Barneveld, and of penetrating the minds of the actors in his narrative. It is needless to say that his powerful genius has done justice to these new discoveries; that he has brought to light-a number of facts which had been unknown or were only guessed at; that he has added largely to the store of evidence on points already in part elucidated; and that his materials have been worked up in a singularly striking and brilliant manner. These volumes are a model of industry, and of patient, careful, and elaborate inquiry. They also display remarkable power in describing scenes and events in war, in bringing personages vividly before us, and in marking out the character of individuals. The episode of the siege of Antwerp, in the fifth chapter of the first volume, is a fine specimen of military narrative; and the portraits of Philip, and Alexander Farnese, of Guise, Henry III. and Henry IV. of France, will not easily fade from the memory.

The great merits of these volumes, however, are counterbalanced by several imperfections. It requires a mind of extraordinary grasp to arrange the masses of crude material which modern researches yield to the historian, and to place them in their proper significance. It is the natural result of the study of state papers to assign by far too important an influence to the actions and schemes of governments and statesmen, and to lose sight of the powerful effects of race, institutions, and national character. Speaking generally, too, this method of study induces most persons to overestimate the skill and power of organized despotism, and to underrate the resources of freedom in any really popular contest. In all these respects, Mr. Motley's volumes appear to us sometimes open to censure; and his work is not only confused in parts, ill-ordered and hampered with repetitions, but we think that he often has failed to perceive the true relation of facts and events,to judge justly of the forces of the antagonists in the struggle of 1584-8, to comprehend the real attitude of England, Spain, and the Provinces to each other, and to calculate fairly the probable chances involved in the memorable effort of Philip. We think, too, that his description of the relations between the Government of England and that of the Dutch in 1586-7, is marked with very great partiality; that he misunderstands the policy of Elizabeth in reference to the United Provinces; that his whole conception of the character of the Queen is one-sided, weak, and imperfect; that he does not give us an accurate notion of Leicester's mission and its results, and that he omits or distorts some facts which bear strongly on these interesting subjects. Moreover, we are not completely satisfied with the place he assigns to France as a power engaged in the drama he

Merits and Defects of the Work.

287

sets before us; and we think that his error in this particular has led him into several misconceptions. For these reasons we look with distrust at different parts of this brilliant narrative; and while we admit its fulness and splendour, we question not only some of its statements, but, in many respects, its effect and tendency. We should add, besides, that while Mr. Motley is a great master of the picturesque, and describes the external aspect of events with singular power, fidelity, and grace, he is not so skilful in comprehending the genius and bent of the age he deals with; that he is not subtle in catching the bearing of social, popular, and religious movements; and that some of his portraits are wanting in depth and real insight into individual character, though all of them are distinct and vigorous. And although, as a whole, the style of this book is manly, free, and often eloquent, it is sometimes dashed with a weak sarcasm, and a mocking but not effective irony which, we own, appear to us rather disagreeable. Mr. Motley, we think, need not have apologized for the large space he has given to the events of 1584-8. For these events involved in their issues not only the fate of the Europe of the age, but the destiny of three-fourths of the world as we see it after the lapse of three centuries. The struggle between the Provinces and Philip was a contest between the youthful forces of Protestantism, still immature and ill-organized, and Romanism, then apparently irresistible. It was also a contest between the spirit of freedom, justice, and good government, and the spirit of tyranny-civil and religious-at a crisis when the cause of humanity seemed hopeless to many who watched its progress. And, as it drew England within its sphere-the only power existing in Europe which could really cope with the Romanist reaction-so it marshalled within these eventful years the whole strength of the opposite parties, and sent them forth to a mortal encounter. The great triumph of 1588 arrested the progress of tyranny and priestcraft and from that time forward, though long retarded, and sometimes checked by antagonistic influences, the cause of freedom has gradually triumphed. The power of Spain declined sensibly immediately after the wreck of the Armada, and that of Catholicism, though slower to succumb, has become weakened and changed in spirit. On the other hand, England rapidly advanced as soon as her rule on the sea was established; and with her advance the power of Protestantism and that of freedom of conscience and action have steadily grown throughout Europe and the world. All round us, though ten generations intervene, we see the results of the memorable conflict which came to a crisis in 1588; and probably ten generations hence these results

will only be more developed. Where now is that power which spanned the world, which held three-fourths of Europe in its sway, which stretched its arms over either Indies, and spent its energies for nearly a century in forging the bonds of tyranny and superstition? Where now is that cruel and awful voice which shook heretic monarchs on their thrones, and banded together three parts of Europe in a wild crusade against infidel England? And what was the England of Queen Elizabeth-illustrious though she was among the nations-compared with that vast and advancing empire which girdles the world with its ships and its colonies, is throned in India from the Indus to the sea, and spreads its influences far and wide in all parts of the habitable world? The causes which led to the wonderful change which England and Spain have undergone since the last years of the sixteenth century ascend directly to 1588; and therefore we think an apology was needless for dwelling upon this great scene in history.

Mr. Motley's volumes open with a sketch of the state of Europe in 1584, when the dagger of Gerard aimed by Philip had cut short the life of William the Silent. For sixteen years the United Provinces had kept the forces of Spain at bay, and, notwithstanding the valour of Don John, the cruelties of Alva, and the genius of Parma, had never completely succumbed to their tyrant. But now the chief whose wisdom and skill had held the tottering States together, had checked dissension, and silenced opposition, was hurriedly swept away from the scene; and, like a machine whose mainspring is broken, the whole Republic's action was paralysed. Mr. Motley, though much too candid and fair to keep a single fact out of view, has, we think, exaggerated the status of the Provinces considered as a power of Europe at this juncture, and has over-estimated their means of resistance. To all Europe, and even to themselves, the fate of the States seemed well nigh desperate, and was aptly typified in a medal of the time, which compared them to a wreck reeling helmless in the storm. The entire Celtic region of the Netherlands, which had never embraced the Union firmly, seceded at once to the side of Philip, and the former barrier of the Republic became a post of vantage to its enemy. From this outwork the Prince of Parma was rapidly conquering Flanders and Brabant, and the towns on the Scheldt in quick succession were falling before his skill or his valour. In fact, at the close of 1584, nearly all the present kingdom of Belgium, except Antwerp and a narrow seaboard, had been subdued, or tempted to submission; and even beyond the Rhine and the Waal some important towns were held for the

Condition of the Netherlands.

289 King, and seemed to beckon him onward to victory. In four of the Seven Provinces of Holland* a Spanish party already proclaimed that further resistance would now be fruitless; and Parma's spies and emissaries assured him that his presence among them would cause their defection. It was really only in Holland and Zeeland-'that slight sand-hook attached to the Continent, those isles entangled in the coils of rivers'—that no thought of yielding existed; and few could suppose that this little territory, inhabited by its amphibious breed, could long resist the first general of the day, when backed by the veteran legions of Spain. Notwithstanding the treason of Celtic Flanders, and the dubious attitude of Gelderland and Groningen, it was felt that this scanty band of patriots would rather perish than yield to Philip; but Europe believed that a few months would see the end of the unequal contest. So certainly thought Alexander Farnese, and Philip from the depths of the Escurial, and Henry of Valois, and Catherine of Medicis; and so feared the statesmen of England as they met within the Cabinet of Elizabeth.

Nor were the material weakness of the States, and the terrors of doubt, distrust, and suspicion, their only perils at this fearful crisis. It was not only that in 1584 they had scarcely five thousand men in the field, that town after town on the Scheldt and the Senne was opening its gates to their powerful foe, and that fear and treachery were doing their work in breaking up their bond of cohesion. The sudden death of their great Dictator, whose genius had checked all real opposition, and given him uncontrolled authority, revealed at once the defects of a government which, parcelled out among several states united by only a federal tie, could never form a powerful executive, and was now reduced to impotent nothingness. Throughout each commonwealth of the Provinces authority centred in many hands whose union was needed to make it efficient, and the joint action of every commonwealth was required for any national movement. With such institutions, a real government which should act vigorously, promptly, and secretly was out of the question at a juncture when the minds of men were harassed and appalled by the presence of dangers that seemed irresistible; when numerous interests were set in collision by mutual fears, animosities, and suspicions; and when fidelity, honour, and patriotism were being rapidly sapped and subverted. The many-headed government of the States,' as Queen Elizabeth called it sarcastically, was little more than a broken anarchy, distracted by opposite passions and interests; and it seemed a chaos of discordant juntas without the * We use the term Holland here as contradistinguished from Belgium.

power of real coherence, conflicting in many important respects, and only linked by a general wish to get rid of the Spanish tyranny. In addition to this, religious discord came in aid to increase the general confusion. Catholicism was predominant in Belgium, and this influence had detached a third of the Union from the common alliance. In the rest of the Provinces two forms of Protestantism divided men into opposite sects, which viewed each other with jealous suspicion. The aristocracy and richer burghers, and, speaking generally, the upper classes in the States, inclined to what is termed Arminianism, while the great mass of the lower orders were steadily given to extreme Calvinism. Thus, beside the disunion and feebleness of the government, and the causes of civil separation in the governed, there existed throughout the Protestant States the mischief of fierce sectarian dissension.

Looking at these things, it appears certain that a vigorous effort on the part of Spain would have put an end to the struggle in the Provinces at any time in 1584. They had no foreign allies or assistance; they had scarcely any means of resistance in the field; they were fast losing their southern frontier; they were being undermined by treachery on all sides; they were separated into discordant units with a very feeble power of cohesion; except Holland and Zeeland, they were timid and wavering; and besides, they were torn by internal disorders. We think, therefore, that Mr. Motley is in error when he estimates their power for a contest with Spain as nearly on a par with that of England, and accuses Elizabeth and her ministers for not having hastened at once to their rescue. The truth is, that their ruin at this time appeared certain to all actors on the stage; and there is no doubt that it would have been effected, had Philip possessed any military understanding, and paid attention to Parma's counsel. At any moment in 1584 an addition of ten or twelve thousand men to the Spanish forces in Flanders and Brabant would probably have given the Provinces to Philip; nor is it surprising that all Europe considered their chance of success a chimera.

Since this was the state of the Netherland 'rebels,' as Philip and Parma called them in scorn, what was that of their mighty southern antagonist? The power of Spain was indeed enormous compared with that of the tottering Republic, nor can we doubt that, if properly used, it would soon have closed the unequal conflict. Considering, too, the condition of Europe, the disunion of Germany, and weakness of France, it followed that Philip possessed an influence which well nigh made him the arbiter of the Continent. We think, however, that Mr. Motley has