manufacturers and their employes do if England and Japan, are allowed to undersell our manufactured goods in our home market as they can do under the present low tariff because of the abnormal wage increases American labor has received during the war, increases which are far greater than those granted to English workers? In Japan, the traditional few cents a day paid laborers hasn't been increased much, because the Japanese, unfortunately for us, have the happy faculty of being satisfied with the same simple food and living their ancestors were accustomed to hundreds of years ago. We, on the other hand, demand that our luxuries and pleasures keep pace with our growing national wealth. The Jap has been quick to see the advantage, and travelers report a wonderful industrial boom in Nippon. Their historic policy of free trade should not blind Democrats, and especially level-headed northern Democrats, to industrial conditions. Widespread unemployment is increasing as our soldiers return to civilian life, while manufacturers, hampered by strikes for shorter hours or increased pay, have to keep one eye out for competing English and Japanese goods. The great world war has given, during the past four years, the greatest protection to American industry that could be asked for, but we are soon to encounter the competition of cheap foreign labor under the Underwood Tariff, whose blighting effects on American industry were being manifested with increasing force during the seven months before the Germans entered Belgium. As it is an ill wind that brings no man good, the party that enacted the Underwood Tariff was saved from crushing defeat in 1916 by the war in Europe that upset all normal conditions of international business. The blockade shut off all exports from Germany, and the Allied nations were turning all their energies to saving civilization and winning the war. There was a demand for all the goods we could make and no foreign competition, so that the pernicious tariff was impotent during the war to work evil to our industries. There will be an opportunity for patriotism in shaping tariff legislation. The Republicans have not enough votes to pass a bill over the President's veto, and he could hardly be expected to approve a bill coming to him as a party measure and opposed by his own party in Congress. The Presidential election is nineteen months away, and the world has not yet resumed peace conditions, but before November, 1920, the industries of manufacturing countries will have resumed their work sufficiently to give a new demonstration of the defects of our present tariff. Unless some radical legislation is effected by the present Congress, the tariff is likely to become again a dominant issue in the next national election. AMEND LEAGUE COVENANT. There still seems to be a great deal of misconception regarding the League of Nations, and the function of the United States Senate in regard to it. A large number of people seem to understand that the existence of the League of Nations depends upon the action of the Senate, which is now not true at all. The League of Nations treaty has been signed by so many nations that it exists as a League. The only question now before us is whether the United States shall become a party to the League, in its present form. I. Under the Federal Constitution, Article II, Section 2, treaties are to be made only "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,... provided two-thirds of the senators present concur." The vote of the Senate is absolutely essential, and it would be manifestly wrong for the Senate to vote otherwise than in accordance with its best judgment and honest convictions as part of the treaty making power. 2. The Monroe Doctrine is a good deal sneered at lately as an old relic of early United States history, but specifically it was that doctrine only which (a) Prevented England from imposing her will upon Venezuela, and (b) Has prevented German and Japanese colonization and establishment of naval bases in Mexico, and Central and South America. If there were nothing else to the credit of that doctrine, it would need no defence now. It is said that in the present draft of the League the Monroe Doctrine is saved to us, which is not true, because, in the first place the Monroe Doctrine is not a "regional understanding," and in the second place, the interpretation and application of the doctrine is taken from us and vested in foreigners. This country and Europe have had distinct policies for nearly 150 years. We have no interest or concern whatever in Europe, save as every good man is interested in morals generally. Our policy has been to "mind our own business," and we have insisted that Europe keep its "hands off." It is not because Washington, or Jefferson, or Monroe said so and so that we must now do or refuse, but because the principles which they stated were sound and have since been recognized as sound by all good men down to 1919. To make this country now a factor, or give the world to understand that it is hereafter to be an active factor in current European politics, would certainly be a very grave step for this country to take. 3. Human nature has not changed in essentials in the last 4000 years. It is said that some eighteen to twenty-five wars are now going on in Europe, and wars will in the future inevitably recur. They will stop only when the nations of the earth have developed higher characters and better moral sense, and this must come through the development of the individual citizen. In the meantime, we can arrange new paper promises, but we must not forget that they are only paper promises. 4. When among the fourteen points we read, "open covenants openly arrived at," many persons confidently hoped that there would be no more secret treaty making, and yet the present treaty was concluded and signed by the "Big Four" behind closed doors. Within recent years we have seen elaborate plans for the tribunal of the Hague, and much was expected, with the greatest confidence, from that tribunal. It is now practically forgotten. 5. The Constitution of the United States is probably the most perfectly drafted instrument of the kind in existence. It was a compact between numerous state sovereignties, making up one national whole, with the greatest natural inducements and desires possible to live. harmoniously together, and yet neither the situation itself nor the text of the covenant was sufficient to avert the struggle of 1861. These afford illustrations of the difference between the written promise from which we hope, and the performance from which we realize. 6. There is, of course, every reason why this country and England should be friends, and yet we have been either actually at war, or upon the very verge of war, with England several times. 7. Joining the League, in its present form, subverts our Federal Constitution. The provision of our Constitution as to amendments, is that proposed amendments must be submitted to and ratified by twothirds of the States. The Constitution provides specifically as to our Army and Navy, and as to declaring war, those powers being in Congress. The proposition now is that the President and two-thirds of the senators (present and voting) shall complete a treaty putting the control of (a) our Army and Navy as to size, and (b) our declaring or entering upon war, in the League of Nations. This is practically amending the United States United States Constitution in a vital respect, without submission of the question to any State, and would be a grave mistake, first because a very bad precedent, and second because no foreigner on earth should have anything whatever to say about either the size of our Army, or our going to war. 8. Consider a practical test: If we join the League we are expected to state the size of our Army and Navy. Assume that we fix that size at some reasonable figure. Assume that Mexico or Japan then commits some new outrage, and we need our Army or Navy, or both, and quick. If either proves insufficient, what are we to do? We can only apply to the League for permission to increase it, and wait through three, four, five or six months for a decision. Does anyone for a moment think that either Mexico or Japan would also wait for that decision? The Lord only knows what might not happen while we were waiting in accordance with our treaty obligations. 9. There are a number of purely United States questions, such as our Monroe Doctrine, our immigration laws, our naturalization laws, our tariff laws, and our labor laws. Under our present system we judge these matters for ourselves, we announce our policies, and the world thus far has respected them. The League Covenant proposes to put the interpretation and the application of these matters in the Council of the League, and this country is asked further to yield (under Article XXIII) to the Council, entire supervision of the trade in opium and drugs, and in arms and munitions, also the traffic in women and children. 10. Under Article X we are asked to guarantee the political integrity of all the other nations. This means that we undertake to fight at any time, on land or sea, and it would even compel us to send our ships and men to protect Japan in her control of Shantung and many million Chinamen stolen by the conferees at Versailles from China, and presented to Japan as part of her spoils of victory, a disgrace to all participants and to the United States for consenting. II. A serious question arises in connection with Articles XX and XXI of the League. Under Article XX, all prior treaties inconsistent with the League, are repealed. Un der Article XXI "treaties of arbitration" are preserved. Assume, now, any one of hundreds of existing treaties covering various subjects, and containing arbitration clauses. Are those treaties, so far as inconsistent, repealed, or are they, because containing arbitration clauses preserved? Who is to answer this question? How can anyone find out? Would it not be well, by amendment, to clarify this situation somewhat, so that at least all the good which may be in existing treaties may be certainly, and not uncertainly preserved to us? 12. Under Article IV of the League, "The Council may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League, or affecting the peace of the world." If A gives B a power of attorney to "deal with any matter relating to his affairs and business," it is a very full power of attorney, and A must stand by what B does, or repudiate his action and fight. National sovereignties should be careful how they give that kind of power of attorney. 13. There are some who say, "Let us join in the interest of harmony, and if it doesn't work we can withdraw." The trouble with this proposition is that we should be in for two years at any rate. After that time, under Article I, we could withdraw on two years notice, provided, "all [our] international obligations, and all [our] obligations under this Covenant shall have been fulfilled at the time of [our] withdrawal." But who is to say whether all our international obligations and all our obligations under the League Covenant, have or have not been tulfilled? Apparently a lot of foreigners. Suppose one or more vote that we have not performed some international obligation or some League Covenant, and, therefore, could not withdraw, and it were thus made entirely problematical whether we had withdrawn or not. Wouldn't that be a sweet situation? 14. There are those who say that we should now join the League, and then seek to perfect it by the necessary amendments, but under Article XXVI an amendment can be made only when ratified by all the members of the League having representatives on the Council, and by a majority of the members of the League having representatives in the Assembly. Thus no amendment would be possible unless England, Japan, and Italy say so. Does it not seem highly probable that any amendment which this country might want, in its interest, would be likely to be opposed by one of those three interests and thereby defeated? 15. There is another practical difficulty arising from our system of government. If the United States joins the present League, it will be expected to appoint a representative on the Council. How shall this United States representative be chosen? Under the Federal Constitution (Article II, Section 2) the President "shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassa dors, other public ministers, and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law." If the treaty be ratified, there will be another office provided by law, and there will have to be an appointment to this office. But where is there any provision of law as to the control over this representative when appointed by any power in this country, or as to his tenure of office? The appointee will be the representative of the United States in the League. His vote will bind this country whenever, and however, and to whatever end given, and once appointed and confirmed he would apparently be the representative for life, and subject to no control whatever. It does not require much imagination to foresee from the present Administration, a possibly unfortunate appointment to a position of almost limitless power. 16. How little reliance is placed upon the present treaty by Great Britain, France, and President Wilson, is shown by the separate treaties negotiated, one between France and the United States, and the other between France and Great Britain, both dated June 28, 1919, and the recitals of those treaties. This separate proposed treaty between France and the United States frankly recites the doubts felt as to whether the German treaty and the League of Nations will adequately protect France along the Rhine, and it proposes to |