale. A reasonable quantity is six months' supply. Substitutes may not be imported unless it is determined by the Commission that they are for a use other than that to which the domestic article is put.

The distribution of chemicals and dyes whose admission is contemplated under a provision of the peace treaty is placed under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission. All wartime restrictions upon coal-tar products are continued for ninety days after the passage of the act, even though the peace treaty may have been ratified, also all licenses issued by the War Trade Board. The Commission is given full power to require information from manufacturers and to inspect their plants and books, but must regard all information so gained as confidential. A person who ships an article in interstate commerce in defiance of an order of the Commission may be fined $100 a day, and one who enters or attempts to enter an article except as provided

by the law, or who misrepresents or misstates facts may be penalized with a fine of $5000 and imprisoned for two years; and an importer may be put completely out of business by the Commission in its discretion.

The Commission is given $100,000 for the enforcement of the act, and is required at the end of ninety days to take over all the books and papers of the War Trade Board relating to the licensing of dyestuffs. The Senate committee expresses confidence that this system will adequately protect the chemical industry of the United States without imposing hardships upon consumers. In view of the embargo authorized by the bill, the committee is willing that the existing customs duties upon dyes and intermediates remain, thus aiding toward reasonable prices upon such goods as it may be found necessary to import. If this legislation is enacted, it is doubtful if Congress will further consider the Fordney or Smoot anti-dumping bills.

IS THIS THE BEST SOLUTION? The solution of the dyestuffs problem proposed in the Senate bill will hardly be found satisfactory all around. It will be roundly condemned in some quarters, not only as sacrificing the principle of protective duties but as providing an exceedingly slow and roundabout method of supplying colors to the consumer. It preserves the principle of the licensing system, for which Attorney General Palmer has contended, and rejects the plan of adequate customs duties, which Republicans regard as the essential basis of the protective system. But the anomalous situation created by this

hardly be found

bill has emphasized in the minds of many members of Congress the desirability of adopting the American market value as the basis of assessing duties, and thus avoiding resort to experimental devices which Congress is unlikely ever to embody in a permanent system. It is safe to say that whatever the merits of the dyestuffs bill as the two houses have tried to write it, a wholly different and more workable plan would have. been proposed had a Republican Congress and a Republican President been working together in the interest of scientific and systematic protection. As it is, the best hope for

the embargo system, with its Tariff Commission adjunct, is that it will function rapidly enough to safeguard the textile and other trades dependent on dyes, and with such thoroughness as to provide suitable protection where such is actually needed. The textile trade without question is facing serious competition and finds much of the world supply of raw materials in the hands of its foreign rivals. Congress has broader work cut out for it in the economic field than in even the important department of dyes and chemicals.

W. E. B.

ing high prices and the general condition of unrest that foments strike after strike.

The planting and fertilizing of the seeds of socialism and anarchy which had their inception way back in 1883, when the first successful attempt to wage a perpetual war between labor and capital was inaugurated, the untruthful assertions that the Republican party had become corrupt, the foolish cry of "reduce the surplus," all resulted in the election of Grover Cleveland in 1884. After a few years of Republican rule the cry to reduce. the surplus becomes chronic, but after a few months of complete Democratic rule there is no surplus to reduce.

The Democrats won the election of 1892 on a platform designed to smash the trusts, although the Wilson-Gor

man tariff law was not enacted until August, 1894; yet the fact that the opponents of an adequate tariff had for the first time since the Civil War obtained full control of the Government created a panic, and before the year closed the Cleveland free trade calamity had started with a rush.

Believing in the Democratic promise that no tariff would be passed to injure business, there was no loss of confidence immediately after Wilson's election in 1912. It was only after the American producers fully realized what a poisonous reptile the Committee on Ways and Means was hatching, that confidence was killed.

The key-note of Wilson's first administration was a competitive tariff, which really meant competition between foreign nations for the rich American trade, with the United States practically excluded. The development of foreign competition since October 3d, 1913, caused a startling decrease of American production (which lasted until the early summer of 1915, when the war babies began to grow), and the withdrawal of labor from peace products to make war necessities, decreased American production of our regular market. products. The blundering incompetency of the Democratic administration, both executive and legislative, which not only fully equipped our military forces but furnished more than ninety million extra pieces of personal clothing, etc., and continued this extravagance for six months after the armistice was signed (this surplus of supplies embraced food and forage of all kinds), the utter failure of our billion dollar aero-serv

ice still further reduced the legitimate products of peace.

To carry out this unreasoning extravagance, the shortage of workers became stringent, all were compelled to work. The right of choice was denied, all who refused, millionaires or tramps, were rounded up and arrested,-nobody objected; the patriotic spirit of the times extended everywhere and included everybody; a little tot would toddle into the house with a peach pit clutched in his chubby fist, "to win the war." The volume of work, the advance in wages, and the rise in prices were close comparisons. The numerous advances in wages made by the Government, that were not asked for, bore the ear marks of being a slightly camouflaged attempt to bribe the whole labor vote.

The enactment of the Adamson law; the sycohphantic four pen signature by the President; the Supreme Court decision that it was legal; the surrender of the railroads to their employes, which was caused by the general belief that the Government would not give them the necessary protection in case of a strike, all together made labor believe that they had the whiphand over capital and that President Wilson was in full sympathy with them. Consequently strike followed strike, all decreasing production.