It is objected, however, that there are certain officers which, for special reasons, should be remunerated by fees, as for example the sheriff, for, so runs the pretense, his liabilities are great, and the country is not responsible for them. What reason is this? The sheriff assumes the office of his own free-will. If the salary, when balanced against the liability, does not offer a sufficient inducement to accept the place, he has only to refrain. There can be no doubt that good men can be found sufficient for the due execution of the office. The officer has it in his power always to require indemnity before acting in doubtful cases. His liability may last a great while, no doubt; so may the liability of the collector of the port, but that is no reason, in the opinion of Congress, why the collector should not be compensated as now by a salary, instead of fees as formerly.

But would you have the sheriff's, or clerk's, or register's services performed for private parties without requiring these parties to pay for them? Perhaps not, but I would require the sums paid to be transferred to the Treasury. How will you make sure that the sums are truly accounted for? The question implies a distrust of official honesty which is, perhaps, justified by the frequent breaches of trust. Dishonesty, however, is not universal, nor do I think that it is general. Whatever there is of it can be provided against. I suggest a series of stamps. For example, a stamp might be required on every summons for the commencement of an action, and on every execution or other process, and on every deed left for record, and on every requisition for a search.

The last of the rules with which I started requires that such compensation shall be given to the person employed as he would have obtained in other employments. As a general rule, this would be just to him and just to the public. I say as a general rule, for there may be exceptional cases, as when one has been taken into a public office, and has special qualifications, which there was no room to exercise in his previous employment. I can imagine such a case, however unfrequently it may occur. A person may possibly have such a peculiar aptitude for a special work that his services may be invaluable, while, at the same time, he may be unfitted for another employment, and, of course, unable to obtain other compensation;

but as a general rule I think the one I have given is the true one. Public officers are but agents and trustees of the public, and have no right, moral or legal, to give more for public service than they would have given for the like service for themselves. And those who enter public employment must know that, when they receive more than an equivalent for their services, they become participants in public robbery. The temptations to get into the service are great enough, without adding to them the inducement of better pay than can be got elsewhere.

The government should take from the people only what is necessary for its support. Then giving a person employed more than he could get in other employments produces an unjust competition with these employments; and giving more than can be obtained elsewhere creates a pressure upon those who have the offices to fill to force into them more persons than are necessary to the service.

There is a constant struggle to make the government do something which an individual would not do for himself in like circumstances, as, for example, to make it pay more for the same work, or the same price for less work.

A great deal is said about the eight-hour rule. It would, indeed, be well if men could support themselves on eight hours' work. I wish every man could do it. I wish I was not obliged to work more than that number of hours myself. In a society brought up to the ideal standard, I believe that less than this would be sufficient for all necessary labor. But we are not living in such a society; ours is one of diversified employments, differing in their productions, in which each person is free to engage as he pleases. It is inevitable that some should gain more than others, and hence inequality begins the moment all begin work. Every man competes with some other man; every laborer with another laborer. In this competition time is an element, as well as strength and skill; and, when the latter are equal, time wins. He who rises earlier than his competitor, and works more hours within the limits of healthful endurance, will carry off the prize. This would be the result in every community where labor is free. A law which prohibits a laborer from working more than eight hours a day is an infringement upon his freedom; and so, a law which com

mands the employer to pay the price of ten hours' work for eight is an infringement upon his freedom also. The consequence is that men in their private transactions must be left to regulate for themselves the time as well as the price of service. The Government stands and must stand in this respect on the footing of an individual; otherwise, it violates the fundamental rule by paying its servants more than they could get in other employments.

It is assumed that workingmen want such a discrimination against the government, and politicians therefore think that they will commend themselves to the people by promoting it. But, if the workingmen would reflect that every dollar that the government pays more than an individual would pay, is so much unnecessary expense, the burden of which falls on workingmen not less than on others, they would be slow to ask for or even tolerate the discrimination. Every public expense is borne at last by the consumer, so that the workingman who demands the price of ten hours' for eight hours' work would in fact make the government pay one fifth more for his labor than an individual would pay, and this fifth must fall on the shoulders of his fellow-workingmen in proportion to their numbers. The man who lives in the poorest tenement-house, barely able to pay the rent, and feed and clothe his children, pays in fact a share of every excessive salary, and of all other unnecessary expenses of government.

My reason for touching upon this question is, that it is intimately connected with the larger question we are discussing, and involves the true theory of government. Every dollar paid by the government of the city, State, or nation, comes out of our pockets directly or indirectly. No man can escape the payment who hires a house or a room, or wears a coat, or eats a meal. It is not the landlord, it is not the rich man, that pays the taxes in the long-run, but he who eats, drinks, wears clothes, or finds shelter. All the citizens, then, rich and poor alike, have an interest in reducing the public burdens to the lowest practicable limit. It is forgetfulness of these rules which has led to so much wasteful expenditure. For the sake of catching soldiers' votes, the last Congress voted away millions, and some say a hundred millions, to pay what it did not owe; but it forgot

that every dollar paid was levied in part upon the poorest man in the land. No wonder that municipalities and administrative officers are spendthrifts, after the examples set before them!

In political science there are two schools: one, which teaches that the State should do the least possible; and the other, that it should do the most. This club, no doubt, belongs to the former, and with reason, as I think. The province of the State is to protect rights, or, as it has been sometimes expressed, to keep the peace. We hold, as self-evident truths, that men have unalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and that "to secure these rights governments are instituted among men." To spend money, to extract it from the people, that it may be spent for other objects, is as contrary to the principle we profess as it is ruinous in consequences.

It is not the business of government to take care of the people. The people must and will take care of themselves. This is the law of nature, which is the law of God. Suppose the government were to undertake to furnish this city with provisions; to procure from land and sea and distribute the meats, fish, vegetables-what sort of a purveyor would it make? The provisioning of an army is one of the hardest tasks of military administration. What sane man would undertake to furnish this city with its food for a month? And yet the natural laws which govern our instincts and appetites bring to our door all the necessaries of life month by month and year by year.

It is not my purpose to go further into details of salaries or wages. I limit myself to the rules according to which these details should be arranged. Whether the price paid to this person or to that is excessive, I will not undertake further to inquire. It may be instructive, however, to compare the cost of the police of London and Paris with that of New York.

The pay of a London policeman is about twenty-four shillings a week; and the police of Paris, consisting of a force of 7,756 agents, including 6,800 common policemen, costs 12,168,850 francs (about $2,433,770), exclusive of equipments, and an indemnity of 185 francs to each policeman for lodging. Whether these figures furnish any guide here I will not undertake to say. It is enough to say that every rule that I have sought to prove is violated here.

We do not employ the best men; we employ more men than are necessary to do the work required; we employ many of them for uncertain terms of service, and at unfixed rates of compensation; we have a system of fees for the most coveted places; and we give a higher compensation in a great many instances than the persons compensated could obtain in other employments. And yet reform is not difficult if the will be not lacking; or rather, I should say, if we could have the concerted will of a few disinterested persons, the reform might be secured. It certainly is for the interest of the whole community that it should be brought about, and I am confident that a majority may be made to think so. When there is once an agreement in opinion upon that point, there will not be much difficulty in finding a way to convert the opinion into action; for we know that where there is a will there is a way.

I will venture to indicate one of the ways. Fix the limit of expenditure in every department or subdivision of a department, and tell the officers in charge that if they do not perform the service and by performing I mean well performing-they must give way to others. For example, I would set apart a sum sufficient, in the judgment of the best experts, for cleaning the streets, and I would then say to the officials having the matter in charge, "If you do not keep the streets clean, you must retire and let others try "—and so on, until the work is done, or the doing of it is found to be impossible. Every department and every subdivision of a department should be subjected to this trial, even those which are supposed to be best conducted. Taking, for instance, the Department of Education, I would see whether it does not cost more than it need. In round numbers the annual cost is $3,500,000, and the number of scholars about 120,000; that is, the education of each scholar is nearly thirty dollars a year. I mention this department, because it is the one for which the people appear to have the most affection, and which they think is the least mismanaged.

Other departments there are which need the unsparing hand and iron will of the reformer. I hope that the members of this club have many such, and that they may find in what I have here said something to invite them to begin the work, which they can not begin too soon.