Hood moves north from the Tennessee-Thomas directs Schofield to fall back -Schofield evacuates Columbia-Hood crosses Duck river-Affair at Spring Hill-Schofield extricates his army-Battle of Franklin-Repulse of Hood-Thomas directs Schofield to retreat to Nashville-Grant disapproves this strategy-Anxiety of government-Correspondence between Grant and Thomas-Difference of views between the two commandersFirst news from Sherman-Proposed movement against mouth of Cape Fear river-Orders to Butler and Weitzel-Orders to Sheridan-Movement of Meade against Hicksford-Situation at Nashville-Thomas delays to fight-Grant gives peremptory orders-Excuses of Thomas-Grant's general supervision of armies-Butler starts in person for Fort Fisher, contrary to Grant's expectation-Further delay of Thomas-Correspondence between Grant and the government-Grant orders Thomas to be relievedSuspends the order-Starts for Nashville-Receives news of Thomas's success-Goes no further than Washington-Topography around Nashville-Dispositions of Hood and Thomas-Thomas's plan of battle-Fighting on 15th of December-Success of national movements-Battle of 16th -Rout of Hood-Pursuit of rebel army-Hood crosses Tennessee - Congratulations of Grant and the government-Further urging of ThomasThomas defends his course-News of Sherman's arrival at the coastThomas prepares to go into winter quarters-Grant makes different dispositions-Results of campaign against Nashville-Criticism of HoodBehavior of national troops-Criticism of Thomas-Justification of Grant's judgment-Temperament of Thomas-Friendly relations between Grant and Thomas-In war, nothing which is successful, is wrong.

THOMAS's plans and operations were now all dependent on the course that Hood might take when the designs of Sherman could no longer be concealed; and the forces at Florence were anxiously watched to ascertain whether the national army was to advance

into Alabama, or remain for awhile on the defensive in Tennessee. Grant's first order to Thomas after Sherman moved was typical of his character and of what was to follow. On the 13th of November, Thomas telegraphed : "Wilson reports to-night that the cavalry arms and equipments applied for some weeks since have not yet reached Louisville. Their non-arrival will delay us in preparing for the field." But it was still possible that Hood might re-cross the Tennessee, in pursuit of Sherman. In that event, not a moment must be lost; and Grant telegraphed at once: "If Hood commences falling back, it will not do to wait for the full equipment of your cavalry, to follow. He should, in that case, be pressed with such force as you can bring to bear." Thomas replied the same night: "Your telegram of this A. M. just received. Am watching Hood closely, and should he move after Sherman, I will follow with what force I can raise at hand."

Hood, however, had no idea of following Sherman. The campaign into Middle Tennessee was his own design,* and the dispositions of the national commanders appeared not in the least to disturb his plans. On the 16th of November, Sherman marched out of Atlanta, and the same day Beauregard telegraphed the news to Richmond: "Sherman is about to move with three corps from Atlanta to Augusta, or Macon, thence probably to Charleston or Savannah, where a junction may be formed with enemy's fleet." On the 19th, he announced again : Enemy are turning their columns on shortest road

66

"The plan of campaign into Middle Tennessee was correct, as originally designed by General Hood."-Beauregard's Endorsement on Hood's Report, January 9, 1865.

to Macon, and scouts. . report Fourteenth corps crossed Chattahoochee to join Sherman, giving him four corps. This information has been communicated to General Hood. It is left optional with him to divide, and reinforce Cobb [in Central Georgia], or take the offensive immediately, to relieve him." Hood chose the latter course, and Grant declared : This "seemed to me to be leading to his certain doom... Had I had the power to command both armies, I should not have changed the orders under which he seemed to be acting."

On the 21st of November, the rebel columns were in motion from the Tennessee, marching by the roads west of Pulaski, near which point Schofield was encamped. Hood evidently hoped to interpose his army between the national forces and Nashville; but Thomas divined his purpose, and at once directed Schofield to fall back from Pulaski, and concentrate in the vicinity of Columbia, so as to reach that place before the enemy. "Hood's force," he said to Grant, "is so much larger than my present available force, either in infantry or cavalry, that I shall have to act on the defensive."* His only resource, he declared, was to "retire

".. General Stanley's corps being only 12,000 effective, and General Schofield's 10,000 effective. As yet General Wilson can raise only about 3,000 effective cavalry. Grierson's division [of cavalry] is still in Missouri, and the balance of the cavalry belonging to the army of the Cumberland, not having yet received their horses and equipments, at Louisville. I have a force of about 4,000 men at Decatur and on the Memphis and Charleston railroad, which might be made available, if Decatur and that road were abandoned, but as General Sherman is very anxious to have Decatur held if possible, I have kept the force there up to this time. I will, however, if you approve, withdraw and add it to my

slowly, delaying the enemy's progress as much as possible, to gain time for reinforcements to arrive, and concentrate." The portion of the Twenty-third corps which had been left at Johnsonville was now brought rapidly up to Schofield; and as all possibility of Hood's forces following Sherman was at an end, the garrisons along the Memphis and Chattanooga railroad were called in ; but according to Thomas's invariable policy of guarding every possible point, these troops, instead of being sent to Schofield, were moved to Stevenson and Murfreesboro', still further away from the enemy. On the night of the 23rd, Schofield evacuated Pulaski, and on the 24th, he reported himself in position at Columbia. This town is on the south bank of the Duck river, which here runs from west to east, and is at the crossing of the direct road to Nashville, distant only sixty miles. About half way between Columbia and Nashville, is Franklin.

On the 24th of November, Grant returned to City Point from the North, and at four P.M. that day, he telegraphed to Thomas: "Do not let Forrest get off without punishment." Thomas replied at length, detailing his difficulties, but concluded: "The moment I can get my cavalry, I will march against Hood. If Forrest can be found, he will be punished."* On the 25th, Grant telegraphed to

main force at Columbia, and shall then be, on the arrival of General A. J. Smith with his force, as strong in infantry as the enemy; but his cavalry will greatly outnumber mine, until I can get General Wilson's force back from Louisville."-Thomas to Halleck, November 21.

"Yours of 4 P.M. yesterday just received. Hood's entire army is in front of Columbia, and so greatly outnumbers mine that I am compelled to act on the defensive. None of General Smith's

Halleck: "I think it advisable to send orders to Missouri that all the troops coming from there should receive their directions from General Thomas, and not listen to conflicting orders." These instructions were promptly carried out, and Thomas was made absolute master of all the troops within his territorial command.

corps have arrived yet, although embarked on Tuesday last. The transportation of Hatch and Grierson's cavalry was ordered by Washburne, I am told, to be turned in at Memphis, which has crippled the only cavalry I have at this time. All of my cavalry were dismounted to furnish horses to Kilpatrick's division, which went with General Sherman. My dismounted cavalry is now detained in Louisville, awaiting arms and horses. Horses arrive slowly; arms have been detained somewhere en route for more than a month. General Grierson has been delayed by conflicting orders in Kansas, and from Memphis. It is impossible to say when he will reach here.

"Since being placed in charge of affairs on Tennessee, I have lost nearly 15,000 men, discharged by expiration of service, and permitted to go North: my gain probably 12,000 perfectly raw troops; therefore as the enemy so greatly outnumbers me in both infantry and cavalry, I am compelled for the present to act on the defensive. The moment I can get my cavalry, I will march against Hood. If Forrest can be found, he will be punished."-Thomas to Grant, November 25.

When Thomas says in this despatch "all my cavalry was dismounted," etc., he must be understood as meaning all the cavalry of the original army of the Cumberland, for on this date he had a cavalry force equipped for duty, of 5,500 men. See his return of November 20.

Wilson distinctly states in his report: "All the serviceable horses of McCook's and Garrard's divisions and Colonel Garrard's brigade were turned over to the Third [Kilpatrick's] division, and every effort was made to put it upon a thoroughly efficient footing; while the dismounted men of the First and Second divisions were ordered by rail to Louisville, Kentucky, for removal and equipment." These were the only troops dismounted for Sher

man,