John C. Calhoun on the Rights of the terpose for arresting the progress of the States. Delivered July 26, 1831. The question of the relation which the states and general government bear to each other, is not one of recent origin. From the commencement of our system, it has divided public sentiment. Even in the convention, while the Constitution was struggling into existence, there were two parties, as to what this relation should be, whose different sentiments constituted no small impediment in forming that instrument. After the general government went into operation, experience soon proved that the question had not terminated with the labors of the convention. The great struggle that preceded the political revolution of 1801, which brought Mr. Jefferson into power, turned essentially on it; and the doctrines and arguments on both sides were embodied and ably sustained; on the one, in the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions and the report to the Virginia legislature; and on the other, in the replies of the legislature of Massachusetts and some of the other states. These resolutions and this report, with the decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania about the same time (particularly in the case of Cobbett, delivered by Chief Justice McKean, and concurred in by the whole bench), contain what I believe to be the true doctrine on this important subject. I refer to them in order to avoid the necessity of presenting my views, with the reasons in support of them in detail. As my object is simply to state my opinions, I might pause with this reference to documents that so fully and ably state all the points immediately connected with this deeply important subject; but as there are many who may not have the opportunity or leisure to refer to them, and, as it is possible, however clear they may be, that different persons may place different interpretations on their meaning, I will, in order that my sentiments may be fully known, and to avoid all ambiguity, proceed to state, summarily, the doctrines which I conceive they embrace. The great and leading principle is, that the general government emanated from the people of the several states, forming distinct political communities, and acting in their separate and sovereign capacity, and not from all of the people forming one aggregate political community; that the Constitution of the United States is in fact a compact, to which each state is a party, in the character already described; and that the several states, or parties, have a right to judge of its infractions, and in case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of power not delegated, they have the right, in the last resort, to use the language of the Virginia resolutions; "to in evil, and for maintaining, within their respective limits, the authorities, rights, and liberties appertaining to them." This right of interposition thus solemnly asserted by the state of Virginia, be it called what it may-state right, veto, nullification, or by any other name I conceive to be the fundamental principle of our system, resting on facts, historically as certain as our revolution itself, and deductions as simple and demonstrative as that of any political or moral truth whatever; and I firmly believe that on its recognition depends the stability and safety of our political institutions. I I am not ignorant that those opposed to the doctrine have always, now and formerly, regarded it in a very different light, as anarchical and revolutionary. Could I believe such in fact to be its tendency, to me it would be no recommendation. I yield to none, I trust, in a deep and sin cere attachment to our political institutions, and the union of these states. never breathed an opposite sentiment; but, on the contrary, I have ever considered them the great instruments of preserving our liberty, and promoting the happiness of ourselves and our posterity; and next to these, I have ever held them most dear. Nearly half my life has passed in the service of the Union, and whatever public reputation I have acquired, is indissolubly identified with it. To be too national has, indeed, been considered, by many, even of my friends, to be my greatest political fault. With these strong feelings of attachment, I have examined, with the utmost care, the bearing of the doctrine in question; and so far from anarchical or revolutionary, I solemnly believe it to be the only solid foundation of our system, and of the Union itself, and that the opposite doctrine, which denies to the states the right of protecting their reserved powers, and which would vest in the general gov ernment (it matters not through what department) the right of determining exclusively and finally the powers delegated to it, is incompatible with the sovereignty of the states, and of the Constitution itself, considered as the basis of a Federal Union. As strong as this language is, it is not stronger than that used by the illustrious Jefferson, who said, to give to the general government the final and exclusive right to judge of its powers, is to make "its discretion and not the Constitution the measure of its powers;" and that "in all cases of compact between parties having no common judge, each party has an equal right to judge for itself, as well of the operation, as of the mode and measure of redress." Language cannot be more explicit; nor can higher authority be adduced. That different opinions are entertained against the unequal action of the laws, when applied to dissimilar and opposing interests, is in fact what mainly renders a constitution indispensable; to overlook which in reasoning on our Constitution, would be to omit the principal element by which to determine its character. Were there no contrariety of interests, nothing would be more simple and easy than to form and preserve free institutions. The right of suffrage alone would be a sufficient guarantee. It is the conflict of opposing interests which renders it the most difficult work of man. on this subject, I consider but as an addi- | where, the great difficulty of forming and tional evidence of the great diversity of preserving free institutions. To guard the human intellect. Had not able, experienced, and patriotic individuals, for whom I have the highest respect, taken different views, I would have thought the right too clear to admit of doubt; but I am taught by this, as well as by many similar instances, to treat with deference opinions differing from my own. The error may possibly be with me; but, if so, I can only say, that after the most mature and conscientious examination, I have not been able to detect it. But with all proper deference, I must think that theirs is the error, who deny what seems to be an essential attribute of the conceded sovereignty of the states; and who attribute to the general government a right utterly incompatible with what all acknowledge to be its limited and restricted character; an error originating principally, as I must think, in not duly reflecting on the nature of our institutions, and on what constitutes the only rational object of all political constitutions. In Where the diversity of interests exists in separate and distinct classes of the community, as is the case in England, and was formerly the case in Sparta, Rome, and most of the free states of antiquity, the rational constitutional provision is, that each should be represented in the government as a separate estate, with a distinct voice, and a negative on the acts of its co-estates, in order to check their encroachments. It has been well said by one of the most England the constitution has assumed exsagacious men of antiquity, that the object pressly this form, while in the governments of a constitution is to restrain the govern-of Sparta and Rome the same thing was ment, as that of laws is to restrain indi- effected, under different but not much viduals. The remark is correct, nor is it less efficacious forms. The perfection of less true where the government is vested their organization, in this particular, was in a majority, than where it is in a single that which gave to the constitutions of or a few individuals; in a republic, than these renowned states all of their celebrity, a monarchy or aristocracy. No one can which secured their liberty for so many have a higher respect for the maxim that centuries, and raised them to so great a the majority ought to govern than I have, height of power and prosperity. Indeed, taken in its proper sense, subject to the a constitutional provision giving to the restrictions imposed by the Constitution, great and separate interests of the commuand confined to subjects in which every nity the right of self-protection, must apportion of the community have similar pear to those who will duly reflect on the interests; but it is a great error to suppose, subject, not less essential to the preservaas many do, that the right of a majority to tion of liberty than the right of suffrage govern is a natural and not a conventional itself. They in fact have a common obright; and, therefore, absolute and unlim-ject, to effect which the one is as necessary ited. By nature every individual has the as the other-to secure responsibility; that right to govern himself; and governments, is, that those who make and execute the whether founded on majorities or minorities, must derive their right from the assent, expressed or implied, of the governed, and be subject to such limitations as they may impose. Where the interests are the same, that is, where the laws that may benefit one will benefit all, or the reverse, it is just and proper to place them under the control of the majority; but where they are dissimilar, so that the law that may benefit one portion may be ruinous to another, it would be, on the contrary, unjust and absurd to subject them to its will: and such I conceive to be the theory on which our Constitution rests. laws should be accountable to those on whom the laws in reality operate; the only solid and durable foundation of liberty. If without the right to suffrage our rulers would oppress us, so without the right of self-protection, the major would equally oppress the minor interests of the community. The absence of the former would make the governed the slaves of the rulers, and of the latter the feebler interests the victim of the stronger. Happily for us we have no artificial and separate classes of society. We have wisely exploded all such distinctions; but we are not, on that account, exempt from all conThat such dissimilarity of interests may trariety of interests, as the present distractexist it is impossible to doubt. They are ed and dangerous condition of our country to be found in every community, in a unfortunately but too clearly proves. With greater or less degree, however small or us they are almost exclusively geographical, homogeneous, and they constitute, every-resulting mainly from difference of climate, soil, situation, industry, and production, | move in its prescribed orb, is the great and but are not, therefore, less necessary to be difficult problem, on the solution of which protected by an adequate constitutional the duration of our Constitution, of our provision than where the distinct interests Union, and, in all probability our liberty, exist in separate classes. The necessity is, depends. How is this to be effected? in truth, greater, as such separate and dissimilar geographical interests are more liable to come into conflict, and more dangerous when in that state than those of any other description; so much so, that ours is the first instance on record where they have not formed in an extensive territory separate and independent communities, or subjected the whole to despotic sway. That such may not be our unhappy fate also, must be the sincere prayer of every lover of his country. So numerous and diversified are the interests of our country, that they could not be fairly represented in a single government, organized so as to give to each great and leading interest a separate and distinct voice, as in governments to which I have referred. A plan was adopted better suited to our situation, but perfectly novel in its character. The powers of the government were divided, not as heretofore, in reference to classes, but geographically. One general government was formed for the whole, to which was delegated all of the powers supposed to be necessary to regulate the interests common to all of the states, leaving others subject to the separate control of the states, being from their local and peculiar character such that they could not be subject to the will of the majority of the whole Union, without the certain hazard of injustice and oppression. It was thus that the interests of the whole were subjected, as they ought to be, to the will of the whole, while the peculiar and local interests were left under the control of the states separately, to whose custody only they could be safely confided. This distribution of power, settled solemnly by a constitutional compact, to which all of the states are parties, constitutes the peculiar character and excellence of our political system. It is truly and emphatically American, without example or parallel. To realize its perfection, we must view the general government and the states as a whole, each in its proper sphere, sovereign and independent; each perfectly adapted to their respective objects; the states acting separately, representing and protecting the local and peculiar interests; acting jointly, through one general government, with the weight respectively assigned to each by the Constitution, representing and protecting the interest of the whole, and thus perfecting, by an admirable but simple arrangement, the great principle of representation and responsibility, without which no government can be free or just. To preserve this sacred distribution as originally settled, by coercing each to The question is new when applied to our peculiar political organization, where the separate and conflicting interests of society are represented by distinct but connected governments; but is in reality an old question under a new form, long since perfectly solved. Whenever separate and dissimilar interests have been separately represented in any government; whenever the sovereign power has been divided in its exercise, the experience and wisdom of ages have devised but one mode by which such political organization can be preserved; the mode adopted in England, and by all governments, ancient or modern, blessed with constitutions deserving to be called free; to give to each co-estate the right to judge of its powers, with a negative or veto on the acts of the others, in order to protect against encroachments the interests it particularly represents; a principle which all of our constitutions recognize in the distribution of power among their respective departments, as essential to maintain the independence of each, but which, to all who will duly reflect on the subject, must appear far more essential, for the same object, in that great and fundamental distribution of powers between the states and general government. So essential is the principle, that to withhold the right from either, where the sovereign power is divided, is, in fact, to annul the division itself, and to consolidate in the one left in the exclusive possession of the right, all of the powers of the government; for it is not possible to distinguish practically between a government having all power, and one having the right to take what powers it pleases. Nor does it in the least vary the principle, whether the distribution of power between coestates, as in England, or between distinctly organized but connected governments, as with us. The reason is the same in both cases, while the necessity is greater in our case, as the danger of conflict is greater where the interests of a society are divided geographically than in any other, as has already been shown. These truths do seem to me to be incontrovertible; and I am at a loss to understand how any one, who has maturely reflected on the nature of our institutions, or who has read history or studied the principles of free government to any purpose, can call them in question. The explanation must, it appears to me, be sought in the fact, that in every free state, there are those who look more to the necessity of maintaining power, than guarding against its abuses. I do not intend reproach, but |