Blatchf. Prize Cas. 382, Fed. Cas. No. 12,260; The Winifred (1861) Fed. Cas. No. 17,873; The Mary Clinton (1863) Blatchf. Prize Cas. 556, Fed. Cas. No. 9,203; The Lynchburg (1861) Blatchf. Prize Cas. 49, Fed. Cas. No. 8,637a, affirmed in Blatchf. Prize Cas. 659, Fed. Cas. No. 8,639), liens on the vessel for material and repairs (The Nassau (1863) Blatchf. Prize Cas. 665, Fed. Cas. No. 10,028, affirmed in 4 Wall. 634, 18 L. ed. 413; The Battle (1868) 6 Wall. 498, 18 L. ed. 933), the claim of the master of the vessel for advances to procure repairs and necessary supplies (The Velasco (1861) Blatchf. Prize Cas. 54, Fed. Cas. No. 16,910a), and a claim for alleged balances due a copartner (United States v. The Isaac Hammett (1862) Fed. Cas. No. 15,446); and see, also, as indorsing the general rule, The Ariel (1857) 11 Moore, P. C. C. 119, 2 Eng. P. C. 600; The Napoleon (1862) Blatchf. Prize Cas. 296, Fed. Cas. No. 10,012.

The law differs in this respect from the case of property seized as forfeited under the municipal laws of the state. The Nassau (1863) Blatchf. Prize Cas. 665, Fed. Cas. No. 10,028.

In none of the decisions has it been regarded as material whether the lien claimant was a citizen of the country making the capture or of a neutral country.

The doctrine that a person taking property takes it subject to existing obligations is not known in prize courts unless in very peculiar cases where the lien is imposed by a general law of the mercantile world independent of any contract between the parties, as in the case of freight upon enemy's goods seized in the vessel of a friend, which is always decreed to the owner of the vessel. "It is, to use the words of Sir W. Scott, 'an interest directly and visibly residing in the substance of the thing itself.' The possession of the property is actually in the owner of the ship, of which, by the general mercantile law of all nations, he cannot be deprived until the freight due for the carriage of it is paid. He has, in fact, a kind of property in the goods by force of this general law which a prize court ought to respect, and does respect. On the one hand, the captor, by stepping into the shoes of the enemy owner of the goods, is personally benefited by the labor of a friend, and ought, in justice, to make him the proper compensation; and, on the other, the shipowner, by not having carried the goods to the place of their destination, and this, in consequence of an act of the captor, would be totally without remedy to recover his freight against the owner of the goods." The Frances (1814) 8 Cranch, 418, 3 L. ed. 609.

In the case of liens created by the mere private contract of individuals, depending upon the different laws of different countries, the difficulties which an examination of such claims would impose upon the captors, and even upon the prize courts in deciding upon them, and the door which such a doctrine would open to collusion be

tween the enemy owners of the property and neutral claimants, have excluded such cases from the consideration of those courts. The Tobago (1804) 5 C. Rob. 218; The Frances, supra.

"Captors are supposed to lay their hands on the gross tangible property on which there may be many just claims outstanding between other parties which can have no operation as to them. If such a rule did not exist it would be quite impossible for captors to know upon what grounds they were proceeding to make any seizure. The fairest and most credible documents declaring the property to belong to the enemy would only serve to mislead them, if such documents were liable to be overruled by liens which could not in any manner come to their knowledge. It would be equally impossible for the court which has to decide upon the question of property to admit such considerations. The doctrine of liens depends very much on the particular rules of jurisprudence which prevail in different countries. To decide judicially on such claims would require of the court a perfect knowledge of the law of covenants and the application of that law in all countries under all the diversities in which that law exists. From necessity, therefore, the court would be obliged to shut the door against such discussions, and to decide on the simple title of property with scarcely any exceptions." The Marianna (1805) 6 C. Rob. 24, 1 Eng. P. C. 518.

Another reason which has been given is, that liens held by enemy subjects on neutral property are not subject to capture. The Tobago (1804) 5 C. Rob. 218.

See also, as to the grounds of the rule, The Hampton (1866) 5 Wall. 372, 18 L. ed. 659, as quoted at length in The Marie Glaeser, ante, 958.

But where the claimant has not a jus ad rem, but a jus in re, for the enforcement of which it would not be necessary to resort to a court of justice, the right of the claimant will be respected, as where goods purchased by the claimants were shipped under a bill of lading by which the master was bound to deliver the goods to their order, and they have ordered them to be delivered to themselves, their real character being that of trustees holding the legal title and possession with a right of retention until their advances should be paid. The Amy Warwick. (1862) 2 Sprague, 150, Fed. Cas. No. 343.

So, in United States v. The Arcola (1861) Fed. Cas. No. 14,464a, it was held that the considerations which lead prize courts to refuse to recognize liens on enemy property do not apply to the case of a mortgage of a vessel made before the outbreak of hostilities, and regularly recorded under the act of Congress, and indorsed on the certificate of enrolment, under which mortgage something more than a mere lien passes to the mortgagee.

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