sented in the form in which we have given them. Modifications, greater or less, have been suggested. But we think we have given the substance of all the plans which have been proposed for the amendment of the electoral system. All of them are large reforms; but they are not alike in merit. That of preferential voting is theoretically the most perfect, and if faithfully executed would give the best representative chamber. It would compel a certain degree of deliberation before voting; would insure to two or more parties proportional representation in the Legislature, and would insure a certain degree of non-partisan representation. Whether it would prove, as has been predicted, too complicated in its working among a large constituency, can hardly be determined before actual experiment. We should fear that under it there would be opportunity for much fraudulent counting, and, while it would give to each party its proper weight in legislation, it would leave much in the power of party managers. The proxy system would give the most complete representation. The objections to it are that there would be a loss of the deficient votes; that is to say, the votes given for a candidate who could not concentrate upon himself sufficient to make a quota would be thrown away, unless a transfer to other candidates were permitted. Preferential voting avoids both the objection of too great concentration of votes upon one person and the loss of votes below the quota, since no candidate can have counted in his favor more than enough to elect him, and every vote will be counted, except the number less than a quota left after electing all of the required number of candidates. Other difficulties, however, might appear in the actual working of any of the plans which we do not now foresee.

Indeed, though we are confident that any one of them would go far to purify our elections and our legislation, we think the preference among them can only be decided by actual experiment. Some of them may be best in a large constituency, and others in a small one.

If we might choose which to begin with, and where to begin, we would try the plan of cumulative voting for members of Congress in the State of Massachusetts, and that of limited voting for aldermen in the city of New York, restricting in

the latter case each voter to one candidate. The former might require concurrent legislation of Congress and of the General Court; the latter only an act of the New York Legislature. In either case, the process would be simple enough. To begin with the Congressional election in Massachusetts, which sends ten members to the House of Representatives, and has about 200,000 voters: Every voter would give ten votes, which he might scatter among ten candidates, or cumulate them upon a less number, even upon one. The whole number of votes to be counted would be 2,000,000. Parties are divided between the Republicans and Democrats in nearly the proportion of two thirds to the former and one third to the latter, giving the Republicans about 134,000 voters and the Democrats about 66,000, though the latter have not a single member of Congress. Each party would calculate its strength beforehand, and nominate as many candidates as it was confident of electing. If the Republicans were to nominate a full ticket of ten candidates, they could give each only 134,000 votes; while the Democrats, if they nominated four candidates, could give each of them 165,000 votes. The result would be that the Republicans would nominate only seven or eight candidates, and the Democrats three or four. There would also be an opportunity for any number of voters wherever obtained throughout the State, not less than 20,000 in all, to elect their own candidate, without regard to either party. If by any chance, a most improbable one, the votes should be cumulated upon a less number of candidates than ten, a new election would have to be ordered to supply the deficiency.

Then in regard to the trial of limited voting for aldermen in the city of New York, the process should be this: supposing fifteen aldermen to be elected by general ticket, which is the scheme of the new charter just enacted by our Legislature, each voter should be limited to one candidate, and each ballot should have only one name upon it. There being about 150,000 voters in the city, every 10,000 of them, wherever residing and of whatever party, might have a representative in the chamber of aldermen. If there should happen to be a large concentration of votes upon one person, that would not be a very great evil, since it could scarcely happen that there would not be

candidates sufficient to fill the board.. If that very improbable event should come to pass, a new election would supply the deficiency. In practice, parties would probably distribute their tickets about the city in such manner as not to waste their votes. That these changes would be great improvements upon our present system, we venture to think we have already shown. If irregularities or difficulties should appear in the practical working and such are likely to occur in the introduction of any new scheme-they can be remedied afterward, as occasion offers. When once the theory of proportional representation is reduced to practice, and made familiar to the people, it will assert its superiority. If one of the methods of practical application is found imperfect, it will give way to another and better. All the plans which have been explained are kindred in general theory and in purpose. Any of them would give to a minority party a representation proportional to its numbers; and most of them would give to electors who are not partisans an opportunity of being heard and felt in representative halls. The elector would be independent of party in his choice of a candidate; and the person elected without a party nomination would be beyond the domination of nominating conventions or party managers. Even these would be put upon their good behavior, by the knowledge that their favor was not essential to the success of any person; and their candidates, being placed in competition with men independently nominated, would have to be selected with more attention to their fitness. Any person who has the confidence of a quota of electors could be elected to represent them, whatever party, or partisan tool or master, might say. No bully of the primaries, no tempter of the lobby, no hound of party, would have dominion over him.

We boast that a popular representative republican government is the best in the world. It has been already shown how far in practice we fall behind our theory. To this cause are due in no small degree the corruptions, gross and monstrous, which oppress us. We have saved the life of the nation in its struggle with slavery and rebellion. We have now to save it from another enemy more subtile and not less formidable, official and electoral corruption. There is no time to be lost. Let us begin at once.

THE ELECTORAL VOTES OF 1876.

WHO SHOULD COUNT THEM, WHAT SHOULD BE COUNTED, AND THE REMEDY FOR A WRONG COUNT.

Pamphlet by Mr. Field, published in January, 1877.

THE electoral votes of 1876 have been cast. The certificates are now in Washington, or on their way thither, to be kept by the President of the Senate until their seals are broken in February. The certificates and the votes of thirty-four of the States are undisputed. The remaining four are debatable, and questions respecting them have arisen, upon the decision of which depends the election of the incoming President. These questions are: Who are to count the votes; what votes are to be counted; and what is the remedy for a wrong count? I hope not to be charged with presumption if, in fulfilling my duty as a citizen, I do what I can toward the answering of these questions aright; and, though I happen to contribute nothing toward satisfactory answers, I shall be excused for making the effort.

The questions themselves have no relation to the relative merits of the two candidates. Like other voters, I expressed my own preference on the morning of the election. That duty is discharged; another duty supervenes, which is, to take care that my vote is counted and allowed its due place in the summary of the votes. Otherwise, the voting performance becomes ridiculous, and the voter deserves to be laughed at for his pains. His duty-to cast his vote according to his conscience-was clear; it is no less his duty to make the vote felt, along with other like votes, according to the laws.

The whole duty of a citizen is not ended when his vote is delivered; there remains the obligation to watch it until it is duly weighed, in adjusting the preponderance of the general choice. Whatever may be the ultimate result of the count, whether his candidate will have lost or won, is of no impor

tance compared with the maintenance of justice and the supremacy of law over the preferences and passions of men.

It concerns the honor of the nation that fraud shall not prevail or have a chance of prevailing. If a fraudulent count is possible, it is of little consequence how my vote or the votes of others be cast; for the supreme will is not that of the honest voter, but of the dishonest counter; and, when fraud succeeds, or is commonly thought to have succeeded, the public conscience, shocked at first, becomes weakened by acquiescence; and vice, found to be profitable, soon comes to be triumphant. It is of immeasurable importance, therefore, that we should not only compose the differences that, unfortunately, have arisen, but compose them upon a basis right in itself and appearing to be right also.

WHO SHOULD COUNT THE VOTES?

This is the first question. What is meant by counting? In one sense, it is only enumeration, an arithmetical operation, which in the present instance consists of addition and subtraction. In another sense, it involves segregation, separation of the false from the true. If a hundred coins are thrown upon a banker's counter, and his clerk is told to count the good ones, he has both to select and to enumerate. He takes such as he finds sufficient in metal and weight, and rejects the light and counterfeit. So when the Constitution ordains that "the votes shall then be counted," it means that the true ones shall be counted, which involves the separation of the true from the false, if there be present both false and true. In regard to the agency by which this double process is to be performed, the words of the Constitution are few: "The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates, and the votes shall then be counted." What would one take to be the meaning of these words, reading them for the first time? It is, that somebody besides the President of the Senate is to count, because, if he was to be the counting officer, the language would naturally have been that the President of the Senate shall open all the certificates and count the votes. There must have been a reason for this change of phraseology. It should seem to follow,